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Introduction
While international migration involves human mobility across political 
borders, it also encompasses multiple, layered and complex temporalities. 
Recently, migration scholars have begun to unpack the temporalities at stake 
in modes of governing migration (McNevin & Missbach, 2018; Tazzioli, 
2018), and how complex temporalities and discrepancies shape migration 
experiences and practices (Mavroudi et  al., 2017; Barber & Lem, 2018). 
Scholars have also importantly drawn attention to how temporal frames 
inform different conceptualisation and understandings within migration 
scholarship (Çağlar, 2016; Ramsay, 2019a). Foregrounding temporality 
as an analytical lens can provide critical new knowledge about the socio- 
cultural dynamics of contemporary migration. Considerable advances have 
been made, but there is, we argue in this volume, a need to develop more 
conceptually robust approaches to time and temporality. While the mutual 
imbrication of time and space is crucial to acknowledge, we insist on a thor-
oughgoing temporal gaze as necessary to destabilising the dominance of 
spatial understandings of migration in anthropology and beyond.
This edited volume focuses on the form of migration that tends to be la-
belled irregular, or sometimes undocumented or ‘illegal.’ These terms refer 
to people who enter or dwell on state territory without formal authorisation, 
and comprise a wide range of situations, including those who remain on 
state territory after having overstayed their visa, having had their residency 
revoked or asylum application rejected or never having applied for residency 
or asylum. While some scholars have criticised the term ‘irregular migrant’ 
for becoming dangerously broad (Kubal, 2013), others have proposed what 
they see as more flexible and inclusive terms such as precarious migratory sta-
tus (Goldring et al., 2009) and liminal legality (Menjívar, 2006). The bound-
ary between ‘regular’ and ‘irregular’ in particular socio-historical contexts 
can often be overlapping, fluid and contextual. This is the case notably with 
the categories of asylum seekers and refugees and that of undocumented mi-
grants. The widespread dichotomisation of these categories reflects regimes 
of power and interest as well as assumptions about individual agency or the 
lack thereof (Yarris & Castaneda, 2015), inscribed on bodies with long and 
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complex migration histories, often involving both political and economic 
violence and hardship. Furthermore, the broad spectrum of irregularity is 
not confined only to the non-citizen, and citizens may also sometimes get 
caught up in the deportation apparatus and become deportable ‘irregular 
citizens’ (Nyers, 2018).
Notwithstanding the challenges of terminology and different uses in the 
chapters of this edited volume, they all speak about migrants whose pres-
ence on state territory is somehow contested and/or legally precarious. In 
approaching such contested and precarious legal statuses, we are informed 
by the anthropological literature on the socio-legal production of ‘migrant 
illegality.’ In a landmark article published in the Annual Review of Anthro-
pology in 2002, De Genova argued that it is insufficient to examine the ‘il-
legality’ of undocumented migration only in terms of its consequences and 
that it is necessary also to pay attention to the historically situated socio- 
legal production of migrant ‘illegality.’ In this volume the temporal dimen-
sion is accordingly discussed not only in terms of its consequences, such as 
the prolonged periods of waiting that are produced by contemporary border 
regimes, but also in terms of the role of time in processes of illegalisation 
or irregularisation in particular socio-historical contexts. Rather than ap-
proaching ‘irregular migrants’ as a generalised category, the volume aims 
to situate the analysis within distinct configurations of ‘illegality’ that are 
constituted within particular regimes of migration control (De Genova, 
2002), but also in everyday life beyond legal codes, government policies and 
bureaucratic apparatuses (Coutin, 2003).
Engaging with the literature on time and migration, this volume zooms 
in on the question of waiting. In both research and public debate, there has 
been a proliferation of representations of refugees, asylum seekers and ir-
regular migrants waiting in refugee camps, asylum reception and detention 
centres and at border crossings. In their fieldwork, ethnographers have in-
creasingly encountered temporal insecurity and conflicts in time, as a cru-
cial element of migrants’ experiences of (im)mobility and inequality. While 
some works have analysed waiting as a significant facet of (im)mobility 
(e.g. Vigh, 2009; Conlon, 2011; Anderson, 2014), waiting needs to be further 
explored as a particular engagement in, and with, time in migration. In com-
bination with theories on time and temporality, we approach waiting both 
as a social phenomenon that proliferates in irregular migration and as an 
analytical perspective on migration processes and practices. According to 
Hage (2009a: p. 5), the analytical power of waiting derives precisely from its 
capacity to highlight previously overshadowed features of a social process 
or practice. Waiting as an analytical lens offers new insights into the com-
plex and shifting nature of processes of bordering, belonging, state power, 
exclusion and inclusion, and social relations in irregular migration. Waiting 
is not only produced and experienced within such complex and shifting pro-
cesses, it is in itself productive, and contributes to the production of migrant 
‘illegality’ or ‘irregularity.’
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A challenge for research into temporalities in irregular migration is to 
make explicit and explain the temporal entanglements, shifts and relations 
between multiple forms of waiting (Hage, 2018). Waiting in migration can in-
clude both quotidian forms of waiting, including waiting for public services 
and bureaucratic decisions, and more prolonged and open-ended forms of 
waiting, for regularisation, justice and uncertain futures. Dwyer (2009) de-
scribes these two forms of waiting as ‘situational’ and ‘existential,’ with the 
former being a reaction to things or events, and the latter an embodied state 
of being. He cautions, though, of mistaking this analytical tool for the terri-
tory it tries to map. As he points out: ‘There is no fixed line that separates sit-
uational and existential waiting. There is, instead, a personally experienced, 
and context-dependent, threshold’ (Dwyer, 2009: p. 25). The entanglement 
between situational and existential forms of waiting is something that runs 
through the chapters in this volume. While some of the situational forms of 
waiting are specific to migration, existential waiting in the form that Vigh 
(2008) calls ‘chronic waiting’ is arguably a constitutive practice of globali-
sation and central to the post-colonial experience as such (Bayart, 2007). 
Increasing precarisation contributes to spreading ‘existential stuckedness’ 
also to previously more privileged groups and regions (Hage, 2009b). Such 
conceptualisations of existential waiting destabilise neat partitions between 
citizens and migrants, and raise questions about historical, social and cul-
tural specificities of waiting. What is the relation between subjective experi-
ences and macro structures of waiting? And, particularly for the purpose of 
this edited volume, are there specific migratory forms of waiting?
A key concern in this volume is to contribute to the development of more 
theoretically robust approaches to waiting and migration, focusing on how 
temporal structures related to irregular migration are shaped by legal re-
gimes, cultural norms and power relationships, as well as on how they are 
encountered, incorporated and resisted by migrants. As we will detail more 
later, we contribute to the existing literature by pushing further the under-
standing of the multiple temporalities of waiting, the relations between such 
temporalities and the normativities they involve. Chapters address ques-
tions of how waiting is worked on, and differentially experienced, at the 
intersection of multiple temporalities and social positions, tracing thus the 
social and relational contours of power in its temporal form. Paying atten-
tion to how migration regimes and geopolitical borders consign migrants 
to waiting, the chapters investigate the chronopolitics – or politics of time – 
involved in waiting and irregular migration.
Waiting as an analytical lens – what’s at stake?
One of the analytical difficulties posed by the notion of waiting is its in-
clusiveness. ‘Waiting’ spans not only an array of experiential phenomena 
(Hook, 2015) but is also related to diverse affects ranging from anticipation, 
desire, hope, urgency, doubt, uncertainty, anxiety, boredom, dread, anger, to 
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shame and apathy (Bandak & Janeja, 2018). Several important and insight-
ful contributions have been published on waiting in recent years, includ-
ing ethnographies of youth in India (Jeffrey, 2010), of welfare recipients in 
 Argentina (Auyero, 2012), of hope and the future in urban Ethiopia (Mains, 
2012) and of contemporary Iranian life (Khosravi, 2017). Edited collections 
by Hage (2009a), Dalsgaard et al. (2014), Vidal and Musset (2016), Pecheny 
and Palumbo (2017) and Bandak and Janeja (2018) have shed new light on 
how analysis of waiting can enhance the understanding of phenomena as 
diverse as capitalist modernity, neoliberal economic restructuring, love and 
gendered sexualities, white nationalism and ethnographic fieldwork. These 
volumes highlight waiting as a prominent feature of modern everyday life, 
to the extent that its familiarity and pervasiveness has meant that it is hard 
to pin down analytically and tends to be taken for granted in academic re-
search. There is also, we argue, an acute need for greater awareness of how 
waiting, as a social and temporal practice, is represented and replicated in 
migration research. What does it mean to approach irregularised migration 
through the lens of waiting?
This book emerged from a 4-year interdisciplinary research project called 
Waiting for an uncertain future: The temporalities of irregular migration, 
or simply WAIT. One particular concern and recurrent discussion in the 
project, and with the larger group contributing to this book, was how to 
deal with the often tacit normativities implied in the concept of waiting. As 
 Rozakou (2020: p. 25) poignantly asks in her chapter in this volume: 
Is this scholarly emphasis on the migrant condition of waiting just the 
reflection of an empirical reality encountered in checkpoints, detention 
centres, asylum courts, and immigration bureaucracies? Or does it risk 
replicating a specific understanding of migrant temporalities that is 
produced by the migration regime?
Rozakou’s questions draw on insights from scholars who have increasingly 
begun to problematise the exceptionality often attached to migrants in 
migration studies and how this is entangled with discourses that normal-
ise migration-related differences and certain, often exceptional, modes of 
governance (Anderson, 2013; Dahinden, 2016; Ramsay, 2019b). Migration 
researchers risk reinforcing a logic of otherness when characterising mi-
grants as people who occupy a distinct temporality related to their migra-
tion status (Çağlar, 2016). As Ramsay (2019a: p. 20) argues: ‘We deny the 
coevalness of refugees by describing them as “stuck” in the present and 
ignoring the ways in which they share particular temporal rhythms with 
other people.’ Ramsay (2019b) criticises in particular the tendency to an-
alyse ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ as a distinct category of experience that is 
defined by lives lived in ‘crisis,’ which does not reflect the contemporary 
reality of how precarisation, stemming from the expansive effects of global 
capitalism, has made ‘crisis’ the norm in many contexts. Ramsay’s critique 
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thus draws attention to the difference between understanding irregular-
ised migrants’ waiting as exceptional, or as emblematic of a more pervasive 
 experiences of precarity caused by contemporary configurations of neolib-
eral capitalism. 
The tendency to portray irregularised migrants’ waiting as exceptional 
relates to how their condition of politico-legal exclusion is often concep-
tualised as a form of protracted in-between time through concepts such as 
liminality and limbo. In much migration research, these concepts are used 
to communicate a sense of temporal disjuncture, suspension and stagna-
tion. The concept of liminality, as theorised initially by Arnold van Gennep 
(1909/1960) and Victor Turner (1967), refers to the position of being effec-
tively betwixt and between categories of classification and has, as such, eas-
ily lent itself to analysis of migrants that do not fit into the categorical order 
of the nation-state system (Malkki, 1995; Menjivar, 2006; Brun & Fábos, 
2015). Yet, the concept rests on the idea of a passage, thus problematically 
implying a temporal linearity where the subject is, or should be, reincorpo-
rated into a particular normative social structure.
The term limbo is Latin for ‘in or on the edge or border’ and was initially 
introduced by Christian theologians to describe a state or place in the af-
terlife for souls who deserved neither salvation nor damnation. Sometimes 
it was thought of as the waiting room to Purgatory (Capps & Carlin, 2010). 
In more recent times, limbo is used to refer more generally to an interme-
diate and indeterminate state of confinement, abandonment and oblivion. 
Although limbo tends to be used more as a metaphor than as an analytical 
concept in studies of irregularised migrants, it risks giving an impression of 
a locked and consequently static situation in which people wait passively for 
a better life (Brun & Fábos, 2015; Hightower, 2015).
A key challenge with concepts such as limbo, liminality and waiting is 
their simultaneous vernacular and theoretical usages. Ethnographic stud-
ies, including chapters in this volume, have extensively and forcefully doc-
umented how refugees, asylum seekers and other irregularised migrants 
consider themselves in a state of limbo, liminality or as waiting. Yet, there is 
a challenge when such experiences are conflated with theoretical conceptu-
alizations of limbo and liminality (Ramsay, 2019a). Such conflation not only 
reinforces perceptions of migrants as people ‘out of time’ with others but 
also rests on the assumption that the ‘normal’ life of citizens is secure and 
stable. Moreover, by positioning reinsertion into a system of national iden-
tification as the solution, such conceptualisation can inadvertently reify the 
national configuration of society, or what Malkki (1995) has aptly termed 
the ‘national order of things.’
In this volume, we seek carefully to avoid reproducing or naturalising 
assumptions about the nation-state. How waiting as an analytical lens is 
susceptible to the practice of methodological nationalism in ethnographic 
work, that is the implicit acceptance of the territorial nation-state as the 
natural model of society, is explored explicitly in Drangsland’s chapter in 
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this book. She does this through a commendable exercise in self-reflexivity 
regarding her own embeddedness as researcher in the normalisation dis-
course of the migration apparatus. Reflecting on her attempt to reassure a 
distressed interlocutor, she shows how the state assumed the position as the 
redemptive endpoint to waiting.
Our concern regarding the normativities associated with the concept of 
waiting, though, extends beyond questions of exceptionality and methodo-
logical nationalism, to consider how waiting is deeply enmeshed in modern 
conceptions about linear time and progress. This is a challenge also when 
approaching waiting as emblematic of more pervasive experiences of pre-
carity that are the effect of contemporary configurations of neoliberal capi-
talism. In modern societies, time is associated with success and money, and 
approached in terms of how it most efficiently can be used (Eriksen, 2001). 
In this context, waiting symbolises waste, emptiness and uselessness. A fo-
cus on waiting in irregular migration may thus unwittingly reinforce im-
ages of migrants as unproductive ‘human waste’ (Baumann, 2004). There 
is a need to further problematise the gender, sexual, class, and racialised 
norms that are, often implicitly, found in ideas about lives put on hold, be it 
from particular life cycle expectations or expectations of productivity and 
development. The literature that examines ‘waithood’ (Honwana, 2013) as a 
prolonged suspension period in the transition from childhood to adulthood, 
for instance, risks reifying the gendered and heteronormative assumptions 
underpinning such expected life-courses if the gendered norms and power 
structures at play are not addressed as part of the analysis. Similarly, con-
cepts such as liminality and limbo do not only position reinsertion into the 
national order as the solution but also the reincorporation of the subject into 
the roles and rhythms of supposedly ‘normal’ social life. The authors in this 
volume seek to acknowledge migrants’ experiences of having their lives put 
on hold without re-inscribing gendered, sexual, classed or racialised norma-
tivities. Rather than taking the normative times of capitalism, nationalism 
and the family for granted (Halberstam, 2005) and seeing irregular migrants 
as outside of or excluded from them, we pay attention to how ‘waiting’ may 
serve instead to open a space for new subjectivities and relations. 
When we started working on the WAIT project and this volume we con-
sidered proposing the concept of ‘waitinghood’ as a ‘thinking tool’ through 
which to articulate and explore the complexity of constructed, contested 
and performed temporalities involved in ‘migratory waiting.’ Adding the 
suffix ‘hood’ was meant to introduce a space for thinking analytically about 
waiting, beyond the ubiquitousness of waiting as a mundane act that perme-
ates society. Moreover, we hoped to capture the significant tangible, as well 
as discursive characteristics of waiting in the context of migration. Beyond 
the mere awkwardness of the concept, we acknowledged however the poten-
tial difficulties related to the use of the suffix of -hood. ‘Hood’ as a suffix is 
used in an amazing number of ways, but it most often works to form con-
cepts that presuppose some sort of imagined community or temporally and/
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or spatially delimited category to which people do (not) belong, or might 
(not) enter/leave (see Snitow, 1992; Kanno & Norton, 2003). Furthermore, 
these are often based on gendered, classed and racialised imaginaries. As 
Drangsland (2017) argues, ‘hood,’ as a word-forming element, thus risks 
naturalising something as an objective fact of life, in this case irregular mi-
grants as ‘people who wait.’ Instead of proposing a new concept, we decided 
to remain alert to the concerns regarding the implicit normativities of wait-
ing, in its vernacular as well as academic use, when carefully unpacking 
ethnographies of waiting as configured in specific legal, material and socio- 
cultural situations. In what follows, we also propose two ways to further 
develop waiting as a robust analytical lens in migration studies. Our first 
contribution is to conceptualise waiting as constituted in and through mul-
tiple and relational temporalities. Our second contribution is to highlight 
the significance of the geopolitical and chronopolitical locations of waiting.
Waiting as multiple and relational
Through ethnographic and theoretical explorations of waiting in migration, 
this volume can be situated within the ‘temporal turn’ in the social sciences. 
Social theories of time and temporality have importantly highlighted how 
time is multifaceted and complex, consisting of multiple, uneven and en-
tangled temporalities (Adam, 1998; Bear, 2014, 2016; Sharma, 2014). In this 
volume, authors seek to move beyond a mere catalogisation or typologisa-
tion of the temporal dimensions of migration to critically investigate the 
temporal hierarchies and relations that are embedded in various migration 
and border regimes, as well as the technologies that connect and synchro-
nise multiple temporalities and power relations. Chapters address the co- 
existence, entanglements and relation between forms of waiting, and how 
different forms of waiting are shaped by multiple temporalities in migration 
processes and control. This is amongst other done through an analysis of 
structural elements of time such as duration, tempo, timing, sequence and 
directionality.
Waiting as a temporal phenomenon is too often not unpacked beyond 
general assumptions about stasis, suspension, emptiness and slowness. Tak-
ing temporal complexities seriously, we contend, involves attending to the 
relations between social framings of time (including abstract measures of 
time and routines associated with state bureaucracy, capitalist production, 
social reproduction and cultural norms) and human experiences of time, as 
well as between the different tempos, paces and rhythms associated with 
different practices. Several chapters in this volume focus on the relationship 
between the slowness often associated with waiting and ‘acceleration’ of 
tempo. These do not interrogate waiting merely as an opposed secondary re-
lation to or residual product of acceleration, but rather show how the inter-
play between multiple tempos produces and shapes situations of waiting in 
irregular migration. In Rozakou’s chapter, an ‘accelerated’ influx of refugees 
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during the ‘long summer of migration’ in Greece creates new configurations 
of hasting and waiting. Whereas in the case discussed by Rozakou acceler-
ation brings about a loss of temporal control and a reshaping of the rhythm 
at the border, Jacobsen analyses acceleration in French migration policies 
as a form of temporal control to which migrants must recalibrate. Eriksen, 
focusing on how the smartphone frames waiting in particular ways, argues 
that it may also function as an antidote to waiting by accelerating commu-
nication and social connectivity, thereby filling temporal gaps which would 
otherwise have been left empty.
Waiting can also be explored as particular relation or orientation to the 
past, present and/or future. The nature of these temporal relations or orien-
tations, though, might vary. So far, most literature has tended to conceptu-
alise waiting as a temporal orientation towards the future. It is, according 
to Bissell (2007: p. 282), the promise of ‘the event-to-come’ or ‘the not-yet’ 
that is seen to bring about the experience of waiting. Crapanzano (1985), in 
his influential ethnography of white South Africans during the last days of 
Apartheid, foregrounds the future orientation of waiting as inducing a pa-
ralysis where the present slips away, and meaning can only be found in the 
future or ‘in the arrival or the non-arrival of the object of waiting’ (Crapan-
zano, 1985: p. 44). Drawing on Bourdieu (2000), Jeffrey (2010) also connects 
waiting to a loss of a sense of a viable future. He understands waiting as 
produced primarily by a breakdown between the expectations that are built 
into the habitus and the probabilities that are built into the social field. As 
such, he draws attention to how past experiences and upbringing as well 
as the spread globally of linear progressive time through the colonial and 
postcolonial project of ‘development’ produce waiting among unemployed 
lower middle-class young men in India, who continue to study for years un-
able to access public sector jobs. Bissell (2007), however, has warned that 
a means–end, purposive conceptualisation of waiting risks uncritically to 
reduce waiting to empty or dead time.
Scholarship on irregular migration has also to a large extent related ex-
istential or chronic waiting to an experience of the future being foreclosed. 
The lack of legal status is seen to constrain peoples’ ability to make long-
term plans and to imagine their future. What this means for migrants’ 
relation to the present though seems to be ambiguous. While some have 
described waiting in temporal terms such as timeless or endless present 
(Griffiths, 2014), lack of meanwhileness and being out of sync (Griffiths 
et al., 2013), and associate waiting with a sense of waste (Haas, 2018), others 
have conceptualised migrant illegality as an enforced orientation towards 
the present (De Genova, 2002). In the latter form, the uncertainty over the 
future is seen to produce an overly powerful present, rather than the present 
being relegated to a context for realising the future.
Several chapters in this volume critically interrogate the temporal direc-
tionality of waiting. Problematising future-oriented conceptualisations of 
waiting, Drangsland warns in her chapter of how waiting as an analytical 
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lens can lend itself to a reductive reading of migrants’ lives. She suggests 
that by trying to reassure her interlocutor by proposing vocational train-
ing as a pathway out of irregularity, she configured waiting’s now as a ‘not 
yet’ of a particularly awaited future. She was thus not sufficiently attuned 
to the complexity and heterogeneity of her interlocutor’s ‘now.’ This ‘now’ 
should be conceptualised as a constellation of interrelations that are biolog-
ical, material, legal and affective, and imbued with relations of power, she 
argues. Drawing on fieldwork among so-called long-staying rejected asylum 
seekers in Norway, Karlsen explores endurance or ‘waiting out’ as a particu-
lar way of inhabiting the temporal category of waiting that emphasises liv-
ing through the present conditions rather than focusing on finding pathways 
to a desired future. ‘Waiting out’ denotes here both the affects and practices 
that allow people to persevere under unfavourable conditions, and a mode 
of governing the self in times of crisis that works by positioning waiting as 
something that can be done well or badly (Hage, 2009b; Povinelli, 2011).
How temporal disjunctures or irregularities are produced through immi-
gration laws and enforcement is another central theme explored. In Schultz’s 
chapter, she demonstrates how the turn towards more temporary protection 
has unsettled the concept of asylum in Europe. Rather than functioning as 
a supplementary or exceptional response, temporary policies now infiltrate 
the mainstream practice of refugee law and thereby refigure refugees’ future 
imaginaries. The ‘final’ decision on refugee status as a much-anticipated end 
to waiting, Schultz argues, is replaced by prolonged uncertainty concerning 
permission to remain in the country of refuge, reinforcing the ‘invisibility, 
immobility, uncertainty and arbitrariness’ associated with chronic waiting 
(Khosravi, 2014). Uncertainty related to temporariness is also produced by 
the massive South African deportation campaigns, described by Machinya 
in his contribution. Machinya argues that migration control in the form 
of deportation campaigns simultaneously accentuates undocumented mi-
grants’ sense of deportability and plunges them into a profound state of 
‘temporal irregularity’ in which they regard arrest and deportation as in-
evitable but are unsure of when and how this will materialise. His analysis 
shows how undocumented Zimbabwean migrants lived in constant anticipa-
tion of expulsion, and how the affective state of anticipatory preparedness 
prevents migrants’ from making durable investments. The importance of 
affects such as anticipation, anxiety, uncertainty but also desire, hope and 
urgency rings through in several of the books’ chapters.
The temporal architectures of waiting
The literature on waiting in relation to migration has so far tended to be 
ethnographically oriented and framed by a phenomenological approach, 
focusing on the ways in which time is experienced and lived (Barber & Lem, 
2018). While much of this phenomenological literature approaches waiting 
as a way of experiencing (state) power, how waiting is produced by legal 
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regimes, cultural norms and power relationships remains under- explored. 
Rather than seeing waiting simply as a practice unfolding in time, or a 
particular experience of time, the authors in this volume investigate (eth-
nographically, theoretically and from a legal perspective) how practices re-
lated to migration, bordering and migration control produce waiting as a 
temporal phenomenon. As Jacobsen suggests in her chapter, complex com-
positions of laws, built environments, services and technologies structure 
the time of irregular migrants and asylum seekers, and produce time–spaces 
and experiences of waiting. Paying attention to such ‘temporal architec-
tures’ (Sharma, 2014), authors in this volume carefully account not only for 
how waiting is experienced by migrants but also for how it is relationally 
configured in different settings, for different groups of migrants and over 
time, in particular geopolitical and chronopolitical locations.
One attempt to develop a more systematic analysis of how ‘the condi-
tion of migrant illegality’ is configured in different settings is Willen’s (2007) 
‘critical phenomenology.’ This critical phenomenological approach involves 
a three-dimensional model of illegality: First, as a form of juridical status; 
second, as a socio-political condition; and third, as a mode of being-in-the-
world. Though not necessarily taking a phenomenological approach as a 
point of departure, the analyses of waiting proposed in this volume span the 
three dimensions identified by Willen. Irregularity is above all a product of 
law, and the volume aims to deepen the understanding of how refugee and 
immigration laws establish and sustain particular forms of waiting. By ex-
ploring temporal tension within and between laws, and between ‘legal time’ 
and other forms of time, chapters in this volume critically build on and ex-
tend insights from the anthropological literature on the socio-legal produc-
tion of migrant illegality (De Genova, 2002, 2004; Coutin, 2003). Several 
chapters specifically trace legal productions of waiting, be it in the context 
of unaccompanied minors in France waiting to be assigned a legal age in 
Musso’s chapter, migrants held in indefinite detention in De Genova’s chap-
ter, or, in Schultz’ chapter, refugees put in a prolonged temporary situation 
due to the return-turn in Norwegian migration policies.
Alongside the legal and administrative production of waiting, capital-
ism manipulates time in the production of global inequalities. While most 
chapters are concerned predominantly with temporalities associated with 
the bordering and migration control of states, they also acknowledge the 
importance of political economy and capitalism as a powerful structuring 
of time and waiting in contemporary societies. As Hage notes, ‘[t]here is a 
political economy of waiting, not least because “time is money” and wait-
ing can be a waste of time’ (Hage, 2009a: p. 3). The political economy of 
migrants’ waiting has also been discussed in relation to the reproduction of 
the exploitable workforce required by capitalist economies. In his previous 
work, De Genova (2013) has argued that refugee camps and detention cen-
tres serve the function of either containing surplus labour or releasing work-
ers intermittently and under conditions that make workers more exploitable. 
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Such containment also creates conditions for not-detained migrants’ inclu-
sion in the workforce as cheap, docile and disposable labour (De Genova, 
2013; Tsianos & Karakayali, 2010). In his chapter in this volume, De Genova 
draws attention to how tactics of precaritisation – here in the form of one’s 
susceptibility to being indefinitely detained – contribute to the creation and 
maintenance of migration as a reliable, mobile, flexible and ultimately dis-
posable source of labour-power (cf. De Genova, 2018; Golash-Boza, 2015). 
By rendering all of life unstable and unpredictable for migrants subjected 
to detention or the threat of detention, detainability refines and exacerbates 
the sheer disposability of migrant life and intensifies migrants’ precarity, he 
argues.
This logic of precaritisation and exploitation of labour-power is not nec-
essarily generalisable across different socio-historical locations, though. In 
a conversation with Papadopoulos, Hage (Hage & Papadopoulos, 2004) ar-
gues that the logic of exploitation of slaves and migrant workers is radically 
different from the contemporary logic of ‘pure exclusion’ vis-à-vis refugees. 
According to Hage, pure exclusion has not been the dominant logic of capi-
talism historically. Capitalism generally promotes the logic of exploitation, 
rather than a spatial and physical keeping out, that for a large part charac-
terises for instance European responses to the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015. The 
political economies and temporal logics of exclusion and inclusion of vari-
ous groups of irregularised migrants and refugees, we suggest in this volume, 
cannot be assumed a priori. Instead, taken together, chapters point towards 
a need to carefully situate logics of exploitation, exclusion, ‘differential in-
clusion’ (Andrijasevic, 2009, Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013) and ‘precarious in-
clusion’ (Karlsen, forthcoming) and their temporal configurations.
In her chapter Jacobsen shows how, in the French context, the usurpa-
tion of migrant’s time by the asylum system and bureaucratic procedures 
may further precarise them within the labour market. Their time is coded as 
‘empty’ waiting time in need of being filled rather than as potentially pro-
ductive time geared at the realisation of migrants’ own present and future 
projects. Drangsland, in her chapter, shows how migrants’ time in the Ger-
man context is conjured up to futures defined by the state and its economic 
and demographic concerns. She discusses how particular arrangements 
such as the so-called Ausbildungsduldung serve to discipline irregular mi-
grants, conjuring up their future to the future needs for labour force in the 
German economy. In contrast, Karlsen’s chapter deals with rejected asylum 
seekers in Norway, who remain excluded from the labour market, and live 
their ‘waiting’ within humanitarian ‘endurance projects’ (Feldman, 2015), 
which seek to enable people to live differently with their conditions – rather 
than changing them.
While waiting and temporal bordering has tended to be discussed in 
terms of political economy notably in the United States, the European con-
text, in particular since the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, has been more 
focused on the humanitarian dimension. Some scholars have addressed 
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waiting in camps and detention centres by drawing attention to the role of 
humanitarian reason in migration management. Attempts to humanise ac-
commodation and waiting times for asylum seekers is here seen to contrib-
ute to legitimising and depoliticising confinement and waiting itself (Tyler 
et al., 2014; Morris, 2016; McNevin & Missbach, 2018). Brun (2016) reveals 
the limits of prevalent understandings of temporality in the canon of the hu-
manitarian system. The mission to save biological life, she argues, does not 
entail a concept of a future. Instead, humanitarian interventions produce 
and rely on knowledge that puts biographical lives on hold.
The reliance on knowledge that puts biographical lives on hold is given 
a particular twist in Musso’s discussion (2020) of age evaluation and the 
emergence of unaccompanied minors as a new ‘humanitarian population’ in 
the French debates in the 2000s. Procedures for age evaluation are put to use 
to separate out minors to be placed under child protection authorities from 
adults who are deemed in an irregular situation. This creates a ‘new human-
itarian population’ characterised by its vulnerability, to which bodies are 
put through tests to prove their minority and their isolation. Several other 
chapters draw attention to the humanitarian logics that traverse migration 
control and bordering, and that contribute to the socio-legal and experien-
tial production of waiting. The identification of humanitarian populations 
based on criteria of vulnerability are sites of tensions and controversies. 
This is evident also in Camminga’s chapter. Camminga shows how, in re-
lation to refugees’ resettlement, vulnerability remains a key comparative 
that sets some groups, as more vulnerable, apart from and therefore more in 
need than others, as is the case with LGBTI refugees in the Kakuma camp. 
Being defined as particularly vulnerable does not automatically translate 
into prioritisation in the form of less waiting time or less precarious waiting 
conditions, however. As the chapters by Musso, Camminga and Rozakou 
demonstrate, complex dynamics of invisibility and visibility configure wait-
ing time in particular ways for differentiated migrant populations. 
A challenge with deploying waiting as an analytical lens, and particu-
larly in the context of populations deemed particularly vulnerable, is the 
risk of producing one-dimensional accounts of passive and powerless vic-
tims, as well as of a homogenous mass, whose lives are simply put on hold. 
Recent literature focusing more explicitly on time has started to unpack 
how migrants manoeuvre to make tolerable lives within, or to overcome, 
the constraints of their status, as well as how waiting is filled with substi-
tute meanings (Brun, 2015; Rotter, 2016; Sampson et al., 2016). Bendixsen 
and Eriksen (2018), in their work on Palestinians categorised as irregular 
migrants in Norway, show, for example, how, by setting up a protest camp 
in Oslo, a group of Palestinians attempted to transform their wait into an 
active state by giving it direction. Conceptualisations of the future, or ‘tem-
poral horizons,’ were sources of both fear and hope that prompted action in 
the present in an attempt to recapture time and shape the future. However, 
their study also shows the fragility of this exercise.
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As an analytical device, waiting has the potential to foreground the am-
bivalence of agency (Hage, 2009a). Crapanzano (1985) attempts to capture 
this ambivalence conceptually as ‘passive activity’ to highlight that waiting 
is something one actually does. Hage (2009b) suggests that ‘waiting out’ in 
situations of stuckedness implies a certain heroism as it involves asserting 
some agency over the very fact that one has no agency by not succumbing 
and becoming a mere victim. Waiting can, in this sense, be understood as a 
strategy of defiance where out-waiting becomes a form of outwitting (Sutton 
et al., 2011). Brun (2015), discussing the case of internally displaced persons 
from Abkhazia in Georgia, adopts ‘agency in waiting’ as a way of exploring 
how migrants simultaneously carry on, feel trapped and relate to alternative 
notions of the future through their daily activities.
Rather than providing a generalised account of waiting as active or pas-
sive, or as a passive activity, chapters in this volume explore how people’s ‘ca-
pacity to act’ is differentially and relationally shaped in concrete situations. 
In so doing, they draw on a variety of theoretical resources and analytical 
elaborations of agency. In her chapter, Karlsen discusses her interlocutors’ 
simultaneous ‘waiting for’ and ‘waiting out’ in light of Vigh’s (2009: p. 425) 
conceptualisation of ‘social navigation.’ ‘Social navigation’ takes into ac-
count how individual practices are entangled with a wider web of power rela-
tions, as migrants assess dangers and possibilities of their present position as 
well as plot and attempt to actualise routes into an uncertain and changeable 
future. Putting Sharma’s (2014) concept of ‘power-chronographies’ to use, 
Jacobsen’s contribution to this volume also situates migrants’ waiting within 
wider power relations and analyses the ways in which migrants ‘recalibrate’ 
or synchronise their body clocks, their sense of future and the present, to the 
tempo, duration and directionality of complex ‘temporal architectures.’ In 
Rozakou’s chapter, she presents a nuanced relational account of how diverse 
actors such as border-crossers, police officers and various border brokers 
worked within the accelerated rhythm of the border during the 2015 ‘refugee 
crisis.’ The centrality of questions of visibility and invisibility to how peo-
ple’s capacity to act are configured is brought out both by Rozakou and in 
Camminga’s chapter on LGBTI refugees in the Kakuma camp. 
A different approach to agency is carved out by Eriksen (2020), who in 
discussing migrants’ use of smartphones and their various applications 
draws attention to technology as fundamental to how migrants manoeuvre 
the social and cultural fabric of their surroundings. He makes use of the 
concept of ‘affordances’ to analyse the opportunities and constraints, of-
ten unacknowledged by the actors but inscribed into their bodily actions, 
offered by a particular environment. The concept of ‘affordances’ draws at-
tention to the materiality of waiting in migration, notably the materiality of 
technologies such as the smartphone in Eriksen’s chapter, the social media 
platforms invested by LGBTI refugees discussed in Camminga’s chapter, or 
the software used for distributing appointments to the Préfecture in Jacob-
sen’s chapter.
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The materiality of bodies and of built environments such as camps, wait-
ing rooms, train stations and other urban spaces are further crucial to how 
waiting is produced and experienced. Camminga shows how in the Kakuma 
camp, the UNHCR facilitated the sectioning off of a protection area – 
essentially encamping LGBTI refugees within the camp – marking them 
thus out and making them visible to those perpetuating the anti-gay vio-
lence they were meant to be protected from. In Musso’s chapter, on the other 
hand, the ‘truth of the body’ is determined through such bodily material-
ities as testicles, breasts and pubic hair, distinguishing between those who 
will receive protection as ‘minors’ and those who will be categorised as ‘ir-
regular migrants.’ Drangsland’s contribution to this volume brings out how 
the aging of one’s body can be experienced as time uncontrollably passing, 
in the sense that the reproductive future that young men and women envi-
sion for themselves at a certain point become unobtainable.
Situating the contributions
The book is organised in three parts. The first part, The Multiple Tempos 
of Waiting, seeks to unpack waiting as a temporal phenomenon beyond as-
sumptions of stasis and suspension by drawing attention to the interplay 
between multiple tempos in migration processes and control. Unpacking 
a rich ethnographic material, the chapters paint a complex picture of the 
uneven temporalities and power structures that shape situations of waiting 
in irregular migration. Part two, The Social Relations of Waiting, traces the 
complex interactions between waiting, mobility and immobility and rela-
tions both to places, to significant others and to particular presents and 
futures. The chapters show the ways in which migrants’ life projects unfold 
within a temporal context defined by waiting for either deportation, legali-
sation or to be reunited with loved ones. In doing so, they also challenge the 
normativities involved in conceptions of the social. The third part, Legal 
Temporalities and Waiting, deals with the significance of immigration and 
refugee law to the production of waiting in migration. The chapters high-
light how tension within and between laws produces conditions of temporal 
precarity for particular migrant groups such as LGBTI, unaccompanied 
minors, asylum seekers and detainees.
While the volume combines ethnographic, legal and theoretical ap-
proaches, most chapters build on ethnographic fieldwork conducted by the 
authors. Anthropological definitions and demarcations of ‘the field’ remain 
fundamentally anchored in tropes of location and spatiality. But ‘the field’ 
is arguably also temporally constituted. As Dalsgaard and Nielsen (2013) 
point out, doing fieldwork entails periodicity, durationality and rhythms, so 
that the notion of multi-sited fieldwork, which is often invoked in studies of 
migration, could be complemented by the notion of a multi-temporal ethno-
graphic practice. When studying waiting and irregular migration, there is a 
further twist in that temporality (as event, period, duration, tempo, rhythm) 
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is both the subject to be explored and constitutive of the field. In other 
words, the temporalities of ethnographic practices inevitably become en-
tangled with the temporalities that the ethnographer observes ‘in the field.’ 
This necessitates a further disentanglement (Hage, 2018) of temporalities of 
waiting, which also positions the researchers as part of the temporal field 
they investigate. Such positioning of the researcher also needs to include 
critical reflection on the risk of (re)colonising other people’s ways of un-
derstanding time and waiting, as explicit in particular in the discussion in 
Drangsland’s chapter.
The chapters in this book span not only different geographical locations 
but also contain and actualise a variety of social times and temporalities. In 
recent research and public debate on migration in Europe, the onset of the 
so-called ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015 has served as a powerful chronotope. In this 
volume, some authors explicitly locate their contribution as an engagement 
with this particular time–space, as in Rozakou’s account of the acceleration 
and reconfiguration that took place during the ‘long summer of migration’ 
in Greece. However, Rozakou’s chapter also speaks to the intersecting time 
of the ‘economic crisis,’ with its series of sudden reforms and austerity meas-
ures that led to impoverishment and loss of income and property of the 
Greek population. The multiple temporalities in which waiting and hasting 
are produced in this field site, not least the experienced existential ‘stuck-
edness’ of Greek border police, are thereby brought to the fore. Similarly, 
Drangsland, in her chapter, discusses a measure that was established and 
gained significance in Germany in the context of the ‘refugee crisis,’ and 
Eriksen’s chapter focuses on the mediatisation and digitalisation of move-
ments during the ‘Syrian refugee crisis.’ As powerful as the chronotope of 
the ‘refugee crisis’ has been in Europe, other field sites contain and actual-
ise other social times and temporalities. The waiting of Karlsen’s interlocu-
tors in Norway stretches well beyond the recent crisis, as most of them have 
stayed in the country with a precarious legal status between 7 and 12 years, 
and some as long as 20 years. In Camminga’s chapter it is the criminalisa-
tion of LGBTI people in certain African countries, notably the Ugandan 
anti-homosexuality act passed in 2013, and UNHCR’s increased focus on 
protection of LGBTI refugees which offer the temporal coordinates for the 
analysis of waiting events. Machinya’s chapter evokes the mounting xeno-
phobic violence in South Africa, and the increasing criminalisation of mi-
gration through state-initiated deportation campaigns.
Lastly, we acknowledge the multiple temporalities of scholarship. Faced 
with ‘urgent matters,’ often framed as some form of crisis, scholars of migra-
tion may indeed experience that the ‘slow’ knowledge they produce is ‘out 
of sync’ with the ever-changing terrain of mobility and migration control. 
As such, our effort to develop more robust analytics of waiting in irregular 
migration can be read as a form of ‘navigation’ of trying to make sense of 
an ever-shifting terrain of laws, built environments, technologies and bodily 
materialities, fixed in writing at a particular moment in time.
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Part I




‘Flows’ of border-crossers reaching the shores of Europe in 2015 constituted 
what has widely come to be known in media and political discourses as 
the ‘European refugee crisis.’1 The aquatic metaphor of the ‘flow’ that is so 
dominant in representations of the ‘crisis’ has dehumanising and securitis-
ing effects. The border-crossers are depicted as an undifferentiated mass 
of people, embodying bare humanity (Malkki, 1996) and a threat to the 
European borders which momentarily seemed unable to serve their halting 
and decelerating functions. Not only that the flow metaphor is problematic, 
it also produces particular political effects related to the crisis as an excep-
tional moment that calls for specific responses and remedies. In this chapter, 
however, I am interested in a different aspect of this ‘flow’ and the analytical 
potential that it conveys. I suggest we turn our attention to the accelerated 
rhythm of the border and the reconfigurations of the temporal regimes of 
power that occur in this historical conjuncture.
Known as ‘the long summer of migration’ (Kasparek & Speer, 2015), the 
summer and autumn of 2015 was a time of (relatively) unhindered mobility 
for the border-crossers who arrived to Europe through the Mediterranean 
Sea and carried on their journey to Western and Northern Europe through 
the Balkan route. This period in time has been studied as a spectacular mo-
ment of mobility. From the autonomy of migration perspective, the force of 
human mobility not only disrupted but overtly contested the fortified EU 
migration regime provoking a crisis of EU borders and Europe itself (De 
Genova, 2017). Vivid ethnographic accounts record the force of movement, 
the disparate field of actors and the role of activist groups that moved as vig-
orously as the border-crossers (Kallius et al., 2016; Papataxiarchis, 2016a, b; 
El-Shaarawi & Razsa, 2019). The Balkan route lends itself to an anthropo-
logical approach of the road and mobility, their particular spatialities and 
temporalities (Dalakoglou & Harvey, 2012). For example, Bernd Kasparek 
(2016) approaches the transformation of the Balkan ‘route’ into a ‘corridor’ 
as a political move that aimed to control and channel a form of human mo-
bility that, until then, was not mediated by states. Whereas the ‘route’ was 
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the space formed by spontaneous and defiant mobility, the ‘corridor’ con-
verted mobility into passive and governed movement. The border-crossers 
were no longer in control of their speed or trajectories (Kasparek, 2016: p. 6).
In this chapter, I do not focus on the spatial aspects of ‘the long summer 
of migration.’ Instead, I suggest that the rupture in the borders that occurs 
at this historical moment invites us to rethink not only migrant spatiali-
ties but also our understanding of migrant temporalities. The condition of 
waiting seems to be fundamental in the experience of illegalised migration 
and it has been thoroughly examined in meticulous ethnographies. Instead 
of this picture, I here draw a different one: a picture of acceleration, speed 
and hastiness (see also Jacobsen, 2020; Eriksen, 2020). The stillness, slow-
ness and inactivity that have (correctly in my opinion) been associated with 
the disempowering, dominating and punitive core of the migration/border 
regime gave their place to constant movement, velocity and robust activity. 
In tracing this shift, I do not claim some inseparability between time and 
space. In fact, time and space are intertwined in mobility (Munn, 1992). 
Categories such as immobility, stillness and stuckedness are more than tem-
poral features. They illustrate the co-constitution of the temporal with the 
spatial dimensions of mobility. Neither do I intend to embrace a dualistic 
approach of waiting that the editors of this volume caution us of (Jacobsen & 
Karlsen, 2020, Introduction). Acceleration is not equated with liberation 
and emancipation, just as waiting is not de facto a state of inactivity and 
passivity.
In particular, I explore ethnographically the shifting temporal regimes of 
power through the encounters of various actors who inhabited the border 
on Lesvos during the summer of 2015. What was the relationship between 
acceleration and deceleration in that spatio-temporal context? How might 
we figure such accelerated time into accounts of waiting? How were border 
temporalities produced relationally? And how did border-crossers, police 
officers who guarded the border and various border brokers experience and 
work within these shifting temporal rhythms?
The chapter is organised around these different figures on the border and 
how they struggled for control over time, chased time, attempted to hasten 
or slow time down and mediated within the temporal border regime. As I 
will show, not all border-crossers partook in this new accelerated rhythm 
of the border. Border-crossers who were not classified as deserving but also 
the ones who became (though, again, randomly) the par excellence subjects 
of care and protection such as the unaccompanied minors, and others who 
could not or would not mobilise the random border brokerage system, be-
came ‘forgotten.’
The chapter is based on research I conducted between 2014 and 2016 in 
Athens and Lesvos. During the summer and autumn of 2015, I did field-
work inside the Moria camp, then registration and identification centre for 
border-crossers on the island of Lesvos. Over the following years I had the 
chance to return to the Moria camp, which had become emblematic of the 
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shifting Greek and EU border and migration policies and a site for the im-
plementation of various caring and policing innovations. The Moria camp is 
the location of the ethnographic vignettes that structure this article. Never-
theless, my observations are also drawn from pre-removal detention centres 
in Athens, as well as my research on deportation and with pro-immigrant 
solidarity groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and intergov-
ernmental organisations (IGOs) since 2014.2
Acceleration and deceleration
The state of being for the asylum seeker and the illegalised migrant is one 
of waiting. Slowed down trajectories and limbo are considered as its funda-
mental elements materialised in lengthy border registration procedures and 
protracted pre-removal detention. Borders that halt and regulate mobility, 
long queues, bureaucratic mazes and detention centres where time is decel-
erated if not frozen; all these are images associated with migrant waiting. It 
comes as no surprise that waiting is such a central theme in migration (and 
asylum) scholarship and especially illegalised migration as it offers itself 
for vibrant analyses of power in the migration and border regimes.3 Several 
studies illustrate the ways in which waiting informs particular subjectivities 
and precarities for asylum seekers, rejected refugees and irregular migrants 
(Mountz, 2011; Lucht, 2012; Andersson, 2014; Cabot, 2014; Griffiths, 2014; 
Khosravi, 2014; Biehl, 2015; Rotter, 2016; Turnbull, 2016; Bendixsen & Erik-
sen, 2018; McNevin & Missbach, 2018). Less attention, however, has been 
paid to the struggles over time and its ownership by diverse actors involved 
in migration control (Eule et al., 2019).
Despite the disempowering and even paralytic aspects of waiting, waiting 
is not merely associated with desperation, passivity and inactivity. Waiting 
can be meaningful and active (Brun, 2015) or even form the ground for mo-
bilisation (Bendixsen & Eriksen, 2018) and political possibility (Mountz, 
2011). Protracted waiting can also be abruptly transformed to violent ac-
celeration in deportations (Griffiths, 2014) or during the migrant journey 
where stasis and speed alternate (Andersson, 2014).
But does the prominence of waiting in scholarly analyses merely reflect 
the migrant condition and the effects of the migration/border regimes on 
migrants’ subjectivities? Is this scholarly emphasis on the migrant condition 
of waiting just the reflection of an empirical reality encountered in check-
points, detention centres, asylum courts and immigration bureaucracies? 
Or, does it risk replicating a specific understanding of migrant temporalities 
that is produced by the migration regime?
More recently, scholars have called attention to the latter points through 
the critical unpacking of our epistemological obsession with migrant wait-
ing. As Ayşe Çağlar (2016) and Georgina Ramsay (2019) argue, by empha-
sising if not actually reifying the differential temporalities of the migrant 
experience, researchers have committed the same ‘denial of coevalness’ 
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(Fabian, 1983) of which anthropology and ethnographic ‘othering’ has been 
found guilty. Just as the ‘primitive’ Other was constructed as residing in a 
different temporality by anthropology (Fabian, 1983), migration scholarship 
has placed migrants in a different temporal reality. Çağlar (2016) suggests 
that we turn to the shared temporality between migrants and non-migrants, 
and, in a similar vein, Ramsay urges scholars of displacement to shift their 
analytical view to the precarity and uncertainty that both refugees and citi-
zens share (Ramsay, 2019).
I consider these critiques as important and fruitful and, taking as my van-
tage point the ‘long summer of migration’ of 2015, I turn my attention to 
acceleration and to moments when waiting and hasting interchange. At that 
time acceleration reconfigured the power relations between various border 
actors. Moreover, it became a distinguishing mark between different cate-
gories of border-crossers and it introduced a sense of urgency in the experi-
ence of waiting. Even more than before, border-crossers were pressured to 
chase time. The existing literature on waiting illuminates waiting as part of 
techniques of domination and temporal control on subaltern populations 
whether these are migrants or poor people seeking welfare services (Auyero, 
2012). In a similar, yet quite different vein, I approach acceleration in regard 
to power and thus explore ‘the link between time and power’ not in waiting/
deceleration (cf. Bourdieu, 2000: p. 228) but in acceleration. However, in-
stead of seeing acceleration as the direct opposite of deceleration, I argue 
that, in the context of border crossing, acceleration was a reconfiguration of 
situational waiting.
For Paul Virilio, cultural theorist and author of an influential critique of 
acceleration, the militarisation of urban space and the technological organ-
isation of social existence produce a particular political economy of speed 
(Virilio, 1986). The ‘dromocratic society of hypermodernity’ is a society 
dominated by the logic of speed. The world is accelerated, in Virilio’s terms, 
and this has a severe effect on social, political and cultural life (Armitage, 
1999).
Speed is associated with modernity (Eriksen, 2016), the information age 
(Eriksen, 2001) and capitalism (Ngai, 2005; Tomlinson, 2007). This perva-
siveness of velocity signifies the triumph of time over space that prevails 
in our times of ‘liquid’ modernity (Bauman, 2000). Relentless acceleration 
is a crucial and constitutive element of the precarity and inequality of late 
capitalism (Bear, 2016). Despite such dystopic accounts of speed, recent 
analyses emphasise that speed can also be associated with the prospects 
of freedom and the emancipatory potential of technology (Duclos et al., 
2017: p. 5). Active deceleration, on the other hand, is an alternative to a life 
dominated by the oppression of constant and demanding acceleration and 
its toll on social life and bodies. Hence, slowing down, in the assembly line, 
becomes a tactic of defiance towards the domination and disciplinary power 
of capitalist production (Ngai, 2005). Similarly, the collective labour politics 
of slowness in academia is proposed in the context of a feminist ethics of 
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care as a contestation to neoliberalisation and its accelerated temporalities 
(Mountz et al., 2015). In the pattern of other ‘slow movements’ such as the 
slow food movement (Andrews, 2008), claiming ‘laziness’ in the neoliberal 
university is part of a conscious critique of colonial epistemologies and Eu-
rocentric notions of time (Shahjahan, 2015), whereas the very myth of the 
slow or ‘lazy native’ has historically played an instrumental role in the justi-
fication and development of colonial capitalism (Alatas, 1977).
It seems that various underprivileged ‘Others’ are not considered as 
inhabiting Western modernity. Instead, they are situated in a different 
time–space. By emphasising acceleration as a crucial element in illegalised 
migration, I invite the reader to explore speed and the shifting temporali-
ties on the border as correlated to precarity as well as emancipation for the 
 border-crossers. But how do the people who inhabit the border experience 
and deal with these shifting temporalities?
‘You have to wait, my friend’
‘My friend, believe me, here is the best place for you. Outside, it is hell. I’ve 
been here for three years (sic). Wait and you will go out eventually.’ This was 
how Dimosthenis, a 35-year-old police officer, responded to the pressing 
question ‘when will I leave?’ of a border-crosser.4 It was July 2015 and the 
border-crosser would remain detained in the Moria camp of Lesvos until 
his registration was completed, uncertain of how long that would take. It 
was early in the morning and the heat was already becoming unbearable. 
Dimosthenis and the rest of the police officers were sitting on plastic chairs 
outside the two wings where border-crossers were detained and every now 
and then they responded to such questions from the shade of an umbrella.
Dimosthenis’ claim that ‘this is the best place for you’ can only sound 
ironic if one considers that the Moria camp would be named as ‘the worst on 
the planet’ in a BBC report (citing a humanitarian worker), merely 3 years 
later. Already in the summer of 2015, the living conditions inside the Moria 
camp were poor. During most of the day, the heat was unbearable and the 
air-conditioning in the prefabricated units functioned intermittently. The 
water service was often cut off and the conditions were unsanitary. There 
was no bed linen and the border-crossers slept on bare and torn mattresses 
and broken beds. The Moria camp had exceeded its maximum capacity of 
750 people and during most days there were at least 4,000 border-crossers 
camping in adjacent olive groves, staying in tents with little if any access 
to water and medical services and suffering from the brutal heat. At the 
time, police officers were assigned to the task of registration and the over-
all management of those crossing the border. Alongside other state func-
tionaries (public prosecutor, mayor, prefect, etc.), EU officers and non-state 
agents (IGOs and NGOs, local collectives, independent Greek and foreign 
volunteers, locals, etc.), they formed a diverse group of actors who acquired 
shifting roles.
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Located 8 kilometres from the capital of the island of Lesvos, and placed 
among olive groves and warehouses, the Moria camp was initially designed 
to host a registration and identification centre (RIC) and a pre-removal 
detention centre. From 2013 to 2015, the Moria camp operated as a RIC 
under the authority of the Greek Police and, in late 2015, the Ministry of 
Migration Policy. Over the next few years, the Moria camp became more 
and more an assemblage of diverse agents and jurisdictions, a place of con-
finement and a site of violent and unruly order (Rozakou, 2019).5 During the 
‘long summer of migration’ of 2015, the Moria camp primarily functioned 
as a first arrival point. After registration, border-crossers were allowed to 
leave the island and the country altogether. Therefore, the character of the 
Moria camp was then quite different from the place of confinement that it 
used to be before 2015 and which it would become (to an even more extreme 
 degree) in March 2016 after the implementation of the EU–Turkey Statement 
(European Council, 2016).
As Dimosthenis explained, the hellish place ‘outside’ signified ‘Europe.’ 
He was warning the border-crossers of the disillusionment that awaited 
them. ‘Europe’ did not want migrants/refugees. ‘Europe,’ as the end of the 
journey, was mere hell. There was no reason in hurrying up to leave the Mo-
ria camp, the island of Lesvos and Greece. What awaited the border-crossers 
was a prolonged liminal condition and ultimate social and spatial expulsion.
During 2015, the acceleration of mobility was both spatial and physical 
but also potentially social, cultural and existential as the border-crossers 
claimed Europeaness (their becoming Europeans). This existential mobility 
was contrasted to the existential stuckedness and the failed Europeaness of 
the crisis-ridden Greek police officers. Situated in the geographic and sym-
bolic frontiers of European modernity and culture, the country had taken 
up the role of safeguarding the doorstep of Europe at least since the early 
2000s (Cabot, 2014) but with disappointing results. As street-level bureau-
crats who were primarily engaged with dealing with irregular migration 
on behalf of ‘Europe,’ the police officers were often accused of failure in 
guarding the borders of Europe (Rozakou, 2017). The police officers’ feel-
ings of stuckedness recall what Ghassan Hage has described as ‘existential 
immobility.’ Such existential immobility is related to forms of white rac-
ism and the feelings of envy and bitterness towards the mobility exerted 
by immigrants as well as ethnic and racial minorities (Hage, 2009). In this 
particular case, moreover, this immobility amidst the accelerated rhythm of 
the border-crossers’ flows also resonates with dominant conceptualisations 
of modernity and the failed ‘Europe(aness)’ of Greece.
Dimosthenis was the sub-commander of the Moria camp and he had been 
working there since the Moria camp started operating as a RIC in Septem-
ber 2013. He used to describe himself as an ‘erotic immigrant’ whenever 
somebody asked what had brought him to the island. During his studies at 
the police academy, Dimosthenis fell in love with a woman who originated 
from Lesvos and when she moved back to the island to open a pharmacy, 
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he followed her. He was second in command in the Moria camp and like 
his superior commander he lacked the necessary connections that would 
bring him to a police station on the island and had therefore ended up in 
the Moria camp, one of the least desirable work posts for a police officer 
on the island. Having worked in the Moria camp for 2 years, Dimosthenis 
was familiar with the detention regime that predominated until 2015 when 
all border-crossers were detained for several weeks before being transferred 
to pre-removal detention centres in the mainland. Dimosthenis was accus-
tomed to these dominant politics of waiting on the border.
Nevertheless, it was as early as spring 2015 that Dimosthenis and his col-
leagues started feeling overwhelmed by the increase in the border-crossers’ 
arrivals. At first, they attempted to carry on the procedures that produce the 
border: The border-crossers had to be detained, identified, fingerprinted, 
registered and finally transferred to the mainland. But then the arrivals kept 
increasing and the police officers were still asked to carry out procedures 
they considered absurd if not altogether counterfeit (Rozakou, 2017). The 
pressure was immense as thousands of border-crossers were stranded on 
Lesvos during most of the summer and autumn of 2015. The island had to 
be ‘decongested,’ registrations ought to speed up, and the temporal rhythm 
that the police officers once had mastered seemed out of their hands. They 
could no longer impose their punitive control over the border-crossers’ time. 
They could no longer tell them cold-bloodedly that they ‘had to wait’ or 
when they did, the expression had little currency to all parts involved – the 
police officers included.
The border-crossers had turned into a ‘flow’ – numbers that needed 
to be processed, papers (expulsion orders) that had to be issued and dis-
tributed and ‘releases’ that needed to be made in order for newly arrived 
border-crossers to be processed, registered, fingerprinted and then again 
released in an endless passage. Despite the fact that this fluidity had an 
emancipatory character for the border-crossers as it signified a shift from 
immobilisation to velocity, this construction of the border-crossers as a 
‘flow’ had dehumanising effects and reduced empathy. Dimosthenis and his 
colleagues reluctantly facilitated the mobility of a nameless mass of people 
on-the-move.
Dimosthenis was aware of the fact that ‘eventually everyone will leave’ 
as he explicitly told me. It was the sheer number of people that forced him 
and his colleagues to work in a totally different manner than earlier; to ac-
celerate rather than decelerate mobility. The imperative was fast process-
ing and velocity in mobility. In fact, both the police officers’ ignoring the 
border- crossers’ pressing questions and the catchphrase ‘you have to wait 
my friend’ seemed like a last effort to reclaim their sovereignty and their 
control over time that had been shattered by the historical circumstances 
of the ‘long summer of migration.’ The camp as a place of ‘decelerated cir-
culation’ (Tsianos et al., 2009) and deterrence (Andersson, 2014) had be-
come a place of accelerated mobility. Despite the police officers’ attempts to 
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reclaim temporal control over time, the Moria camp as the materialisation 
of the border had acquired a new temporality. Yet, the police officers were 
not the only ones manoeuvring within the shifting rhythms of the border.
Border brokers
One way for border-crossers to speed up the registration process was to find 
an appropriate broker who would mediate between them and the police 
officers. Such brokers were NGO or IGO workers, volunteers, journalists, 
locals, tourists and researchers. They would detect and point out specific 
cases to the police officers and plead to have them processed in priority. 
Considering the numbers of people waiting to be registered, this was a pro-
cess with unlikely results which required the ability to attract attention 
and evoke sympathy on behalf of the border-crossers. Very often, border- 
crossers would ask IGO and NGO workers to mediate and to ask the police 
officers to look up their specific case or to speed up their registration. ‘We 
merely highlight a case to the police officers’ an International Organization 
of Migration (IOM) employee subtly told me. NGO and IGO workers never 
challenged the authority of the police officers but simply (as they said) as-
sisted them in this system of personalised bureaucracy. The police officers 
would usually accept the cases brought in by the IGO and NGO workers 
(although not without some sarcasm or hazing) and processed them faster.
Control over time was crucial in this context when the boundaries be-
tween state and non-state actors often collapsed and sovereign power was 
reconfigured. The police officers felt less as embodying ‘the state’ than non-
state actors who at that time became privileged collaborators of the state 
both in the eyes of the border-crossers and the police officers.6 It was not 
only the fact that their colourful vests exhumed the authority of a uniform 
and they were symbols of power. Non-state actors could cross the gates 
of the Moria camp with relative ease and, many times, they seemed to be 
working together with the police officers. They took up state functions and 
border work (cf. Rumford, 2008) such as registration procedures, surveil-
lance and the detection of vulnerable border-crossers (like unaccompanied 
minors and people with chronic diseases).
However, the police officers still possessed relative power over time, and 
they exercised it upon all parties. Making people wait is a crucial distin-
guishing mark of power as Barry Schwartz stresses: ‘especially to be kept 
waiting an unusually long time, is to be the subject of an assertion that one’s 
own time (and therefore, one’s social worth) is less valuable than the time 
and worth of the one who imposes the wait’ (Schwartz, 1975: p. 856). Overt 
disregard was a very common practice enacted by the police officers not 
only towards border-crossers but also towards NGO and IGO employees 
and even other police officers who were lower in rank. Many times, dur-
ing my research, I came across the police officers’ intentional avoidance 
of the mere existence of their interlocutor. It seemed to me that this was a 
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dominant feature both of peer sociality and their interaction with the pub-
lic. Police officers would commonly practice selective deafness and blind-
ness and ignore the pleads made by diverse people who struggled to catch 
their attention. In the Moria camp, humanitarian workers would be left to 
wait, and border-crossers would not even be looked at. This negation of any 
kind of contact and the sensorial isolation was absurd, yet very common in 
contexts of domination and control (Auyero, 2012).
Maria, a 30-year-old lawyer, who worked for a humanitarian organisa-
tion had to wait for more than half an hour to attract the commander’s 
attention as he moved back and forth from one office to the other while 
speaking on the phone or sending emails. The lawyer had come to talk to 
the commander about an elderly man who camped outside the Moria camp 
with his family. As a border broker, she mediated between the police officers 
and the man in order to negotiate faster registration. The man was almost 
100 years old, she explained to me in awe. The commander pretended not to 
notice her, and he let her wait for about an hour. In the end, her request was 
heard: the elderly man’s registration was completed in just one day and his 
seven-member family managed to leave the island in record time.
With the mediation of border brokers, decelerated if not frozen time could 
acquire an accelerated rhythm. Making wait, nevertheless, remained a tech-
nique of power. However, despite the fact that the police officers still seemed 
to possess some control over time by making people wait through ignoring 
them, they were ultimately forced into conforming with the velocity of the 
frenzied time by the very number of the border-crossers. In fact, the border 
rhythm would so radically shift from deceleration to acceleration that all 
parts – border-crossers and police officers – were caught in between these 
conflicting rhythms. This force is quite different from the violent accelera-
tion that deportable migrants face when from the ‘sticky or suspended time’ 
of prolonged detention they are subjected to the ‘frenzied time’ of a sud-
den unnotified deportation (Griffiths, 2014). But although it may appear as 
emancipatory and a celebration of human mobility’s power over the deceler-
ating migration/border regime, not all border-crossers partook in this novel 
accelerated temporality of the border. For some, waiting was an enduring 
condition. Moreover, unless somebody managed to attract the attention of 
any of these border brokers, they would most likely remain detained for an 
indefinite period of time.
Laurel and Hardy and the end of the war
Manolis was a 23-year-old police second lieutenant who had graduated from 
the police academy a few years earlier. He was born and raised in Lesvos 
and he came from a family of police officers: His father and grandfather 
were high-ranked police officers on the island, and his brother was a coast 
guard. Manolis excelled as a pupil at school and he could study at any uni-
versity department he chose, but he decided to follow the same career path 
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as the rest of his male family members. He was always calm and polite, an 
exception to a setting often dominated by exasperated and enraged police 
officers overwhelmed by the situation. In the small office that was next to 
one of the wings of the RIC, he was always the one who sat in front of the 
computer and managed the camp database. The barred window next to his 
office was a few centimetres above the heads of the detainees who knocked 
on the window trying to attract his attention and ask about the course of 
their case. The border-crossers were feeling the urgency to ‘hear their name’; 
the moment when a police officer would call them through the loudspeaker 
in order to give them the expulsion order that, at the time, served as the 
bureaucratic document that enabled mobility across borders on the Balkan 
route.
On that morning in early September 2015, Manolis took up the task of 
helping a group of men from Pakistan whom he met when he entered the 
Moria camp. These were some of the ‘forgotten’ ones, he explained to me. It 
appeared that the men had arrived at Lesvos several days earlier, but they 
had not been registered yet. Manolis tried to trace their files in order to 
admit them to the camp and proceed with registering them. In the domi-
nant taxonomy of deservingness in mobility, the men from Pakistan were 
situated in one of the lowest places. As they were not considered to have 
a ‘refugee profile’ (based on their nationality), they were often destined to 
protracted waiting. They were left out of the registration queue and they did 
not partake in the same accelerated mobility as other border-crossers from 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and so on.
Manolis’ vigorous and empathetic responsiveness brought the forgotten 
Pakistani men back to the rhythm of acceleration of these days. He only 
managed to turn his attention to them on a day that the Moria camp was 
unusually quiet and empty and after thousands of border-crossers had been 
rapidly registered and had left the island. There were endless stories of ‘for-
gotten’ border-crossers who, after waiting in insecurity, were eventually 
taken out of obscurity and partook in the accelerated border rhythm of the 
time.
One morning, in early September 2015, I arrived very early at the Moria 
camp. The moment I arrived, a woman from Iraq asked me to approach the 
wired fence. With the help of a Somali man who translated from Arabic to 
English, Yasmine told me that she had already been detained for several 
days. Her photo was taken twice, but she was still not released. ‘They still 
haven’t read my name’ she said desperately. Cases such as hers were a puzzle 
with pieces scattered in different police departments. For a couple of hours, 
I wandered around asking police officers about the woman and her two 
children, but nobody seemed to have had any idea what the problem was. 
Argyro, an IOM employee who had dropped her official duties to mediate 
between the border-crossers who camped outside the Moria camp and the 
police, has already tried to solve the mystery to no avail. Pavlos, a 28-year-
old police officer, surprised me when he told me that the woman’s husband 
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and himself were ‘friends’ on Facebook. The man had been registered at the 
Moria camp several weeks earlier, and they had been in touch ever since he 
left through the Balkan route. The man, who was by then in Austria, had 
been asking about his wife, and Pavlos had managed to find Yasmine in one 
of the tents outside the camp and brought her inside the registration centre 
so that she could be promptly registered. But now he could not help her any-
more. Nobody seemed to know what the problem was.
At noon, another police officer noticed that Yasmine was crying. He ap-
proached and talked to her. He was the police photographer who worked 
at the Police Directorate, the department where the expulsion orders were 
issued. The man called the police directorate and talked to the police officer 
in charge. It took 2 hours and several phone calls before the mystery was 
solved: the woman’s case was filed together with the case of her underage 
children, but the children were registered with their fathers’ surname and 
not hers. Puzzled with this inconsistency, the police officers would not com-
plete the registration for any of them. They would merely go to the next file 
and let the woman wait indeterminately. After solving this misunderstand-
ing, Yasmine eventually received her documents and she was released the 
same evening.
The next day I discussed the case with the commander of the Moria camp. 
While we talked about the different border brokers who had to mediate in 
Yasmine’s case, I asked what happened to those people who lacked the abil-
ity or did not want to attract somebody’s attention. The commander, who 
often spoke in metaphors or drew upon popular cultural themes, replied to 
me cryptically that ‘then they will end up like Laurel and Hardy.’ He then 
carried on telling me the story of the old black-and-white comedy depict-
ing Laurel and Hardy as soldiers during the First World War. They were 
fighting in the trenches, and although the war was over, they were the only 
ones who had not noticed it and who just kept hiding in the trenches, eating 
canned sardines. It was only when all the sardines were finished and a huge 
mountain of cans had accumulated that Laurel and Hardy finally decided to 
leave the trenches. They did that simply because the sardines were finished, 
not because the war was over.
‘This is what will happen with the “forgotten” ones too,’ ‘Once every-
body leaves and the centre [Moria camp] shuts down, then they will leave.’ 
In the commander’s words, the border-crossers who could not motivate the 
border brokerage system were failing to draw upon valuable resources and 
in a way – as entrepreneurs working with/in the system – failed to keep up 
with the pace of the historical moment. The responsibility of manoeuvring 
within the accelerated rhythm of the border fell on some kind of individual 
ability of the border-crossers themselves, whereas, in reality, the taxono-
mies of deservingness which were at play prioritised certain categories more 
than others. Thus, border-crossers from Syria and Iraq were registered and 
allowed to leave the island faster than others and men from Pakistan were 
condemned to extended waiting.
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During the ‘long summer of migration’ and the seemingly unhindered 
mobility through Greece, border-crossers found themselves trapped in a 
bureaucratic maze that caused delays. In many cases, people would remain 
detained in the Moria camp for weeks while their co-travellers had already 
arrived at the port of Piraeus. The port of Piraeus occupied a crucial place 
in border-crossers’ mobility as it was the first point in the mainland and, 
therefore, closer to the continuation of their journey to Northern and West-
ern Europe. Families would be separated due to a simple misspelling in their 
family name, and border-crossers who were suspected of being underage 
would be delayed until they were assessed as adults and released or they 
would be placed under the custody of the public prosecutor and, in fact, 
detained in the Moria camp, until a place in a shelter was found. Hence, 
it was not only people who did not pertain to the dominant taxonomies of 
refugee deservingness that did not partake in this universe of high velocity 
and enhanced mobility but also groups of people that were the par excel-
lence subjects of care and protection, such as unaccompanied minors. In 
lack of enough shelters, the latter were condemned to protracted waiting 
and extensive detention. 
Hasting and waiting in a reconfiguration of violence
On 31 August 2015 at two in the afternoon the commander and sub- 
commander of the Moria camp were still there although their shift had 
ended. The two men were frantically trying to put out a fire in the nearby 
olive grove with two fire extinguishers. A few border-crossers who camped 
there were cooking a meal, and the extreme heat had turned the ground into 
an inflammable material. While a police officer was calling the fire depart-
ment, the police guard on the front gate of the Moria camp started calling 
out for an ambulance. People started running in both directions unable to 
evaluate the priorities. On the front gate, a woman was lying on the ground 
and two members of the Doctors of the World crew were leaning their entire 
body weight on her to perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CAR). Next 
to the unresponsive woman an IOM employee was in shock. As the young 
IOM employee explained to me, she had found the 40-year-old woman, her 
two sons and her elderly mother in one of the tents outside the Moria camp 
and immediately noticed that she was very ill. The woman had left the hos-
pital only a couple of hours earlier after voluntarily signing her release form 
despite the doctors’ insistence on keeping her hospitalised. The woman was 
terrified that her absence from the Moria camp would cause even more de-
lays to her family’s registration and, ultimately, cost them their opportunity 
to leave the island and Greece. For this woman, hasting became a matter of 
life and death.
While the IOM employee blamed herself for failing to secure a place for 
the woman and her family earlier, the police officers felt cynically relieved 
that the woman did not pass away while detained inside the Moria camp. 
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The violent temporal reconfigurations of the border – the pressure of wait-
ing and the imperative of hasting – that had caused a person’s death had 
turned into a responsibility that lacked an accountable figure.
If slowing down is a political tactic of defiance towards the accelerated 
rhythm of late capitalism, hasting or speeding up during ‘the long summer 
of migration’ appears, at first glance, as an act of defiance towards the EU 
migration/border regime. Celebrated as a triumph of mobility, the ‘flow’ of 
the border-crossers that travelled across Europe overtly contested the es-
tablished temporality of the border and even shifted it entirely. The Moria 
camp, a place of decelerated mobility, turned into a site of accelerated one. 
And yet, the border-crossers were also at times subjected to waiting for in-
definite time. Moreover, not all categories partook in the same accelerated 
rhythm.
At the same time, acceleration does not necessarily equate with eman-
cipation or resistance. As other ethnographies have pointed out, speed or 
‘frenzied time’ (Griffiths, 2014) can also be part of the mechanisms of the 
migration/border regime. During the ‘long summer of migration,’ following 
the pace of this fast time could be extremely risky and it could put border- 
crossers in an even more precarious state. The border-crosses had to con-
stantly find their way and work within shifting temporal rhythms on the 
border. The temporal control over their time lied precisely in the tension be-
tween these two extremes. Highly perceptive to the historical circumstances, 
the border-crossers were chasing time against a migration/border regime 
that was under reconfiguration but still exerted its violence and brutality.
Acknowledgements
I thank the three editors for inviting me to contribute to this inspiring vol-
ume on migrant waiting and for their careful reading and suggestions on 
previous versions of this chapter. Many thanks to Heath Cabot and Geor-
gina Ramsay who read a draft of the chapter and made generous comments 
and suggestions.
Notes
 1 I use the term border-crossers in order to avoid the polemic around the categori-
sation of economic migrants versus political refugees, and additionally to stress 
the specific focus of this chapter on the border and border temporalities.
 2 This chapter is based on the research I conducted as part of the research project 
‘The social life of state deportation regimes: A comparative study of the imple-
mentation interface’ at the University of Amsterdam. The project was funded by 
the European Research Council (ERC-Starting, grant 336319).
 3 The term illegalised migration emphasises the politics of exclusion that consti-
tute a person as deportable (De Genova, 2002) in the frame of an oppressive 
migration regime (Kalir, 2019). 
 4 All names used in this article are pseudonyms in order to protect the anonymity 
of my interlocutors.
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 5 In late 2015, following European Union (EU) efforts to hinder human mobility, 
the Moria camp officially turned into an EU ‘hotspot’; a facility that aimed to 
manage human mobility through the external borders of the EU. The hotspot 
was programmatically oriented towards the ‘streamlining, (production of) ab-
solute knowledge and control of populations on-the-move’ (Kalir & Rozakou, 
2016), the relocation of refugees to other EU countries, and later, under the 
EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016, the confinement and readmission of asy-
lum seekers to Turkey. Within a few months of the implementation of the hotspot 
approach, however, the Moria camp was already suffering from overpopulation 
and despicable living conditions, and deportation rates (or ‘readmission,’ as they 
are officially named) were low, with approximately 2,000 people being readmit-
ted to Turkey between March 2016 and September 2018.
 6 See Cabot (2018) for an earlier account on the unexpected and ambivalent col-
laborations between police officers and lawyers during the asylum process. 
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Introduction
Turning the corner from the bustling Rue d’Aix in the centre of Marseille, 
with its many small North-African shops, I cannot but notice a shift in 
tempo. Every day, hundreds of men, women and children are queuing up in 
front of the ‘first reception platform’ for asylum seekers (PADA) to register 
their asylum application, to check for mail from the authorities or for an ap-
pointment with one of the case workers.1 At the back of the building, under 
the ionic columns of Halle Puget, more people are sitting around, waiting 
for their appointment in the afternoon or for a friend or relative who are 
queuing. During the wait, information and goods are exchanged, services 
bartered and stories shared. The mattresses and stacked luggage reveal that 
some people also spent the night, turning what was historically the city’s fish 
market into a makeshift camp, which in French is paradoxically known as 
a ‘camp de fortune.’
Spaces in which migrants wait proliferate, not only in border zones 
(Andersson, 2014), refugee camps (Agier, 2011) or asylum reception centres 
(Kobelinsky, 2010) but also within the urban fabric. As detailed in the intro-
duction to this volume (Jacobsen & Karlsen, 2020), the waiting of irregular 
migrants and asylum seekers has, like that of other poor and marginalised 
subjects, often been analysed as an effect of power. As Bourdieu (2000: 
p. 228) contends in a much-quoted passage ‘Making people wait […] is 
an integral part of the exercise of power.’ In his ethnography of irregular 
 migrants in Paris, Le Courant (2014) draws on among others Bourdieu to 
argue that through the Préfecture, who decide on whether to regularise or 
to deport, migrants experience being made to wait as a particular form of 
power. Similarly, Kobelinsky (2010: p. 63), in her study of inhabitants of 
French asylum reception centres (CADA), writes that ‘waiting is certainly a 
way of experiencing power.’2
Extending this line of inquiry, this chapter draws on Sharma’s (2014a) no-
tion of ‘power chronography’ to examine how the waiting time of irregular 
migrants and asylum seekers in Marseille is produced, managed and lived 
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at the intersection of a range of social institutions and differences. Power 
chronography draws attention to time as a form of power structured in spe-
cific political and economic contexts, a site of material struggle and social 
difference (Sharma, 2014a: p. 15; 2014b: p. 6). Against those speed-theorists 
arguing that globalisation entails a homogenous flattening of space–time, 
or a simple opposition between ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ classes, Sharma extends 
Massey’s (1991) seminal theory of ‘power geometry’ to explain variegated 
and intersecting social temporalities and their power effects on differently 
situated subjects. Rather than taking ‘acceleration’ as a given of contem-
porary societies, the notion of ‘power chronographies’ points to an uneven 
multiplicity of temporalities that are complicated by labour arrangements, 
cultural practices, technological environments and social spaces. This ap-
proach is useful also to unpack temporality in irregular migration, in which 
accelerated temporalities of migration control produce and distribute expe-
riences of waiting in specific ways.
A complex composition of laws, built environments, services and 
 technologies – what Sharma calls ‘temporal architectures’ – structures the 
time of irregular migrants and asylum seekers. In this chapter I am par-
ticularly interested in how migrants ‘recalibrate’ (Sharma, 2014a: p. 28) or 
synchronise their body clocks, their sense of future or the present, to the 
tempo, duration and directionality of such ‘temporal architectures.’ ‘Re-
calibration’ is about the micropolitics of temporal coordination and social 
control between multiple temporalities (Sharma, 2014a: p. 7). Expectations 
to recalibrate time permeate the social fabric differently for distinctive pop-
ulations (Sharma, 2014a: p. 18). While the request to recalibrate by ‘waiting’ 
is ubiquitous for irregular migrants and asylum seekers, such waiting is con-
figured in a broader regime of accelerated migration control. Recalibration 
stiches together what Barber and Lem (2018) have termed the ‘discrepant 
temporalities of migration’ – the ruptures between how migration is im-
agined collectively and individually, and how it is managed by states. Prying 
open such ruptures around reproduction, health and labour, this chapter 
explores the experience of waiting in asylum as produced within multiple, 
relational temporalities and power relationships.
The chapter is based on several periods of fieldwork conducted between 
2012 and 2018 in Marseille. During this period, migration to France was 
marked by movements onset by the Arab Spring and protracted conflicts 
in Africa and the Middle East, particularly the war in Syria. I zoom in on 
migrants who had sought, were in the process of seeking or intended to 
seek, regularisation under the asylum law, and who had a precarious legal 
status. I conducted interviews with migrants and activists, representatives 
of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and public officials working 
with migrants. Participant observation was crucial to gaining a thicker un-
derstanding of how waiting is produced and experienced. Being-with mi-
grants in time–spaces of waiting and accompanying them in their struggles 
to regularise their legal status or simply ‘get by,’ importantly attuned me 
42 Christine M. Jacobsen
to the material and affective conditions of waiting. Thus, I base the fol-
lowing analysis on research processes grounded in reflexive contextualis-
ation, co- presence and cooperation with the people whose lived experiences 
I examine.
Waiting and dilated time
In one sense, persons who demand asylum per definition find themselves in 
a waiting situation, waiting for the response from the authorities regarding 
their right to stay and participate in society (Kobelinsky, 2014). Having sub-
mitted an asylum application gives a temporary recognition of the person’s 
right to wait on state territory and gives some protection against deporta-
tion. As Kobelinsky argues (2009: p. 228), waiting can also be considered the 
‘activity’ par excellence of asylum seekers and asylum reception centres as 
time–spaces of waiting. Kobelinsky (2014) describes the everyday life of asy-
lum seekers in asylum reception centres (CADA) in France as characterised 
by spatial retraction and temporal dilation. Even if CADAs are not closed 
institutions, they are characterised by certain measures of spatial confine-
ment, such as the duty to report absence and demand authorisation to be 
absent for several days. When it comes to experiences of temporal dilation, 
Kobelinsky suggests they be read as a series of sequences, involving first, 
the halt created by the beginning of the waiting period and the arrival in the 
centre; second, the boredom which ensues and the need to fill up the time; 
and third, ways of avoiding waiting.
Importantly, Kobelinsky (2014) stresses that waiting time is not homoge-
neous or continuous. First, the rhythm depends on the asylum procedure 
and its production of occasional moments of urgency (for instance when a 
rejection arrives, and the asylum seeker has a limited number of days to file 
an appeal), and new beginnings (for instance waiting for the answer to the 
appeal). Second, the duration of the sequences varies depending on the in-
dividual cases, but the first one tends to be shorter (the beginning), while the 
others (boredom and ways to avoid waiting) extend in time. Third, the suc-
cession of sequences is not necessarily linear or uni-directional; there can be 
a back-and-forth in the experience of waiting, between periods of boredom 
and moments of activity. The features of heterogeneity and non-linearity 
that Kobelinsky mention are even more pronounced if we expand the scope 
to the majority of asylum seekers in Marseille currently, who are not offered 
accommodation in CADAs, and who are outside of the so-called normal 
asylum procedure.3 And even more so, if we take into account the broader 
context of waiting in migration, which may include waiting to leave, waiting 
to pass borders and to obtain legal stay in subsequent countries.
One example that troubles a sequential and linear reading of waiting is the 
experience of Lamin and Amina – a Nigerian couple I encountered regu-
larly outside the ‘first reception platform’ for asylum seekers (PADA) during 
my fieldwork.4 They would either have spent the night, or, if they had been 
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lucky enough to get a few days accommodation in a cheap hotel, come in the 
morning to check for mail and pass time with other Nigerians, most of them 
from the Edo state. Lamin and Amina had arrived in Marseille from Italy 
a couple of months before we met and, when registering as asylum seekers, 
had been put under the so-called Dublin procedure.5 One day Lamin agreed 
to tell me more about their experiences as migrants with a precarious legal 
status:
I came to Italy without documents. It was not good for me. I spent one 
year, two years, three years, four years, five years, six years, seven years, 
without documents. All the time I waited. All the time they gave me 
temporary residency. They gave me six months, six months finished, re-
new, then no documents. For a long time, it was six months, six months, 
and then nothing. They said wait, wait – and I waited. Many years I 
waited and waited. I waited one year, two years, three years, four years, 
five years, six years, seven years, nothing. My wife [Amina] and I suf-
fered too much, because I had no work and we had nowhere to live, and 
no money to buy baby things. So, we decided to come to Marseille so we 
could get a better future. Because in Italy we have no future. I think that 
we will have a better future here.
Lamin’s incantation of the time they spent in Italy painstakingly fore-
grounds his experience of waiting. But rather than a series of sequences with 
a defined starting point and a predictable end, Lamin experienced waiting 
as a loop of temporary ends and beginnings. From the repetition of the term 
‘waiting’ and the repetitive counting of years, transpires a feeling of ‘stuck-
edness’ related to temporariness, uncertainty and a continually postponed 
‘better future.’ Rather than being stuck at a particular point in a linear wait-
ing time, though, Lamin seems to experience this stuckedness as circular. 
After years of waiting in Italy for regularisation of their legal situation and, 
related to that, a less precarious socio-economic situation, moving to Mar-
seille resuscitated the hope for a ‘better future,’ which had propelled Lamin 
and Amina to leave Nigeria for Europe in the first place. This time, however, 
pregnancy introduced a new sense of urgency to their waiting. As they had 
been waiting in Italy, lived time had not come to a stand-still. Rather, they 
had passed some of the main cultural markers of adulthood by getting mar-
ried and making a baby. Consequently, a ‘better future’ could no longer be 
indefinitely postponed, the baby they were expecting would soon enough 
need diapers and a roof over the head.
Waiting and accelerated time
Reducing the ‘waiting time’ of irregular migrants and asylum seekers has 
been a target of recent migration policies in France. The temporality of mi-
gration control is characterised by efforts to ‘speed up’ the asylum process 
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towards regularisation or deportation, and by a multiplication of temporal 
borders (cf. Tazzioli, 2018). As in other European countries, acceleration is 
hailed to enhance migration control, and make the asylum system more ‘ef-
ficient’ (Cwerner, 2004; Sontowski, 2018; Eule et al., 2019). The ambition to 
‘speed up’ has restructured the temporal architecture of the asylum system, 
with consequences for the tempo, duration and directionality of migrants’ 
waiting. With the record number of asylum seekers in 1989 and 1990, the 
French spearheaded the acceleration in the examination of asylum claims 
in Europe, with what some critics named ‘TGV procedures,’ which soon re-
sulted in refusals without thorough examination of individual cases, and an 
increase in cases tried before the appeal court (Kobelinsky, 2010; Dembour & 
Martin, 2011; Akoka & Spire, 2013).6 Since the 1990s, the aim to accelerate 
procedures has been reiterated, notably in the asylum law reform of 2015 
and the revised law for ‘controlled immigration, an effective right to asylum, 
and successful integration’7 of 2018. This latter law further strengthened the 
focus on ‘speed’ as a technique for controlling and governing migration, 
proposing to accelerate both procedures for treating asylum applications 
and its exclusionary counterpart in the form of procedures for deporting 
irregular migrants. As we will see later, the deadlines set by the law speci-
fies new temporal borders that are crucial to the production of migrants as 
‘irregular’ and produce new gaps and time–spaces of waiting. With the 2018 
law, the time to apply for asylum was cut from 120 to 90 days, and the time 
to appeal the decision, from 30 to 15 days. On the reverse side, what De Gen-
ova and Peutz (2010) refer to as a ‘detention and deportation regime’ was 
expanded. The maximum length of stay in detention centres was doubled 
(from 45 to 90 days and in certain cases 135 days) and the time of detention 
by the police was extended (from 16 hours to 24 hours). In addition, the use 
of imprisonment for illegal entry or for using fake papers, as well as the 
possibility for issuing a ‘banishment’ from French territory, were extended.
The reform of the asylum law in 2015 established a new system for regis-
tering asylum applications in France, which was intended to accelerate the 
process and reduce waiting times to register asylum applications with the 
authorities. From then on, all asylum seekers were required to pre- register 
with ‘first reception platforms’ (PADA), who distribute appointments to the 
so-called single desk at the Préfecture, where claims are registered.8 One 
chilly November morning, as the queue outside PADA was thickening with 
men, women and children, I joined Bob, a Malian in his thirties who had 
worked his way through Libya and Italy and arrived a few months ago in 
Marseille. Bob had already been queuing since 5 am and had managed to 
put his name up among the first 15 on the list taped on the door, which 
meant that his odds for being received that day were good. We passed the 
time smoking, listening to old reggae hits, looking at some photos Bob’s 
wife had sent of their children and preparing for the registration of Bob’s 
asylum application – carefully noting down the full names and birthdays of 
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his children, as well as the major dates of his journey to France. Approach-
ing midday, it was finally our turn. A case worker helped Bob fill out the 
pre-registration form and, by entering the information into the software SI-
ASILE managed by the Préfecture and the French Office for Immigration 
and Integration, gave him an appointment at the Préfecture’s single desk. I 
noticed that the appointment was in 60 days.
As noted by Eule et al. (2019), the pressure for acceleration rarely matches 
the everyday of migration control. While an appointment to register a de-
mand for asylum should in theory be given within three working days, or 
ten in periods of exceptional influx, figures collected by Observatoire Asile 
Marseille (2018) showed the average waiting time in 2017 and 2018 to be 40 
days after registration with the first reception platform (PADA).9 Interest-
ingly, the Observatoire makes a point of counting not only working days 
but the full number of calendar days pointing thus to a split between the 
duration of waiting time from the perspective of those who make people 
wait and those who are made to wait. Asylum seekers do not take ‘time off’ 
from waiting during weekends and holidays in the same way employees who 
process their applications do. The fixing of appointments to the single desk 
is automated and computerised, the effect of which is both to put the waiting 
time of asylum seekers beyond the control of employees at the PADA and 
to produce a certain randomness in the distribution of waiting time. The 
Observatoire registered such randomness in waiting periods in their report, 
noting that individual appointments were given in ‘52 days, 28 days, 51 days, 
25 days and then suddenly, 2 days, then again 54 days, 34 days, and 23 days.’
The PADA represents the waiting time before people are properly en-
rolled in the asylum system, as well as the link between different parts of 
the asylum procedure. While official statistics show a reduction of average 
waiting times for the applicants at OPFRA from 7.4 months (or 226 days) in 
January 2015 to approximately 3 months (114 days) in 2017, these statistics 
do not count the days of waiting to register the asylum application.10 The 
‘gap’ between the 3-day limit set by the law and the temporalities of the in-
frastructure that regulate actual access, produces an interstitial time–space 
during which protection from deportation is weak and access to welfare 
and healthcare extremely limited. During my meeting at the first reception 
platform with Bob, the social worker admonished Bob to hold on tightly to 
the piece of paper attesting his future appointment at the Préfecture: ‘Do 
not lose the paper, it’s important, it is your identity paper now.’ For the two 
next months, this piece of paper would offer some protection against depor-
tation, but it did not come with any offer of housing or economic support. 
Instead, the social worker presented Bob with some food stamps for a resto 
du coeur, since, as she said, addressing me rather than Bob, ‘he looks a bit 
worn.’11 My presence may very probably have influenced this decision, as 
single male asylum seekers were usually left to fend for themselves in the 
waiting time.12
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Lamin and Amina were also experiencing this gap, and like many, strug-
gled to find accommodation. They carried a letter from the French Office 
for Immigration and Integration stating that they were registered as asy-
lum seekers and that in waiting for housing in an asylum reception cen-
tre (CADA) they must refer to the first reception platform (PADA). At the 
PADA they were told that there were no free places, so all they could offer 
was a few nights stay at a hotel. An employee at the PADA aptly captured 
the circular rhythm, reminiscent of Lamin’s experience of waiting for pa-
pers in Italy, produced by this gap in access to rights: 
Unfortunately both asylum reception centres and emergency shelters 
are full. The 115 [the emergency housing centre] proposes ten hotel 
nights to families and when the stay expires, they send them to us for 
a reassessment of the need to accommodation.13 Often, this creates 
around a weeks’ gap where the family sleeps on the street because we 
are unable to find a place in a hotel.
The gap produced by the mismatch between a chronopolitics of speed and 
the slowness of the practical and material processing of asylum demands 
reorders the duration of the sequences of waiting in asylum identified by Ko-
belinsky (2014). Rather than a ‘halt created by the beginning of the waiting 
period,’ the beginning of the waiting period was itself dilated in time, in a 
largely rightless time–space of waiting before one can even start the wait as 
a recognised asylum seeker with some protection against deportation and 
social rights before the state.
The employees at the first reception platform (PADA) are part of the 
temporal architecture which makes irregular migrants and asylum seek-
ers ‘wait before the state.’ Despite being employed by voluntary associa-
tions, their function as a ‘first reception platform’ which mediates access 
to the Préfecture and the French Office for Immigration and Integration 
make them crucial to migrants’ experience of waiting as a form of power. 
This does not mean though that only asylum seekers are made to recali-
brate to the waiting time and the way it is governed through deceleration 
and acceleration of various parts of the asylum procedure. Observing the 
pre-registration and follow-up process from the other side of the queue 
made me aware of how employees struggled to keep up the pace neces-
sary to process the line of people who queued up in front of the PADA 
every day.14 Attending morning meetings was akin to being in the calm 
before the storm, as everyone knew that there would be no more breaks 
or slowdowns until lunch. Employees worked long days, under high pres-
sure, worrying about many variables only partly within their control. In 
September 2018, less than a year after my visit with Bob, employees went 
on strike, supported by around 20 NGOs, and demanded a reinforcement 
of staff to absorb waiting lines and provide a more ‘dignified reception’ 
of asylum seekers.15
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Waiting and managed time
Within these complex power chronographies of acceleration and deceler-
ation, the reception structure, volunteer associations and migrants them-
selves develop ways of ‘managing’ and ‘circumventing’ waiting time. Laila, 
one of my interlocutors who worked at the PADA, distinguished between 
waiting in the asylum reception centre (CADA) and waiting in the first re-
ception platform (PADA):
In the PADA, given that people have not yet had access to housing, or 
only to day-by-day housing in a hotel, they do not have any activities. 
They have absolutely nothing, they do not have the right to work, they 
do not have the right to go to school, except for French courses that 
hardly exist. This makes the waiting very difficult to manage. There 
is thus a problem of equality between asylum seekers, between those 
who live in a CADA where the waiting time is more manageable than 
for those in the PADA. I mean, NGOs will perhaps offer a gardening 
course or some computer training with ten places, and when that is filled 
up, the only thing left for people to do is to come to the [first reception] 
platform. Some people come in the morning even if they do not have 
any questions and know they do not have any mail, because it creates 
a relationship to us and to the other asylum seekers, and then it keeps 
them occupied for a while. So, there are many people to whom we spend 
a lot of time telling them that ‘It’s normal, you must wait, and it’s long…’
Laila interestingly points to how asylum seekers must find ways to ‘man-
age’ the waiting time, and how the manageability relates to the ‘temporal 
architectures’ of waiting in various material reception structures. While the 
asylum reception centre (CADA) offers a certain ‘rhythm’ in the form of 
regular ‘activities,’ which as Kobelinsky (2009: p. 232) argues also implies a 
certain spatiotemporal subjection, the waiting time of asylum seekers who 
are not offered any such activities is seen as ‘empty’ and in need of being 
filled, given that they are also deprived of the right to work and thus ex-
cluded from one of the major temporal rhythms of contemporary society. 
As Laila makes clear, the employees at the first reception platform (PADA) 
are enrolled in ‘normalising’ the waiting time, both in instructing asylum 
seekers to wait and telling them that it is normal, and in being a node for the 
fragile relationships that asylum seekers establish with the reception struc-
tures and each other.
The pressure for acceleration of procedures was met with ambivalence by 
my interlocutors who worked in the reception structures. On the one hand, 
they saw prolonged waiting as creating a lot of anxiety, and as associated 
with deterioration of physical and mental health. On the other hand, they 
feared that the consequence of acceleration would be a further precarisation 
of migrants and entail an erosion of their rights. With the shortening of the 
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time limit for registering an asylum application, applicants would have less 
time to gather information, learn about the system and prepare their dos-
sier. Accelerating the asylum procedure would also, some worried, make 
asylum seekers less prepared to start a ‘new life’ should they be granted 
asylum. In this perspective, waiting time was not only seen as ‘empty time’ 
to be filled but also as a time of preparation to learn to know the asylum 
system, to learn French, to get an education and to get to know the city and 
the society. While this understanding of the management of time privileges 
an understanding of ‘integration’ as the prospective future of asylum seek-
ers, the current French policies of acceleration are geared primarily towards 
more effectively excluding those who are deemed by the state to be ‘irregular 
migrants’ and to limit access to refugee protection.
Lamin and Amina were among those who came every morning to the 
platform and stayed until midday. Recalibrating thus to the imposed wait-
ing time of the asylum process, the space outside the first reception platform 
(PADA) was nevertheless also crucial to ‘the circumvention of the imposed 
temporality’ (Kobelinsky, 2014) through the creation of what Almer (2016) 
calls ‘espaces de bavardage’ (gossip spaces). As Almer (2016: p. 14) writes, 
undocumented people are required to learn both to live with the tempo of 
administrative functioning and learn 
how to use this time they spend in the ‘waiting for…’ to their advantage, 
namely inventing routines and benchmarks, invest and create spaces 
conducive to meetings that allow them to install themselves as good as 
they can in the temporality of the ‘waiting for…’ and to lead a life de-
spite the uncertainty of its duration.
The space outside the PADA was crucial for Lamin and Amina not only to 
escape boredom and fill up the time, but more importantly, to acquire infor-
mation about where and how to fulfil basic needs such as finding food and a 
place to spend the night. Also, encountering other young parents, they got 
information on possibilities for medical follow up during pregnancy, and 
on how to access the rights reserved for populations deemed vulnerable, 
including families with young children. This ‘espace de bavardage’ was also 
challenging to navigate though, as people’s efforts to install themselves ‘as 
good as they can’ would sometimes involve illegal commerce or attempts to 
manipulate others to their own advantage.
Waiting and dispossessed time
The question of using the time spent in ‘waiting for’ is even more complex 
if we do not see waiting time only as a dilated and empty time to be filled, 
but as intersecting with temporalities related to reproduction, health and 
labour in complex power chronographies. Here, we may pry open the ‘dis-
crepant temporalities of migration’ – the ruptures between how migration 
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is imagined collectively and individually and how it is managed by states 
and institutions involved in the reception of asylum seekers (Barber & Lem, 
2018). Bob’s case is illustrative. For several years, Bob had been suffering 
from severe stomach pain, which ‘ate him from the inside’ and prevented 
him from working. Seeking healthcare upon arriving in Marseille, Bob was 
advised to register as an asylum seeker before the hospital could administer 
further medical examinations.16 Recounting his conversation with the doc-
tor, Bob explained:
I said; but my problem is not primarily that [of needing protection as an 
asylum seeker]. Me, my problem, it is my health. At least, that is what I 
want first. But they told me, no, you must go and demand asylum first. 
So now, I will go and ask for asylum. But I am tired, and I want to go to 
the hospital first.
For Bob, finding out what was ‘eating him’ was a primary concern, not least 
because of the pain and fatigue he was experiencing. Despite the experi-
enced acuteness of his health condition, of being prevented from normal 
social interaction, of getting thinner and less muscular every day, and not 
being strong enough to work, Bob had to ‘recalibrate’ to the temporalities 
of French migration management.
Bob’s immediate concern to get medical treatment was not only related 
to his individual health but also to how his migration was collectively im-
agined, and its temporality relationally constituted. In Mali, Bob’s wife and 
children were waiting for his remittances to arrive so they would be able to 
pay for subsistence, schooling and the house they were building. Haunted 
by the urgency of supporting his family back home, Bob waited every day 
at the roadside outside the primary site of informal labour in Marseille to-
gether with other migrants to be picked up for a day or more of work. It was 
vital to post in the early morning when entrepreneurs and private persons 
drove by to engage workers, and the risk of being detained and deported 
increased when the police started patrolling, usually by the late morning. 
Like the first reception platform, the informal labour platform was an im-
portant ‘espace de bavardage,’ where migrants would build relationships and 
exchange information and services. The rhythm of informal work, however, 
was forcefully interrupted when Bob, prompted by his medical condition, 
recalibrated to the asylum procedure. As we were waiting at the first recep-
tion platform (PADA), an employer Bob worked for rang to offer him a job 
in construction work for the next few weeks. Hanging up, Bob explained to 
me that between queuing at the PADA, the rendezvous at the Préfecture, the 
appointments at the hospital, the waiting line at the emergency clinic and 
the regulations of entry at the emergency housing unit where he slept, he 
would not be left with any time to actually do the job.
Rather than just filling up the dilated and empty time of waiting, the tem-
poral architecture of the asylum procedure governed Bob’s time in a very 
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particular way. This may be analysed in light of Andersson’s (2014) sugges-
tion that irregular migrants are not simply ‘put on hold’ or slowed down. 
Rather, their time is devalued and usurped in endless bureaucratic proce-
dures. A case in point is the use of short temporary permits, which requires 
people to redo queues at public offices at short intervals. As Le Courant 
(2014: p. 63) puts it, ‘the undocumented are not only those who do not have 
the right to be present, they are also those who are dispossessed of the mas-
tery of time.’ While this situation of ‘recalibration’ is certainly an expression 
of the devaluation of the time of undocumented migrants, and can be read, 
as Le Courant does, as a form of dispossession, one should note that, ‘recali-
bration’ to economic and political dominant temporal structures is far from 
unique to those with a precarious legal status. Rather, we could see it as an 
uneven investment in time along a range of social differences, such as race, 
class, gender, labour and immigration status (Sharma, 2014a).
Waiting and being out of time
Unlike Bob, who was waiting to register his asylum claim, Bashir, a young 
man from Sudan who had just turned 23, was waiting to be sent back to 
Italy. In 2017, Bashir who at the time had recently entered France via Italy 
and was living in a ‘camp de fortune’ in Paris, accepted an offer from French 
authorities: ‘They said that they would give us housing and process our ap-
plications,’ Bashir recounts. Together with a group of asylum seekers, he 
was sent to Marseille where he was moved between several reception struc-
tures only to end up in a so-called Hosting Program for Asylum Seekers 
(PRAHDA, Programme d’accueil et d’hébergement des demandeurs d’asile). 
The dismantlement of the informal camps in Calais and Grande Synthe, 
as well as certain parts of Paris in 2017, led the French government to cre-
ate 241 CAOs (Centre d’accommodation and d’orientation) to accommodate 
those displaced. Soon after, the PRADHA was established to channel more 
effectively and speedily those who are ‘Dublined’17 or on a ‘a fast track’ to-
wards deportation. In the PRAHDA, asylum seekers are not accompanied 
by social workers. Instead, they are expected to report themselves regularly 
to the police station, lest they will be considered en fuit (absconding).18
Coinciding with efforts to accelerate the treatment of asylum applications 
and to speed up the return of those who fail, the creation of differentiated 
tracks has given rise to a proliferation of structures that organise the recep-
tion of asylum seekers, and configure the tempos, duration and directional-
ity of waiting in particular ways. Compared to the CADA, the PRAHDA is 
characterised by the absence of investments into the lives of their inhabit-
ants. There are no technologies of care or temporal infrastructures to keep 
them ‘in time’ (Sharma, 2014a). The absence of temporal investments leaves 
irregular migrants ‘out of sync’ with the temporal order(s) of French so-
ciety, recalibrated instead to the temporal architecture of the asylum sys-
tem and the Dublin agreement, and punctuated by the duty to report to the 
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police, a recurring intensification of uncertainty and awareness of one’s own 
deportability.
Bashir experienced waiting time in PRAHDA as dilated, empty and 
repetitive. 
There are no projects. There is no program for the day. You wake up, 
you eat, you sleep, you eat. You discuss with your friend, you pass time, 
you pass the evening, and the day passes like that. It’s always the same 
routine. But little by little, you become disgusted by life…because you 
stay there, and you do nothing. We are bored. We are broken.
Time is empty, a repetitive eternal present, characterised by boredom and 
passivity, as in the second sequence of waiting for asylum described by 
Kobelinsky (2014). The object, duration and rhythm of waiting is neverthe-
less distinct for those who have been ‘Dublined’ and who are waiting for a 
hypothetical answer from the country responsible for their asylum applica-
tion and for a possible expulsion to this country. This waiting time produces 
a ‘gap’ similar to the one discussed earlier in relation to the registration of 
the asylum application with the authorities, in which asylum seekers wait 
in extreme administrative and social precarity. The feeling of temporal di-
lation and spatial retraction was accentuated by the isolated location of the 
PRAHDA, which made it virtually impossible to participate in the ‘espaces 
de bavardage’ that were crucial to migrants’ management of waiting time.
Existing within an uneven multiplicity of temporalities and lived at the 
intersection of a range of social institutions and differences, temporal archi-
tectures do not produce homogeneous experiences of waiting time. Living 
further down the corridor from Bashir, was Tomas, an Ethiopian doctor 
who grew up in a cosmopolitical environment in the Arab Gulf. Due to 
restrictions in migration policies, he was deported to Ethiopia where he had 
never lived. He immediately re-migrated – first to Sweden and then onwards 
to France. In contrast to Bashir’s naked room, and the dirt and degradation 
of the common areas, Tomas’ room was decorated with a colourful carpet 
and a packed bookshelf. His economic, social and cultural resources had 
allowed him to install himself in the ‘waiting for’ in a manner quite different 
from Bashir and most other inhabitants at the PRAHDA. He passed his 
days learning French and reading literature, sometimes spending hours at 
the library in the city centre. At the time we met, Tomas had just received 
a letter saying that Sweden had answered French authorities’ request to de-
port him back to Sweden under the Dublin convention positively. He had 
been given 48 hours to appeal the decision, a deadline it had been impossible 
to meet. Now, he was awaiting the day of his expulsion.
While some people, like Tomas, manage to ‘install themselves’ in the 
‘waiting for’ in a way that makes time seem meaningful, and not only 
something to be passed or endured, waiting as a ‘Dubliner’ or in other 
‘fast tracks’ is characterised by sudden ruptures in the form of events of 
52 Christine M. Jacobsen
expulsion – a constant source of strong uncertainty and nervousness to 
most. Bashir told me: 
You wait for the day of your expulsion. How much time before your ex-
pulsion? It could be tomorrow. Tomorrow they could send you to Italy. 
Of the four people I arrived with, two were already scheduled, and they 
expulsed them to Italy. Three others who, given they did not want to go, 
ran away. So now, they are wanted by the border police. In the middle 
of winter, they ran away. Whether they find somewhere to sleep is up to 
them.
In this grim light, Bashir was incessantly contemplating his own options: 
to stay in the PRAHDA and wait for his sudden expulsion to arrive or to 
‘escape’ and try to stay off the grid until his status as a ‘Dubliner’ was fi-
nally ‘broken,’ as he put it. Managing to live undetected by the authorities 
for 18 months would give him the possibility to file a new asylum applica-
tion in France. This is due to the deadlines set by the Dublin procedure, 
which specifies a time limit for the authorities to contact the other country’s 
authorities and a time limit to answer, as well as a time limit to ‘transfer’ – 
which in the case of ‘escape’ is set to 18 months. The question of ‘timing’ of 
staying or moving ‘at the right time’ was thus crucial to the considerations 
of those anxiously awaiting deportation.
While ‘escaping and hiding’ can be seen as a way to circumvent state 
management of waiting time, efforts to circumvent waiting can also imply 
political mobilisation. Bashir did not only ‘recalibrate’ to the tempo im-
posed by the administrative procedures of the asylum apparatus. Despite 
his experience of temporal dilation, emptiness and boredom, he managed 
to transform the waiting time into building up a social network, mobilis-
ing together with local activists to protest the conditions of living at the 
PRAHDA. At a series of public meetings, they denounced the politics of 
abandonment represented by these structures and called for migrants to 
hold French authorities accountable to their professed ideals of universal 
human rights. In an appeal co-written by migrants and local activists, 
they demanded the annulment of their Dublin procedures, a stop in de-
portations, the acceptance of their right to demand asylum in France, 
the demolition of the PRAHDA and access to education and vocational 
training. Solidarity and political mobilisation are difficult to build in 
haste, though. In the midst of his effort to change not only his own but 
also other migrants’ waiting situation, the accelerated temporality of mi-
gration control suddenly caught up with Bashir. He was arrested during 
one of his weekly reports to the police station. The next morning, before 
his friends and activist network had time to mobilise, he was put on a 
flight to Italy, where yet another cycle of waiting for an uncertain future 
was about to begin.
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Conclusion
Efforts to ‘speed up’ the treatment of asylum applications as well as the deporta-
tion of those who failed to obtain protection and are cast as ‘irregular migrants’ 
have restructured the temporal architecture of French migration control, with 
consequences for the tempo, duration and directionality of migrants’ waiting. 
Given the extensive critique of protracted waiting situations voiced by migrants 
and migrant-rights activists, one would perhaps expect ‘speeding up’ to bring 
migrants ‘in sync’ with the speed of contemporary society, reducing the stress 
associated with protracted waiting. In this chapter, I have tried to nuance this 
understanding of waiting by analysing ethnography from fieldwork with mi-
grants with a precarious legal status in light of Sharma’s concept of ‘power chro-
nographies.’ The accelerated temporality of migration control produces gaps 
and time–spaces of waiting (e.g. for pre- registering an asylum application, for 
being transferred to a responsible Schengen country, and for accessing health-
care) during which protection from deportation is weak and access to welfare 
and healthcare extremely limited. The analysis has demonstrated how migrants 
with a precarious legal status ‘recalibrate’ to a composition of laws, built envi-
ronments, services and technologies, synchronising their bodies and life projects 
to the tempo, duration and directionality of complex ‘temporal architectures.’ 
The time of migrants with a precarious legal status is not only devalued and 
devoid of investment but also usurped by the administrative temporality. ‘Gaps’ 
produced by the efforts to accelerate both the consideration of demands for asy-
lum and the deportation of those who fail to obtain protection contribute to 
their precarisation. The analysis of power chronographies has also served to pry 
open the ruptures between how migration is imagined collectively and individ-
ually, and how it is managed by states. Temporalities related to reproduction, 
health and labour intersect with, and are recalibrated to, the temporalities of the 
state and its management of migration, while also opening up towards tempo-
ralities that escape the experience of waiting as a form of power.
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Notes
 1 Plate-forme d’accueil pour demandeurs d’asile (PADA) in Marseille, recently 
renamed Structure de premier acceuil des demandeurs d’asile (SPADA), run 
by the NGO Forum réfugiés-Cosi on renewable annual contract, is responsible 
for pre-registering asylum seekers, administering appointments to the Guichet 
Unique, and for ‘accompanying’ asylum seekers in the asylum process. 
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 2 Centres d’accueil de demandeurs d’asile (CADA) was established in France 
in 1991 after a regulation made it illegal for asylum seekers to work.
 3 According to figures cited by Observatoire Asile Marseille (2018) of the 3,974 
persons registered as asylum seekers in Marseille in 2017, 980 were put in ac-
celerated procedure and 1,786 in the Dublin procedure. The term ‘accelerated 
procedure’ is somewhat of a strange misnomer, and unlike the privilege usually 
associated with fast tracking, it is reserved for asylum seekers who are consid-
ered a priori less legitimate and likely to succeed in obtaining protection. The 
Préfecture decides which ‘track’ a particular application follows. 
 4 I have altered all the names in this chapter in order to preserve the anonymity of 
my interlocutors. 
 5 The Dublin agreement makes the Schengen member state where one first de-
mands asylum (or that issued a first visa or a residence permit or through which 
a person entered the EU and had their identity checked) responsible for examin-
ing the demand. If the Préfecture determines that another country is responsi-
ble, the asylum seeker can be ‘transferred’ back within a delay of 6 months. 
 6 TGV, train à grande vitesse, means high-speed train. In 1990, the TGV set a new 
world record in speed on rails, and as such it served as the ultimate symbol of 
speed in France at the time. 
 7 LOI n° 2018-778 du 10 Septembre 2018 pour une immigration maîtrisée, un droit 
d’asile effectif et une intégration réussie.
 8 Guichet Unique Demendeurs d’Asile, (GUDA).
 9 The Administrative Tribunal of Paris has deemed failure to register claims 
within the given time frame, and the legal ‘gap’ that results as violations of the 
right to asylum. The tribunal has repeatedly ordered the Préfecture to complete 
registration concerned applications within a strict timeframe. See: http://www.
asylumineurope.org/news/25-05-2017/france-authorities-under-court-order-register- 
asylum-applications. Published online 25 April 2016 (accessed 17 March 2020). 
 10 https://www.ofpra.gouv.fr/fr/l-ofpra/actualites/les-donnees-de-l-asile-2017-a-l. 
(accessed 17 March 2020). 
 11 The French restos du coeur are part of a broader landscape of charitable and 
humanitarian associations, offering food to migrants and others in a precarious 
situation (see Jacobsen, forthcoming). 
 12 At the time, asylum seekers received a subvention – the ADA (allocation pour 
demandeur d’asile). Yet, my interlocutors experienced numerous difficulties in 
accessing it. As noted by the Observatoire Asile Marseille (2018), asylum seek-
ers must wait up to 45 days after registering as asylum seekers before the ADA 
becomes effective. In the meantime, they rely on assistance from various NGOs 
and friends and networks. Housing of asylum seekers is perhaps the biggest chal-
lenge in Marseille. In theory, once one is registered as an asylum seeker, one may 
have access to an asylum reception centre. In practice, however, waiting times 
remain long, and in the meantime, people move between emergency housing 
(115), squats, sleeping rough and staying with friends. 
 13 The social outreach service (SAMU social), which distributes access to emer-
gency housing in Marseille, is usually just referred to by its phone number, ‘the 
115.’ In addition to emergency housing centres, they dispose of some places in 
hotels. The capacity is critically low compared with actual demand.
 14 In an interview I conducted with the head of the PADA in September 2017, she 
estimated that they received around 230 persons without appointments every 
day, of which around 30 were there to register for the first time.
 15 ht t p s : / / w w w.e u rop e1. f r /s o c i e t e /g r e ve - a - l a - p l a t e for m e - d a c c u e i l - 
des- demandeurs-dasile-de-marseille-les-associations-inquietes-3765284 Europe1 
France with Agence France Presse (AFP). Published online 27 November 2018 
(accessed 17 March 2020).
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 16 The healthcare system for irregular migrants in France is generally seen as one 
of the most inclusive in Europe, but migrants nevertheless experience important 
obstacles to realising these rights (Laranche, 2012). Despite my efforts to assist, 
Bob did not manage to obtain proper medical care until after he had registered 
his asylum demand. 
 17 Asylum seekers placed under the Dublin procedure are commonly referred to, 
and sometimes also refer to themselves, as either ‘Dubliners’ or ‘Dublined.’
 18 Asylum seekers placed under the Dublin procedure and subjected to a house 
arrest order can be placed in detention if they do not present themselves for their 
appointment at the Préfecture. 
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In the burgeoning academic literature on waiting (see e.g. Hage, 2009; 
Bandak & Janeja, 2018), little attention has been devoted to the significance 
of new communication technologies; and conversely, although there is a 
keen interest in temporalities in the literature on the Internet and the smart-
phone (Hassan & Purser, 2007; Horst & Miller, 2012; Wajcman, 2018), wait-
ing is rarely discussed as a smartphone temporality. On the contrary, much 
of the latter literature is concerned with speed and acceleration rather than 
the empty, flexible time usually associated with waiting. This chapter aims 
to bring these topics into dialogue by applying them to research findings on 
smartphone use among undocumented refugees in the Levant and Mediter-
ranean during the so-called Syrian refugee crisis in 2015–2016.
The tiny multimedia computer, spoken of as a polymedium by Madianou 
and Miller (2012), was only launched as recently as 2007. It is a slim, sleek 
rectangular object of metal, plastic and silicone equipped with an emi-
nently swipable and thumbable touchscreen instead of a keyboard, which 
fits snugly in the inner pocket of a dinner jacket, the front pocket of a pair 
of jeans or a woman’s handbag. While advanced pre-iPhone mobile phones 
such as Blackberries had already had Internet options, they nonetheless 
lacked important features associated with smartphones today, such as maps 
and social media applications. The smartphone compresses, accelerates and 
miniaturises the user’s relationship to the external world, and such is its 
penetration into the lives of millions that it may well be regarded as a bodily 
extension in McLuhan’s ([1994]1964) sense. And as people lamely joke, ‘they 
say you can even make calls with it as well.’
Drawing on my own current research on smartphone use in general and 
recent fieldwork-based studies carried out by others, I shall raise some ques-
tions about the significance of the smartphone for refugees hoping to make 
a European country their new home. I will particularly emphasise the ways 
in which this minuscule, rectangular electronic device affects temporality, 
rhythms and gaps during indeterminate periods of waiting. There is little 
doubt that the smartphone has transformed everyday life around the world, 
but it is no less obvious that these changes have taken place in different 
ways, for reasons of economy, social organisation, network types, political 
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regimes, scale, cultural values and the situation in which actors find them-
selves. We should always be wary of simple generalisations, and as pointed 
out by Vokes and Pype (2018), it cannot simply be assumed that the Internet 
leads to time–space compression. Rather, time–space expansion is also a way 
of looking at it; when we use the Internet the social space is expanded, and 
time becomes flexible in new ways. Indeed, when social micro- coordination 
(Ling & Yttri, 2002; Ling & Lai, 2016) is mediated by smartphones, clock 
time becomes less important. Delayed responses are built into the social 
media platforms and text messaging to the extent that the simultaneity 
and constant calibration of arrangements in the near future (e.g. social en-
counters) tend to replace fixed temporal categories with more flexible ones. 
‘11:15 a.m.,’ for example, becomes ‘in five minutes.’ The coordination of a 
broad range of social activities can now take place as an ongoing flow of 
minute exchanges, not as done deals finalised days or weeks ago.
By integrating their lives into the temporalities mediated by mobile tele-
communications, refugees planning to flee, on the move or having arrived 
at a detention centre are no different from everybody else; their lives have 
changed, and they have become reliant on smartphone apps for manoeu-
vring the social and cultural fabric of their surroundings. At the same time, 
their precarious, liminal situation may seem to imply significant differences 
as compared with settled populations with a legal status, fixed abode and 
stable daily routines. Strangers in a strange land, severed from filaments of 
belonging, linguistically impaired and condemned to open-ended, debili-
tating and humiliating periods of waiting, these people – whether huddled 
together in the hull of a barely seaworthy vessel, in a tent erected by volun-
teers or an non-governmental organisation (NGO) on a Greek island or on 
the streets of Hannover – may offer a privileged site for an exploration of 
the ways in which the smartphone is transforming the social world and its 
temporal regimes.
Refugees without a legal status are typically described as inhabiting a 
liminal space, living in a legal limbo, the bearers of an anomalous, intersti-
tial present radically separated from aspired, possible futures. In their case, 
the question ‘when exactly is the future?,’ which can rightly be addressed to 
technological dreamers and apocalyptic pessimists, raises itself with espe-
cial urgency. The possible futures imagined by migrants waiting for their 
legal status are not simply ‘put on hold’; rather, they are actively being sab-
otaged and usurped through the biopower enacted by bureaucratic slug-
gishness in institutions of Kafkaesque opacity and Byzantine complexity. 
This observation is not an original one. Bourdieu (1972) commented on 
Kabylian temporalities and the ways in which they clashed with the linear, 
 progress-oriented colonial ones, while Schwartz (1974) described how the 
right to other people’s time, through making them wait, constitutes a signif-
icant form of power in a society where time is linear, can be measured and 
is seen as a scarce resource. In the case of migrants waiting for work, hous-
ing, family reunification and/or legal documents, there is nevertheless a gap 
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between the relentless ageing of the body and the lack of a corresponding 
development in their lives (see Drangsland, 2020, and Bendixsen & Eriksen, 
2018, for a fuller discussion). In their waiting, they oscillate between ‘stalk-
ing a prey’ (Corcoran, 1989) and ‘doing nothing in particular’ (Frederiksen, 
2018) as an existential condition.
In most cases, refugees – be they from Afghanistan, Mali or Syria – 
 waiting to cross into Europe, waiting for asylum applications to be com-
pleted in a refugee camp or waiting for their application for a work and 
residency permit in a new country to be decided upon, possess smartphones 
and use them for such diverse purposes as social networking, communicat-
ing with family members in the country of origin and simply ‘making plans.’ 
The refugees’ reliance on the smartphone was graphically and powerfully 
illustrated in a photo taken at the main railway station in Budapest in the 
summer of 2015 and reproduced in newspapers worldwide, depicting a long 
row of men lying on makeshift mattresses on the floor near a wall, trying to 
rest amid the flickering, bluish light from the screens of smartphones being 
charged from wall outlets behind them.
As much as it may be mitigated by smartphones enabling instantaneous 
communication and filling gaps with networking, games and media con-
sumption, a primary mode of existence for migrants in a legal limbo none-
theless remains that of waiting. So, let us consider the existential condition 
of waiting before proceeding. A pioneering anthropologist of ‘nothing in 
particular,’ Frederiksen (e.g. 2018) points out that waiting is contextual. It 
does not exist in and of itself. It is a social fact, not a natural one. Reading 
Frederiksen, one soon starts to wait (sic) for the first aside about Beckett, 
and it appears soon enough. Like Estragon and Vladimir, Frederiksen’s 
Georgian interlocutors do not expect that anything in particular will hap-
pen. Rather, they consider waiting as a permanent existential condition. In 
a complementary reading of Beckett, Cash (2009) identifies a point-zero of 
waiting where there is no expectation that anything will happen. Citing a 
contemporary review of Waiting for Godot, Cash (2009) discusses the view 
that Beckett performs the almost superhuman feat of keeping the audience 
rapt and enthralled during a play where nothing happens, twice (in the 
first and second acts). However, Cash adds, something does happen; a tree 
sprouts four or five leaves in the interval.
Hage’s (2009: p. 97) much quoted term stuckedness refers to ‘an existential 
immobility.’ He argues that a certain way of being stuck is seen as an asset 
in the contemporary world, the stuck person being a celebrated figure who 
‘is waiting out,’ heroically enduring in the face of adversity, be it climate 
change or the neoliberal devastation of local communities. Yet in the pres-
ent context, it is worth remarking that being stuck is exactly what refugees 
try to avoid, while at the same time, some of their potential collective power 
lies exactly in their ability to wait for a change in asylum policies, visa reg-
ulations or facilities offered to refugees in European countries. Stuckedness 
here becomes a potential source of collective power because refugees might 
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say, ‘We can wait’; a strong statement to an overworked and stressed bu-
reaucrat living in a protestant temporality wherein time is a scarce resource.
Waiting may quickly turn into a permanent existential condition. Many 
refugees are young men, and phenomenological time passes faster for young 
than for older people. This implies that when their life is placed on hold, as 
in an asylum process, opportunities seem to pass by quickly, like so many 
handfuls of sand. In a study of waiting in Macedonia, Schubert (2009: 
p. 108) mentions that if someone is not married by the age of 25, they have 
lost the race since they have already begun to lose physical appeal. Hage 
(2018) speaks of Lebanese migrants who initially spend years waiting for 
their visa application to be approved, but who, following migration to Aus-
tralia, say that they ‘cannot wait’ (sic) to return to Lebanon for a visit. The 
lack of a regular, cumulative rhythm in life is implied by the shifting tem-
poralities of the migratory process, where long periods of stasis are punc-
tuated by quick bursts of movement, inactivity interrupted by the flurry of 
movement or the sudden appearance of new opportunities for work or res-
idency. As previously shown (Bendixsen & Eriksen, 2018), and as shown 
by several chapters in this book (e.g. Rozakou, 2020; Jacobsen, 2020), the 
clash between temporalities can be identified in many of the situations refu-
gees engage in: The regimented clock time of the bureaucracy and the NGO 
world of support and volunteering; the indeterminate, empty time of passive 
waiting; the urgent, precious temporal window of sudden opportunities for 
further mobility, work or residency; the slow, degenerative time of ageing; 
the fast time of instant messaging, and so on.
Whereas the smartphone does not transform the inert structures of work, 
housing, residency, bureaucracies and policing, it does offer tools to deal 
with them. Conceptualising waiting as analogous to ‘stalking a prey’ (Cor-
coran, 1989) redefines it as an active pursuit of an elusive goal. The affor-
dances of the smartphone in the hands of undocumented migrants have the 
potential of shifting the weight of waiting from the emptiness of Vladimir 
and Estragon to the fullness of the patient hunter who, like the undocu-
mented migrant, has no train to catch or meeting to attend. The smartphone 
represents an antidote to the empty time of waiting; it enables the migrant to 
engage more efficiently with social (virtual) networking and personal enter-
tainment, take care of collective and individual memory work, using loca-
tion apps to procure services, meet friends and connecting with volunteers, 
among many other things. The smartphone fills temporal gaps which would 
otherwise have been left empty.
* * *
During the heady summer of 2015 and later, mainly Syrian refugees have 
routinely been scolded in tabloids and online forums, and not least by Euro-
pean politicians of certain persuasions, for having the nerve to seek refuge 
in Europe when many of them are demonstrably able to afford expensive 
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smartphones. However, Syrians fleeing their country did not do so in or-
der to escape poverty; they did it because of war and destruction. A survey 
indicated that 86% of the Syrian refugee households in Lebanon had mo-
bile phones, with an additional 6% having access to one (Göransson, 2018). 
We may thus assume that people embarking on the perilous journey, with 
its many dead ends, dangers, frustrations and privations, also have smart-
phones. According to Marie Gillespie (2016), even the poorest refugees gen-
erally have access to a mobile phone, albeit not a state-of-the-art model.
Although time budgeting is not a main preoccupation in the recent re-
search literature about refugees in the Mediterranean basin, the significance 
of the smartphone for temporal coordination and shifts in temporal ori-
entation should not be underestimated. In a not too distant past, when a 
transport of refugees (as this is called by the people known from the media 
as ‘people smugglers’) did not arrive, the person at the receiving end simply 
had to wait at the site designated by his network. Now, he can ask the so-
called smuggler directly why he is late; he could even scold and pester him 
in real time. He would later also use the GPS to locate himself accurately, 
message his uncle in Munich about being on his way, ask his cousin in Düs-
seldorf if he still has a job for the arriving refugees in the informal sector 
and receive live updates on the military and police presence in Mediterra-
nean hotspots or on European borders. The existence of these possibilities 
is empowering to people who cannot rely on formal means of coordination 
and information, and contribute to the time–space compression described 
by David Harvey (1989) decades before the Syrian war and the invention of 
the smartphone.
During and after the so-called Syrian refugee crisis of 2015–2016, several 
groups of researchers have studied the significance of the smartphone for 
contemporary refugees (Gillespie et al., 2016; Eide et al., 2017; Göransson, 
2018; Leurs & Smets, 2018). Media reports also occasionally shed light on 
the issues, as in this quotation from The Economist may elucidate:
In a camp near the French city of Dunkirk, where mostly Iraqi refu-
gees live until they manage to get on a truck to Britain, many walk for 
miles to find free Wi-Fi: according to NGOs working there, the French 
authorities, reluctant to make the camp seem permanent, have stopped 
them providing internet connections. Some of the residents buy pricey 
SIM cards brought over from Britain, where buyers need not show an 
ID, as they must in France. A lucky few get airtime donations from 
charities such as ‘Phone Credit for Refugees and Displaced People.’ 
(The Economist, 11 February 2017)
It speaks volumes of the importance of smartphones for refugees that the 
‘Phone Credit for Refugees’ charity even exists. Its volunteers collect money 
and top-up phones for undocumented refugees in Paris and elsewhere, 
prioritising unaccompanied adolescents and other vulnerable groups. 
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As several researchers and journalists have reported, some refugees state, in 
no uncertain terms, that a functioning SIM card, Wi-Fi access and power 
outlets for charging are their first priorities, well above and beyond the need 
for food and water. This observation brings to mind the following quotation 
from the Irish Times:
Ramiz (20) from Afghanistan is not the oldest member of his group, but 
his smartphone and online social network make him a typical leader 
in this great, modern migration, in which technology and the ability to 
use it play key roles. ‘The last group didn’t make it,’ he mutters, studying 
and swiping the screen of his phone.
(Irish Times, 2015)
A young woman, freshly arrived on a Lesbos beach and taking a selfie – 
smiling, flawless teeth, wavy hair, sunglasses – became a poster child for 
groups and politicians in Europe who wished to delegitimise the refugees. 
What she was actually doing, however, was not tantamount to an attempt 
to collect likes on Facebook or hearts on Instagram. Rather, with the selfie 
she was communicating to her relatives that she had survived the journey 
and was safely, at least for now, in EU territory. As a matter of fact, she was 
being criticised for the mere possibility that she behaved like most Europe-
ans of her age would.
The smartphone has improved internal intelligence services among mi-
grants, knowledge of physical location and options for further mobility, as 
well as continuous contact with those who were left behind or disappeared at 
an earlier junction. Efficiency is enhanced; social networks are maintained 
and expanded; awareness of rights and whereabouts is improved. The Euro-
peans who see the smartphone as a luxury item, associating it with leisure 
and convenience in the smoothly functioning neoliberal information soci-
ety, misinterpret the ubiquity of smartphones among refugees as signifying 
that they belong to a leisured class. As I stressed earlier, bona fide refugees 
do not flee from poverty; they may well have belonged to the global mid-
dle class before being forced to leave everything behind. Among Gillespie 
et al.’s (2016) informants are a well-travelled businessman, an accountant, 
a shop owner, a technology student, a surgeon’s assistant, an accountant, 
an administrator with a law degree and an international salesman in the 
clothing industry. They did not escape economic hardships, but violence 
and insecurity. They are you and me, and their access to smartphone affor-
dances is urgent and crucial, even if they may sometimes, incidentally like 
Norway’s prime minister, be caught playing Candy Crush to fill gaps or kill 
time. Why shouldn’t they, as long as the cushioned and smug majorities do 
the same thing?
Few of the Syrian refugees interviewed by Göransson and collaborators 
owned a smartphone when they crossed the border to Lebanon in 2014 or 
2015, but they were likely to purchase one soon after arrival, seeing it as 
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essential for their new lives (Göransson, 2018). As a matter of fact, the ex-
ponential growth in global smartphone ownership and use coincides with 
the currently eight years of war and displacement in Syria. Although, as 
Gillespie (2016) found, 80% of the refugees in their sample owned a smart-
phone, the gender disparity was – unsurprisingly – considerable, with 94% 
ownership among men and 67% among women. There is nevertheless almost 
universal saturation, since a neighbour is exceedingly likely to have a smart-
phone if you don’t. In order to begin to understand the radical transforma-
tion in question, it may be useful to keep in mind that as late as 1960, just 9% 
of the UK population had a landline, translating into roughly a quarter of 
British households. The majority of the working class and rural Britons ac-
cordingly relied on neighbours or the pub for urgent calls in or out. In other 
words, notwithstanding the development of a great number of platforms 
and services for the Internet-enabled touchphone, simple phone coverage 
is also better in a Syrian refugee settlement in Lebanon than in the United 
Kingdom of a generation ago.
Having set the stage, we can now move on to a consideration of the impli-
cations of the smartphone for temporality in a context of uneven rhythms; 
from the repetitive and slowly unfolding time of open-ended waiting to the 
speed and frenzy of sudden movement between locations on the road, from 
the languid inertia of the port or camp to the exhausting trek across un-
known hills or dangerous drama on the high seas. The smartphone frames 
waiting in particular ways, but it may also function as an antidote to waiting 
by accelerating communication and social connectivity, thereby filling tem-
poral gaps. My focus is mainly on the social implications of the gadget, not 
its cultural or cognitive aspects.
Three interrelated affordances enabled by the smartphone are loca-
tion, networking and micro-coordination. I am using the word affordance 
deliberately and consistently with its initial coinage by the environmental 
psychologist James Gibson (1979; see also Ingold, 2000), who sees it as the 
opportunities and constraints offered by a particular environment, often 
unacknowledged by the actors but inscribed into their bodily actions and 
intravenously shaping their perceptions of their environment, albeit in dif-
ferent ways since different persons (or animals, in Gibson’s analysis) draw 
different resources from their surroundings contingent on their perceived 
needs and intentions. Analogous to engagement with a biotope, the infor-
mation ecology enabled by the smartphone is understood and acted upon in 
a variety of ways depending on the actor’s circumstances and motivations. 
It is a miniaturised world and a complex system irreducible to a formula.
Location
Jordan Frith’s Smartphones as Locative Media (2015), based on the author’s 
PhD dissertation, is one of the few book-length studies of the smartphone 
as a GPS device. Studying his interlocutors’ usage of Google Maps and its 
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competitors, Foursquare and other locative services, Frith shows that al-
though mutual surveillance among friends, that is, exact knowledge of each 
other’s location in real time is now available (think the Marauder’s Map 
of Hogwarts in the world of Harry Potter), it is less common than the au-
thor had initially expected, possibly because of a widespread unwillingness 
to reveal one’s whereabouts owing to concerns about surveillance by little 
brothers as well as the big ones. Several refugees interviewed in the material 
drawn upon here report that they were reluctant to keep the location op-
tion on continuously, although it was necessary to enable Google Maps, for 
fear of being intercepted by hostile governments. Following the entrance of 
refugees into Europe, law enforcers have been known to confiscate phones 
in order to trace the movements of the people detained. State representa-
tives check content, browsing history, messaging and so on, sometimes even 
smashing mobile phones with batons in the awareness that these devices can 
be empowering for their owners (Kjærre, 2019).
The smartphone map and other location-enabled apps (from workout 
applications to travel sites) place the user at the centre, quite the oppo-
site of the case with the conventional map, where the task of finding one’s 
physical location can be a major challenge. With smartphones, refugees 
are always aware of their location; you are the centre of the universe, and 
the task consists in understanding the location of other places. An inbuilt 
feature of Google Maps is time-geographical, since it tells you how long it 
will take you to get to any location with different modes of transportation, 
from foot to bus, ferry, train and Uber. Locative affordances are thus also 
temporal.
Gillespie (2016) found that over a third of the refugees her team had in-
terviewed in camps (38% of them, to be precise) used Google Maps rou-
tinely. Obviously, they knew where they were, but were also exploring the 
surrounding area, and not least procuring options for escaping into Europe 
proper. In this way, distance becomes tangible; as it is filtered through vir-
tuality, place is paradoxically becoming more specific and less abstract; 
while distances, activities and options are easily converted into duration. 
On Google Maps, everybody can become his or her own time-geographer. 
Time and space are not, thus, compressed in this particular instance, but 
turned into workable chronotopes, tangible and specific.
Other stories are more dramatic. A news report from 2015 tells of an Af-
ghan boy who was sitting with others in a container somewhere in England 
when it gradually became hard to breathe. He sent a text message to a vol-
unteer he had met in Calais, alerting her to their predicament, writing in 
broken English that they were running out of oxygen. The group of five sur-
vived because the volunteer could relay her message to a British colleague, 
who in turn contacted the police, who were able to locate the car and save 
the refugees trapped in it (The Independent, 2018). Another story concerns a 
boat on its way from the Turkish coast to Samos. At night, at sea, in Janu-
ary, the engines failed. The waves were high, and the boat was dilapidated. 
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On Google Maps, some of the passengers were able to locate the nearest 
island, and made it there by rowing with their hands (Eide et al., 2017: p. 39).
Another group of refugees had ended up in an uninhabited and remote 
part of an island. Eide et al. (2017: pp. 41–42) tell the story: ‘They were tired 
and uncertain about the direction. From a mountaintop, they could access 
Turkish mobile internet, using GPS to find the way to the nearest village, a 
few hours’ walk away’ (my translation). The same authors also speak of a 
Syrian refugee who had initially paid traffickers to lead him from Budapest 
to Germany, but by accessing Google Maps in the bus discovered that they 
were in fact on their way to the Romanian border.
The accuracy of GPS location, a practical application of Einstein’s general 
theory of relativity, is a double-edged sword. It helps you to locate yourself 
and others, but GPS signals can easily be intercepted by outsiders. Indeed, 
the astonishingly precise, uncannily updated traffic information that can be 
accessed on Google Maps and other designated location devices, mainly re-
lies on the density of mobile phone signals: The shorter the distance between 
each mobile phone, the denser the traffic. It provides information not just 
about space, but about time–space.
Aware of this duality of transparency, some refugees are advised to lose 
their phones upon arrival, enabling them to compose a story of flight that 
might give the appropriate form to their asylum application. Yet, divesting 
yourself of your phone may be more serious, at an existential and practical 
level, than chucking your passport and other identity papers into a bin. One 
of Eide et  al.’s (2017) informants speak of his smartphone as his cultural 
memory. It is filled to capacity with photos, music and digitalised memo-
rabilia from his previous life. To him, the phone miniaturises, encapsulates 
and compresses his biography and thereby frames his current, indetermi-
nate waiting period in a life story which represents a temporality which is 
longer, slower, cumulative and connected to place in a way that cannot be 
achieved in the indeterminate liminal phase. Cloud services may be helpful 
as a means to disembed content from a physical gadget, making it easier for 
people to keep the content while removing it from the body.
Networking
Summing up the social transformations enabled by the smartphone, Ling 
and Lai (2016) state:
Perhaps the most fundamental function of the mobile phone is to make 
us individually available to one another, thus facilitating coordination. 
Indeed, they afford us constant and ubiquitous connectivity. We can 
call one another to just chat, or to arrange (or rearrange) our plans. Un-
til the rise of the smartphone and the mobile Internet, this was mostly 
limited to dyadic interactions. We could call and text to one other per-
son at a time. Thus, we could micro-coordinate (or hyper-coordinate; 
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Ling & Yttri, 2002) our interactions, but with only one person at a time. 
With the coming of smartphones and messaging apps, it became possi-
ble to expand this horizon. We are able to quickly construct groups of 
varying sizes to just chat or to coordinate specific tasks. 
(Ling & Lai, 2016: p. 834)
The smartphone accelerates networking and enables a new rhythm and 
intensity in social interaction. With a basis in interviews with refugees in 
camps, Latonero et  al. (2018: p. 3) conclude: ‘It is clear that mobile tech-
nologies, such as smartphones, messaging apps, translation apps, online 
maps, and mobile banking all contribute to an unprecedented degree of 
connectivity for refugees.’ Several researchers and commentators point out 
that the smartphone is indispensable in the camp for enhancing social cap-
ital through various forms of networking on platforms such as WhatsApp, 
Facebook, Messenger, Skype and, in some cases, LinkedIn, as well as mo-
bile payment services enabling transactions between kin and others in the 
home country. Many use the less widespread networking platform Viber, 
which has superior encryption features, making detection and interception 
difficult. In the camp, the smartphone is used both for the maintenance of 
primary networks, which may be spatially fragmented following the exo-
dus, and for the development of growing secondary networks (weak ties in 
Granovetter’s, (1973), seminal analysis), which may facilitate ventures into 
the housing, educational and employment markets. Smartphones are also 
used extensively to communicate with NGOs, often through dedicated apps 
but also by using common platforms like Messenger, texting or WhatsApp.
The smartphone enables a renegotiation, and often an implosion, of the 
relationship between space and time. The time -space compression afforded 
by the mobile phone has often been commented upon. The implications for 
refugees en route, in camps or in temporary housing in the host country are 
important in the effort to conjure up, spider-like, some of the silvery fila-
ments of social ties that were abruptly severed at the moment of flight. As a 
colleague once quipped, with reference to contemporary white-collar work, 
‘it no longer matters so much whether you’re on time, as long as you’re on-
line.’ Movement, long or short distance, planned or spontaneous, enforced or 
voluntary, which is often necessary for refugees, is choreographed, managed 
and monitored in new ways with smartphones. News may only be trusted 
when they are relayed by friends (a few obviously are trustworthy filterers).
The term social capital needs to be considered in this context, in Cole-
man’s sense rather than Bourdieu’s (Bourdieu, 1972; Coleman, 1988), which 
refers to returns on investments in others. Social capital, in this intellectual 
tradition, may be defined as the sum of other people’s obligations to oneself. 
The often frantic networking and incessant messaging, liking, swiping and 
thumbing engaged in by denizens of the smartphone society in general may 
be triggered by a never fully satisfied yearning for the attention of others. 
For undocumented migrants, the situation is more urgent and critical since 
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their very existence is at stake: physically, existentially, socially, culturally. 
The affordances created by smartphone apps enable not only quotidian net-
working but also the establishment of weak ties via intermediaries, often 
directed towards the formal sector. An ex-refugee interviewed by Gillespie 
and her collaborators (2016) describes his route from being stuck in Tripoli, 
Libya, to regular employment in a skilled job in Beirut through networks 
partly exploited, partly established, with his phone, online. Without the 
availability of instantaneous communication, this job offer would not have 
been possible.
A range of apps, most of them multilingual, have been designed to aid 
refugees, offering information about social services, NGOs and volunteer 
networks, meeting places, language courses, application procedures and lo-
cal information in general. On the other side of the Mare Nostrum (often no 
more distant than the narrow straits separating the Turkish mainland from 
the Greek islands gained, or recovered, following the 1913 Balkan Wars), the 
informal transport companies (people smugglers) advertise their services 
online, using WhatsApp or Facebook. One of the people involved in this 
transport service tells Eide et al. (2017) that his work would have been im-
possible without a smartphone. As a matter of fact, boat refugees crossing 
the Mediterranean or part of the Atlantic to Europe were not unheard of 
before the smartphone revolution. The logistics of transport were different 
then, more sluggish and unpredictable, and less efficient for both parties. 
Many smugglers solicited their services in person, and their prices and of-
fers became known through word of mouth. The wait in the village and in 
key ports was longer, but in the end, the boat left the shore. In this respect, 
the effects on smartphones on the refugee movement from A to B are con-
sistent with its effects in mainstream society, namely to enhance efficiency 
and logistics. Granted that sending an emoji to your sweetheart is not the 
same as asking an acquaintance whether it is safe to cross a border, the un-
derlying principle and the infrastructure on which it depends are identical.
Micro-coordination
Micro-coordination consists in the continuous, instantaneous communica-
tion of future social activities on a dyadic or larger-scale relationship, ena-
bled by apps on the smartphone. The consequences of micro- coordination 
include changes in the phenomenological experience of time as passing, 
instantaneous or enduring, structured or unstructured, accountable or 
fleeting. When activities can be coordinated continuously, they can also be 
tweaked, shifted temporally or even postponed at short notice. The rhythm 
of micro-coordinated living is faster and tighter than that of the previous 
era of the clock and landline, but it is also more flexible, less certain and 
easier to manipulate.
A question that needs to be raised in this context is whether the micro- 
coordination enabled by the smartphone generates, for example, an 
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improved sense of autonomy, increased job opportunities and primary so-
cial control (e.g. of women left at home during the day)? Does it work as an 
antidote against the potential emptiness and directionless character of the 
monotony of the long wait?
Research in the field (such as Gillespie et al., 2016; Leurs & Smets, 2018) 
shows how the smartphone creates affordances which were formerly non- 
existent. As pointed out by Ling and Lai (2016), people with smartphones are 
now individually available regardless of their location. Notwithstanding the 
difficulties of acquiring local SIM cards without a fixed address and identity 
papers, refugees on the move in Europe have, in the space of just a few years, 
become dependent on the phone for a range of essential activities. It reduces 
waiting time because activities can be planned and coordinated in real time, 
it increases knowledge of anything from local geography to the whereabouts 
of family members or the informal job market in Amsterdam, enables calls 
for assistance or casual encounters and makes temporal markers like 09:30 
am irrelevant. In this, the temporal flexibility afforded by the smartphone, 
reducing the importance of universal clock time, contrasts with the formal 
asylum apparatus, which assigns appointments at fixed hours, where delays 
cannot be mitigated through micro-coordination, and where the temporal 
regime remains stuck in a mid-twentieth century rhythm based on the as-
sumption that clock time reigns supreme and that appointments must be 
fixed long in advance. Migrants accustomed to the flexibility of instanta-
neous ‘timeless’ time (Castells, 1997) may find the rigid temporal regime of 
the bureaucracy stifling, inflexible and oppressive. The certainty of assigned 
appointments coupled with the fundamental uncertainties of the migrants’ 
situation confirms Bandak and Janeja’s general assessment of what wait-
ing consists in: ‘Waiting is not to be found merely in the absence of action 
but in an uncertain terrain where what is hoped for may or may not occur’ 
(Bandak & Janeja, 2018: p. 16).
* * *
To many who live in the affluent North Atlantic world, the smartphone is – 
among other things – an entertainment machine, a bottomless and endless 
source of encyclopaedic knowledge, a news service, a gossip generator and 
a weather forecaster. It is in this regard a younger, miniaturised and deter-
ritorialised relative of the newspaper, the cinema, the game arcade and the 
television set.
To refugees in one of their several liminal phases, the smartphone is to 
a greater extent a descendant of the landline and the phone booth, the let-
ter, the postcard, the coffee shop and the physical encounter at the railway 
station or in other locations where recently arrived immigrants typically 
meet. It has turned Wi-Fi and outlets into precious, scarce resources, pre-
cisely because it is a multipronged lifeline. The implications of this framing 
of the smartphone for temporality are many. It creates instantaneity and 
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compresses time and space by enabling regular, instantaneous contact with 
relatives and others in any location. It also expands space and personal-
ises time by creating the possibility of building and maintaining networks 
in the form of ‘imagined communities’ of people who may not know each 
other personally but have a shared agenda and similar backgrounds. It also 
enables new forms of autonomy and monitoring of circumstances, holding 
out a promise of a horizontally networked social world as an alternative 
to the hierarchically structured one, by facilitating non-state, grassroots, 
informal networks operating in real time. Owing to the instantaneous com-
munication obliterating spatial distance, it certainly becomes important as 
a medium for personal networking to people who, before the flight, had an 
indifferent relationship to it.
Yet the virtues of the smartphone as a flexible networking tool are also 
some of its limitations for people with an interest to stay under the radar 
of the state and other institutions bent on controlling their mobility. In the 
space of just a few years, the smartphone has become indispensable, like the 
air we breathe, but for people wedged between a rock and a hard place, that 
air often carries with it a foul smell.
The difference should not be exaggerated. Much of the time, refugees just 
use the smartphone to fill the gaps created by the long wait with enter- or 
infotainment apps, such as games, music or news sites.
In addition, the smartphone is a repository and an archive, freezing previ-
ous moments and storing half-forgotten memories, essential for people who 
have been forced to leave not only belongings but also persons behind. The 
smartphone is not a phone, it is a miniaturised, but enormously powerful, 
time-capsule enabling the storage, expansion and compression of time.
Stories about refugees and smartphones do not merely signal a series of 
changes in the situation of persecuted and precarious people on the move: 
from the boy who saved his life and that of his friends by urgently texting 
a volunteer about oxygen depletion in the car booth to the professionally 
skilled refugee who negotiated a job in Beirut from a camp in Libya, or peo-
ple reaching out to relatives and friends left at home or in another European 
location or the use of apps to manoeuvre through the urban jungle of a for-
eign place. These testimonies say something about a new world, where the 
refugee and the smartphone fit seamlessly into a larger narrative about the 
destabilisation of time and place, horizontal or sideways scaling of the so-
cial, deterritorialisation and the permeability of all kinds of boundaries. It 
may be the case, as Urry (2000) once suggested, that the sociology of a place 
is giving way to a sociology of mobility, but it is probably more accurate to 
conclude that all that is solid indeed melts into air, if not merely in the way 
envisaged by the influential Victorian thinker Karl Marx.
There are affordances involved but no technological determinism. People 
use the phone in ways which were not imagined by their designers. It can be 
used to tweak time in a multitude of ways. As I have shown, it typically com-
presses time and accelerates communication and activities. However, time 
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can also be slowed down deliberately with this technology. As Nicolescu 
(2014) shows in a study of Romanian teenagers, many deliberately used text 
messaging rather than messaging apps in order to introduce a slight delay 
and reduce the normative pressure of responding immediately.
It is worth keeping in mind, at the end, that notwithstanding the accel-
erating affordances offered by smartphone technology, empowering and in 
many ways helpful for people on the move, their situation remains one of 
uncertainty and waiting, their time less cumulative, less structured and less 
directed than they would have wished for. The smartphone sugars the pill 
by facilitating the filling of temporal gaps and accelerating social commu-
nication, but it does not spirit away the more inert and sluggish structural 
conditions shaping the unstable temporal conditions under which undocu-
mented migrants live.
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Part II




A sunny afternoon in November 2017, Mo and I took one of our many walks 
in a park adjacent to the asylum camp where he was living in Hamburg. 
Mo, an Afghan man in his early twenties, had waited for 2 years for the 
answer to his asylum application. As we strolled along, he spoke about his 
longing to meet his family who lived in Iran and how he feared deportation 
to Afghanistan – a country he had never seen. He was ‘constantly thinking 
about the future,’ and about how he might ‘solve his problems,’ as he put it. 
‘Kari, I believe I am slowly going crazy,’ he said. At that point, I feared for 
his life. ‘Do you have an advice for me?’ he asked. I felt a desire to provide 
some form of comfort, to give some advice. ‘What about vocational train-
ing?,’ I said, albeit hesitantly. ‘You know … there is this possibility … with 
vocational training, you can stay.’ Walking next to me, Mo sounded upset 
as he said: ‘But I cannot do it. My mother needs money so badly now. I must 
work. I cannot wait three years.’
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, I wish to address some episte-
mological challenges that emerge upon using waiting as an analytical lens 
in ethnographic research on irregular migration. Second and consequent, 
I want to think about ways to engage with these challenges analytically. Par-
ticularly, I explore how the temporal logic of waiting as an analytic optic in-
tersects with the territorial imaginary of methodological nationalism; that 
is, the assumption that the nation-state is the natural political and social 
form of the modern world (Glick Shiller & Wimmer, 2002: p. 301). Waiting, 
as a temporal imaginary, tends to be structured in terms of an orientation 
towards an anticipated and awaited future (object). Due to this temporal 
structure, I suggest, the imaginary of waiting risks enforcing a conceptual-
isation of the present in terms of lack. With ‘lack,’ I mean to capture how 
the present comes to be thought in terms of incompleteness in relation to 
the suspended and awaited future to which it tends. I argue that this struc-
ture makes the analytical lens susceptible to reinforcing methodological na-
tionalism when it is used in ethnographic research on irregular migration. 
I suggest, that to further the critical potential of waiting as an analytical 
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lens, waiting should be conceptualised in terms of temporal heterogeneity 
and relationality.
The scene opening this chapter took place during an ethnographic field-
work I conducted in Hamburg, Germany, from 2017 to 2018. I moved to 
Hamburg in August 2017, as part of an interdisciplinary project, research-
ing European border practices and the conditions of irregular migrants 
through the analytical lens of ‘waiting,’ thus forming part of a growing 
body of research on waiting and migration (Conlon, 2011; Andersson, 2014: 
p. 166; Bagelman, 2016; Jacobsen and Karlsen, 2020). In the autumn of 2017, 
German migration discourse was marked by the growth of the nationalist 
party (Alternative für Deutschland) and political struggles in the aftermath 
of the increase in numbers of asylum seekers in 2015 and 2016. Between 
2015 and 2017, the German Parliament issued around 20 bills in the field of 
migration legislation (Forum Menschenrechte, 2019), which to a large extent 
curtailed the rights of asylum seekers and raised the required threshold for 
granting asylum statuses. Young, male, single and healthy Afghans, such as 
Mo, had little possibility of being granted with asylum in Germany. How-
ever, Germany’s migration policies have for years also been shaped through 
the state’s concern with demographic change and labour shortage (Sekino, 
2010; Castañeda, 2012; Schultz, 2018). In 2016, with the new Integrations-
gesetz (Integration Act), the German government opened for the possibility 
that some categories of rejected asylum seekers could receive a long-term 
Duldung, that is, a temporary suspension of deportation, if they started 
Berufsausbildung (vocational training, in short: Ausbildung). The regulation 
came with the possibility of a temporary residence permit for those who 
manage to successfully complete training (usually after 3 years). The Ausbil-
dungsduldung implies years of deportability, a standing prohibition against 
travelling abroad, and the ruling out of family reunification. However, in 
2017, people working with asylum seekers whose applications were denied 
began to understand the category of Ausbildungsduldung as a longed for, 
albeit tough, solution; a way out of the precarious condition of irregularity 
and deportability (Scherschel, 2016; Will, 2018; Drangsland, 2020). It was 
within this context that I suggested Ausbildung as a solution to Mo’s ‘prob-
lems,’ as he put it. Responding to his hardship, I reached out for and con-
jured up a trajectory to a future where he could ‘stay’ in Germany. However, 
Mo rejected my advice with a reference to an urgent ‘now,’ pointing out how 
training means a suspension of work-income: ‘My mother needs money so 
badly now.’
My point of departure for this chapter is Mo’s rejection of my sugges-
tion that he started training. Our conversation prompts a critical ques-
tion: From which awaited future do I envision Mo’s ‘now’ and what are 
the ramifications of this temporal positioning to my understanding of his 
life?1 In this chapter, I first approach Mo’s answer as a challenge to think 
through how methodological nationalism informs waiting as an analyti-
cal lens in ethnographic work. Importantly, my response to Mo highlights 
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how spatiotemporal imaginaries, such as methodological nationalism, or 
indeed, waiting, are never solely a matter of thought or contemplation alone. 
Rather, they are performed and practiced in fieldwork as scholars observe 
and take part in migrants’ struggles for their rights and the possibility to 
build a liveable life (De Genova, 2013b). Second, I approach Mo’s challenge 
as a call to be attuned to the complexity and heterogeneity of the ‘now’ of 
the people whose lives researchers scrutinise through the lens of ‘waiting.’
I will elaborate my argument and methodological prism in several stages. 
First, I will supply an account of the research on which I base my discussion 
and provide some methodological considerations. Afterwards, I discuss the 
critique of methodological nationalism in migration research (Wimmer & 
Glick Schiller, 2002; De Genova, 2013b) in relation to some core concep-
tual features of waiting. I argue that the temporal structure of waiting, with 
its configuration of the present as a ‘lack’ in relation to an awaited future, 
might enforce a reductive understanding of irregular migrants’ struggles 
and reinforce a notion of a benevolent state. In the subsequent sections, I 
tune into the stakes of Mo’s answer, while also drawing on other fieldwork 
encounters. In that respect, ‘Mo’s challenge,’ which was the starting point 
of this chapter, also stands for the general challenge of listening carefully 
to people. Drawing on the work of historian Chakrabraty (2000) and geog-
rapher Massey (2005), I argue that the task of analysing the practices and 
experiences of my interlocutors requires opening the lens of waiting to tem-
poral heterogeneity and relationality. Temporal heterogeneity, in this con-
text, involves, on the one hand, an understanding of people as immersed in 
multiple and co-constitutive temporalities. I show in this chapter how such 
temporalities play out on different scales, such as the scale of international 
politics, and at the embodied, daily ‘microlevel’ (Mountz & Hyndman, 2006: 
p. 447) of migrants’ experiences. On the other hand, the lens of temporal 
heterogeneity involves recognising how the ‘now’ of things, places and peo-
ples’ lives are imbued with change, in the sense of being, as Massey puts it, 
‘a constellation of processes’ (Massey, 2005: p. 141). Such an approach opens 
the lens of waiting to multiple and interrelated futures and thus complicates 
any story of waiting as tending towards a foretold end that is spatialised as 
reinsertion into the nation-state. By showing how the experience of waiting 
is shaped through a sense of life as not waiting – that is, how the ‘now’ of 
waiting is relationally lived and imbued with change – I argue furthermore, 
that rethinking waiting in terms of temporal heterogeneity might further its 
potential as a lens for critique of present bordering practices.
Research context and some methodological considerations
My analysis is based on 11 months of ethnographic fieldwork in Hamburg 
(August 2017 to June 2018), and on subsequent contact with eight of my 
interlocutors in the following years. I also draw on fieldwork conducted in 
southern Germany in April 2017.
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I met most of my interlocutors in two asylum camps, or so-called Erstauf-
nahmeeinrichtungen (EAE). EAE camps provide provisional housing, often 
barracks. In 2017, asylum seekers were obliged to stay in such camps during 
their first 6 months in Germany. Yet, Hamburg was coping with the increase 
in the number of asylum seekers in 2015 and 2016, and the average time of 
residency in EAE camps in 2017 was longer (Zentraler Koordinierungsstab 
Flüchtlinge, 2017). At the time of my fieldwork, some of my interlocutors, 
including Mo, have been living in such camps for more than 18 months. 
The majority of my interlocutors in the camps were Syrian families or men 
with a Dublin decision or a Duldung status, as well as male Afghan asylum 
seekers who were either awaiting their asylum decision or holding a Dul-
dung.2 As this account may testify, the vast majority of the inhabitants in 
the camps were men. I also got in contact with people through two human-
itarian organisations working with irregular migrants. The people I met in 
these arenas were mostly from Ghana or other West African countries and 
were either holding a Duldung or living unauthorised in Germany.
Since I contextualise my discussion in relation to the German Ausbil-
dungsduldung, this legal construct needs some explanation. The Duldung is 
not a residence permit but prescribes a temporary suspension of deporta-
tion (normally 3–6 months), due to legal, humanitarian or factual reasons. It 
can be renewed, and many live in this condition for years. Studies have high-
lighted the Duldung as a condition of rightlessness, uncertainty and social 
stigma (Castañeda, 2010; Mitrić, 2013; Drangsland, 2019; Herbert Brücker, 
2019). As opposed to this finding, state and humanitarian actors have 
tended to frame the 2016 Ausbildungsduldung as providing migrants with 
future prospects (Drangsland, 2020). Its novelty was that it prescribes that 
appropriate training might provide the ‘tolerated’ (geduldet) migrant with a 
legal right to a suspension of deportation for the full duration of training. 
Furthermore, upon successful completion of the training period migrants 
acquire the right for a 2-year work-related residence permit, with the pos-
sibility of renewal. However, the 2016 Ausbildungsduldung was not given to 
Dublin migrants, or (with some exceptions) to people from so-called secure 
third countries. Thus, it excluded most of my Syrian and Ghanaian inter-
locutors.3 My conversation with Mo highlights young and able Afghans as 
a target group for the Ausbildungsduldung in Hamburg.4 Germany had, with 
some exception, stopped most deportations to Afghanistan in 2017 (Pro 
Asyl, 2019). Afghans, when receiving their deportation decision would thus 
also receive a Duldung. As was the case for Mo, this form of Duldung would 
(with some exceptions) give the right to a restricted work permit (Voigt, 
2020).
Before I move on, two clarifications are required. First, to secure their 
anonymity, I have changed my interlocutors’ names and slightly altered 
features of their biographies, including the spatiotemporal markers of our 
encounters. Second, there is a need to be clear about the different situations 
for people waiting for an asylum decision and for those outside the asylum 
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institution. On the one hand, my interlocutors in the camp, including Mo, 
commonly used the German verb warten (wait) to describe the exhausting 
situation of awaiting the asylum application decision. My West African in-
terlocutors, on the other hand, seldom referred to their situation in terms 
of ‘waiting’ but rather described it as a condition of ‘struggling,’ thereby 
narrating their present situation as part of a life-long struggle for a viable 
life.5 The majority had years of migration behind them, often in precarious 
material and legal conditions.
These differences highlight ‘waiting’ as a diverse condition. Importantly 
however, also the Afghans with whom I spent time often described their 
lives in Afghanistan or Iran in terms of struggling to make do in the context 
of an uncertain future. A topic of our conversation was how, for some in-
terlocutors, the present condition in Hamburg formed part of a generalised 
condition of uncertainty. As Ali, a young Afghan man, once said: ‘My prob-
lem here is the same as in Afghanistan: An uncertain future.’ This sense of 
generalised uncertainty recalls Vigh’s (2008) argument regarding the West-
ern conception of ‘crisis’ as an exceptional condition. Drawing on fieldwork 
in Guinea-Bissau, Vigh describes how crisis becomes a context of life, which 
forces people to ‘make lives in fragmented and volatile worlds rather than 
waiting for normalisation and reconfiguration’ (2008: p. 8). By reading the 
notion of waiting through a lens of relational space and temporal heteroge-
neity, I seek to nuance the understanding of how waiting is experienced and 
practiced and, furthermore, the conceptualisation of waiting as a state that 
tends towards ‘normalisation,’ which, when the research object is irregular 
migration, often is spatialised in terms of reinsertion into a territorial, na-
tional order.
Methodological nationalism and waiting’s ‘not yet’
In their seminal text on methodological nationalism in the social sciences, 
Glick Schiller and Wimmer contend that ‘nation building, the control and 
restriction of immigration and the rise of a social science preoccupation 
with migration are interlinked processes’ (2002: p. 302). They argue for the 
need to scrutinise the epistemological ramifications of the predominant 
assumption within migration research ‘that the nation/state/society is the 
natural social and political form of the modern world’ (Wimmer & Glick 
Schiller, 2002: p. 301). Additionally, they criticise migration research for 
inattentiveness to nationalism and its effect on nation-building processes 
and argue that empirical research tends to be circumscribed by the territo-
rial boundaries of nation-states. Within the German context, Hess (2015) 
has shown how methodological nationalism operates in research on ‘guest 
workers’ and migrant integration to essentialise migrant identities and 
naturalise national (and racialised) policy concerns. In a similar vein, De 
Genova (2002, 2013a) has shown how methodological nationalism works to 
naturalise migrant illegality and conceal its political and legal production. 
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In this often-unexamined spatial imaginary, the refugee and the irregular 
migrant are positioned as a problem and denied, as Arendt (1967) argues, 
rights and protection. Through writing and fieldwork practices, De Gen-
ova argues, researchers participate, unwittingly or consciously, ‘in the very 
same socio-political processes and struggles through which the “national” 
configuration of “society” (or, the social field) is reified’ (2013b: p. 251). He 
calls for a self-reflexive critique of how research ‘contributes to the ongoing 
nationalisation of “society”’ (2013b: p. 252).
One researcher who has taken up the call to think critically about how 
methodological nationalism informs research that takes migrants’ wait-
ing as its object of study and analytical lens is the anthropologist Ramsay 
(2017). Exploring humanitarian and policy discourses on migrants’ pro-
tracted waiting in refugee camps, she argues that these discourses narrate 
migrants’ displacement and waiting as a story that ‘begins at exodus, when 
refugees lose the national identity of their origin country, and is resolved 
when the refugee is once again re-inserted into a context of national iden-
tification’ (Ramsay, 2017: p. 18). This one-directional temporal logic, she 
argues, also pervades research literature, with consequences for how policy 
and migrants’ experiences are analysed. Drawing amongst others on Vigh’s 
(2008) critique of the exceptionalism that pervades scholarly work on crisis, 
she argues that displacement tends to be conceptualised, as a ‘a juncture 
in time, as a condition of temporal liminality in which refugees and other 
kinds of irregular migrants are seemingly permanently suspended in the im-
mediacy of the present’ (Ramsay, 2017: p. 18). To her, the metaphor of ‘lim-
inality,’ used in anthropology to capture transitional rites, signals a logic of 
temporal linearity and transition. It might, she suggests, reinforce a concep-
tion of migration as a crisis in relation to the normal (national) social fabric. 
Through ethnographic work with migrant displacement and resettlement 
programs to Australia, she (2017) shows how this logic reduces the complex-
ity of migrants’ lives and reproduces instead a notion of a benevolent state 
as the redemptive endpoint to waiting (see also Drangsland, 2019).
Ramsay’ argument recalls the work of scholars such as Salih and Richter- 
Devroe (2018) and Malkki (1995, 2012) who, through empirical work with 
Palestinian refugees and with Hutu refugees in Tanzania, show how the 
organising logic of territorial nation-states informs thinking about dis-
placement, statelessness and dispossession. All these three scholarly works 
highlight how methodological nationalism functions, in thinking and writ-
ing, as a ‘chronotopic’ (Bakthin, 1981) imaginary; that is, an imaginary 
that performs and ‘project[s] premises about’ (Kelly, 1998: p. 843) ways of 
thinking space and time, including people’s presents and futures. In other 
words, to paraphrase Kelly’s discussion of the large-scale chronotopic im-
aginaries of modernity and globalisation, methodological nationalism 
‘establish[s] space-time possibilities’ (Kelly, 1998: p. 843; see also Klinke, 
2013). In relation to migrant displacement, methodological nationalism op-
erates to conjure up a trajectory that tends towards a future ‘that already 
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is foretold’ (Massey, 2005: p. 68) as reinsertion into ‘the national order of 
things’ (Malkki, 1995: p. 495).
What I want to draw attention to in the following, and thus changing the 
gaze somewhat, is how the analytic optic of waiting carries with it some con-
ceptual features, which, I argue, make it susceptible to reinforcing method-
ological nationalism. This focus is important, because while waiting often is 
deployed to investigate the temporal dimensions of borders and migration, 
how time is thought is often left implicit. Consequently, waiting’s chrono-
topic functions remain unexplored. Since I am unable to provide a thorough 
analysis of the conceptual ‘baggage’ (Desjarlais, 1997: p. 11) of waiting in 
this short essay, I will merely point to two interrelated features that tend 
to characterise waiting as a temporal imaginary to make my argument. 
These are the orientation of waiting ‘towards’ (or, perhaps rather ‘from’) an 
awaited future; and a related conceptualisation of the present in terms of 
lack and incompleteness in relation to this future.
Waiting as a chronotopic imaginary
Tracing the etymology of the verb ‘to wait’ from the German meaning 
to guard and the French meaning to watch, Bissell shows how the verb 
 suggests ‘a sense of anticipatory preparedness – a lying-in-wait-for’ (2007: 
p. 282). Drawing from this, he argues that an understanding of waiting as 
some form of anticipation is common within Western thought. Waiting, he 
contends, is often seen as brought about and necessitated by ‘the promise’ of 
an ‘event-to-come’ (Bissell, 2007: p. 282; see also Rotter, 2016). This t emporal 
configuration, he notes, is visible both within eschatological conceptualis-
ations of waiting (see also Vanstone, 2006) and within research literature 
that is underpinned by the linear temporal model associated with capital-
ism. Within the latter temporal model, waiting generally, as Lahad (2017) 
observes, carries negative associations and is understood as a ‘wasted’ time 
that should be eliminated or minimised for the sake of a more productive 
time.
Visible here, I suggest, is how waiting, as a chronotopic concept, tends to 
be oriented towards a still absent future (its anticipated end). This temporal 
structure also underlies Bourdieu’s thinking about waiting and power on 
which many (migration) scholars have fruitfully drawn (Jeffrey, 2008; Hage, 
2009; Auyero, 2011; Bagelman, 2016). Waiting is a relation to time where 
‘we anticipate the future as too slow in coming,’ Bourdieu (2000: p. 209) 
argues, quoting Pascal. Bourdieu’s work on waiting highlights that intrin-
sic to conceptualisations of waiting’s ‘now’ (the state of anticipation) is its 
configuration in terms of some form of lack in relation to, absence of or dis-
tance from the awaited future. Indeed, when Bourdieu, discussing waiting 
as form of power, notes that destroying hope implies ‘killing the waiting it-
self’ (Bourdieu, 2000: p. 228), or when Crapanzano states that in waiting the 
world’s ‘only meaning lies in the future – in the arrival or non-arrival of the 
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object of waiting’ (in Rotter, 2016: p. 81), they highlight an imaginary that 
posits the ‘now’ as analytically meaningful solely in relation to the awaited 
(hoped for) object or future. In other words, waiting’s ‘now’ becomes legible 
as the ‘not yet’ of the awaited future (waiting’s end).6
It should be noted here that thinking the present as a relation to the fu-
ture means different things for scholars, such as Bourdieu and Crapanzano, 
given the underpinning conceptualisations of time (Hodges, 2008; Peder-
sen, 2012). Bissell’s work (2007), for example, highlights that while ‘waiting’ 
within mobility studies is thought in terms of temporal linearity, the concept 
also often implies a messianic temporality (see also Vanstone, 2006). Often 
however, as Ramsay (2017) notes, the underpinning conceptualisations of 
time are left implicit in work on waiting. My concern is that, as far as its tem-
poral structure and chronotopic function are left implicit, the analytic optic 
of waiting risks enforcing a reading of the present in terms of lack when 
applied in ethnographic research. This is so, because while the awaited fu-
ture (waiting’s ‘end’) already figures in its ‘now,’ it has still not ‘arrived.’ In 
other words, in the chronotope of waiting, the ‘now’ remains a condition of 
incompleteness in relation to the awaited future that it tends towards. When 
waiting is used as lens in empirical research, it thus matters how the future 
is imagined and spatialised.
Practicing the spatiotemporal imaginary of waiting in fieldwork
My interest here is what happens when the chronotopic imaginary of wait-
ing is deployed as a lens in empirical research. In order to answer this ques-
tion, I believe, we must acknowledge how researchers not only practice their 
(our) spatiotemporal imaginaries when writing up the analysis (Massey, 
2005). Indeed, spatiotemporal imaginaries are also practiced in embodied 
and affective fieldwork encounters in contexts where (political) nationalism 
materialises through law and policy. As De Genova argues, ‘the dilemma of 
methodological nationalism is never simply a matter of not thinking critical 
enough’ (2013b: p. 251, my italics). Faced with irregular migrants’ struggles 
in conditions of deportability and violence, researchers reach out for and 
temporalise time in relation to available futures (Bourdieu, 2000). Such 
futures are currently possible, as Hage (2003: p. 15) has noted, primarily 
within national societies that work as mechanisms for the distribution of a 
dignified and meaningful social life. In this context, waiting, as a chrono-
topic imaginary, is spatialised in particular ways, and concepts such as de-
lay, immobility and movement acquire normative meanings.
My encounter with Mo might illustrate this point. When I conjured up 
the future horizon of training, I took part in a broader societal discourse 
on the Ausbildungsduldung. As I have detailed elsewhere (Drangsland, 2020), 
the predominant discursive framing of the Ausbildungsduldung in 2017 was 
as a possibility and hope for tolerated migrants. In public and humani-
tarian discourses, it was coded as future oriented and in terms of activity 
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(training) and movement towards a secure and viable life in Germany. As 
Mitrić (2013) argues, the Duldung is more than a regulation. It is a form 
of chronotopic ‘storytelling in which the state narrates itself’ (2013: p. 166) 
to constitute certain meanings and scenarios of belonging. However, while 
Mitrić shows how the Duldung as such has functioned to ‘map’ (2013: p. 134) 
the tolerated migrant as outside to, or rather, as ‘suspended in’ (2013: 
p. 134) the space and time of the German nation-state, the Ausbildungsduldung 
is structured, in public discourse, as a time of transition, through training, 
towards Aufenthalt. Illustratively of its temporal structure is how the So-
cial Democratic Party (SPD), in the context of policy discourses on labour 
shortage and demographic change, has framed the Ausbildungsduldung in 
terms of Spurwechsel (lane-change) for (rejected) asylum seekers, that is, as 
a change of lane or tier from asylum to work on the journey towards the im-
agined end-station of Aufenthalt (residence permit) (SPD, 2018; Starzmann, 
2018; Voigt, 2018; Walter, 2019).7 The future is, as Massey puts it, ‘inscribed 
into the story’ (2005: p. 68). This was also the story in which training could 
appear as solution to me. I seemed to have already known the future that 
was ‘too slow in coming’ for Mo. I approached his now, and his ‘problems,’ 
as he put it, as the ‘not yet’ of this (awaited) future: Training will enable him 
to move towards a secure future defined and spatialised through Aufenthalt.
Mo challenges such a reading of the Ausbildungsduldung in terms of move-
ment. Defining training as a condition of waiting, his answer enhances and 
rearticulates the Ausbildungsduldung as a condition of delay and immobility. 
Importantly however, he does this by referring to a ‘now’ that ‘cannot wait.’ 
In other words, it is by highlighting how his ‘now’ is relational and config-
ured in terms of movement and change that he makes the Ausbildungsdul-
dung visible as a condition of waiting. Thereby, while his answer challenges 
an understanding of the Ausbildungsduldung in terms of movement, it at the 
same time complicates a reading of his waiting in terms of stasis and immo-
bility. The challenge he posits to ‘thinking waiting’ recalls Chakrabarty’s 
(2000) critique from a very different field; the critique of historical discourse. 
Arguing that academic historical reasoning positions contemporary people 
and places in a developmental process towards a foretold future ‘whose the-
oretical subject [is] Europe’ (Chakrabarty, 2000: p. 34), Chakrabarty shows 
that to read people’s lives from the perspective of a foretold (known) future 
is conditional on an occlusion of the plurality of forms of belonging and 
temporalities people are immersed in. His work opens for an acknowledge-
ment of the plurality of futures people envision for themselves, and that are 
practiced and produced as people live their lives in a web of spatiotempo-
ral  relations – relations that are, as Massey (2005) argues, always relations 
of power. Inspired by this critique, I address the challenge Mo poses as a 
challenge to read waiting against its ‘one story’ structure, forged within the 
nation-state frame – a story that might easily be creeping into writing. To 
paraphrase Vigh, what is at stake is a matter of ‘freeing the concept from its 
temporal confines and thereby putting it to analytical use’ (2008: p. 9).
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A method of temporal heterogeneity
Scholars have taken different steps to ‘de-naturaliz[e] the national in re-
search methodologies’ (Amelina & Faist, 2012: p. 1707). This includes, for 
example, different forms of transnational methodologies (Mountz, 2011; 
Casas-Cortes et  al., 2015; Hess, 2015) and relational approaches to space 
(Amelina & Faist, 2012). In relation to the spatiotemporal imaginary of 
waiting, this critique requires, to paraphrase Chakrabarty (2000: p. 45) 
again, displacing the nation-state from the centre towards which the time of 
waiting gravitates. This could be done in different ways. Ramsay’s analyt-
ical move attempts to undermine the conception of citizenship as waiting’s 
end. Studying her interlocutors’ encounters with the Australian state, she 
shows how a sense of displacement and exclusionary practices endure after 
resettlement (Ramsay, 2017). Ramsay’s move takes on salience in relation to 
Germany’s extensive use of temporary residence permits, renewal of which, 
for some legal statuses, requires economic self-sufficiency. As one Nigerian 
man said, reflecting on the difference between his temporary residence per-
mit and the previous Duldung (with a work permit): ‘When you are recog-
nised, it’s also another race, it’s like, you have to chase the paper, you know, 
like proving to them you want another year, by working… .’ By referring to 
his struggle for papers as a ‘race,’ which awaken associations of competi-
tion, speed and exhaustion, he highlighted the continuous struggle to find 
work in a racialised labour market, and the precariousness of his inclusion 
(Karlsen, 2015), temporally, legally and materially, into the German state. 
It should be mentioned here, however, that when he talked about his life in 
Germany, he also stressed how his experiences formed part of a life-long 
struggle to make a viable life for himself in different locations. He narrated 
his life in Hamburg as part of a longer and open-ended journey: From strug-
gling to find work as a young man in Accra, through years in Libya where 
he earned good money, to his flight to Europe in 2011 and subsequent years 
without secure work, legal status or family in Italy. While my focus in this 
chapter is on the future, this is a reminder of the meaning of the past for how 
people experience waiting (see, e.g. Hage, 2018). In that regard, a reductive 
reading of waiting’s ‘now’ might not only be related to a conception of citi-
zenship as waiting’s end but also to an equation of waiting’s beginning with 
the migrant’s ‘arrival’ on a state territory.
I will, however, make another move to tune into the stakes of Mo’s now – 
stakes that, as Mo’s answer indicates, evade understanding if his life is im-
agined primarily as tending towards an awaited future of Aufenthalt. This 
move implies rethinking the temporalities or temporal structure of waiting. 
As a response to ‘Mo’s challenge,’ the questions I address in the rest of this 
chapter are: What is the potential for knowing if we address Mo’s ‘now’ 
through an analytical lens (waiting) that starts out with its relational char-
acter, that is, how his now is also his mother’s now? What happens if we 
address waiting (object of study) through a notion of temporal heterogeneity 
Waiting and methodological nationalism 85
and how might this move challenge methodological nationalism? Asking 
these questions, I am inspired by Chakrabarty (2000) and Massey (2005), 
who from their different perspectives within postcolonial history and fem-
inist geography, argue that questioning teleological narratives, such as mo-
dernity or globalisation, necessarily implies questioning the underpinning 
conceptions of time. While their respective objects of study were history and 
space, their works are useful for my purpose to think through the analytical 
optic of waiting in relation to the chronotopic function of methodological 
nationalism. This is so because in different ways these authors show how 
thinking time in terms of temporal heterogeneity and relationality chal-
lenges the tendency of scholars’ analyses to, and here I paraphrase Chakra-
barty, ‘sum up [the] present[s]’ (2000: p. 251) of people’ struggles from the 
perspective of a foretold future, be it modernity, globalisation, or – as in the 
present case – a re-established national order. Their work is also a reminder 
that thinking about colonial others as ‘waiting’ to arrive in a future forged 
in the imaginary of the European nation-state carries racialised and essen-
tialising normative assumptions (Chakrabarty, 2000: p. 8).8 If I am right that 
waiting easily entails a reading of migrants’ now as a condition of lack in 
relation to a future of politico-legal inclusion (a future where the researcher 
often already is situated), their critique has relevance for my discussion: It is 
a reminder to question one’s own ‘speaking position’ (Massey, 2005: p. 87) 
when telling stories about people waiting to ‘enter’ Europe.
Mo’s challenge: rethinking waiting’s ‘now’
I first met Mo in August 2017 and then continued to see him on a weekly 
basis throughout my fieldwork. Although he hoped for a positive answer to 
his asylum application, his fear of deportation was intense, and he nervously 
followed news on German deportation flights to Afghanistan. Walking in 
the park that November day, when he said he feared he was ‘going crazy,’ I 
was worried by the pitch and tone of his voice. I knew he had stopped vol-
unteering, stopped drawing, which he loved, and that he did not eat much. 
The young man, who had always lived with his family and from childhood 
worked long hours in a carpentry, was tired and exhausted by the ‘cumula-
tive stress’ (Mountz, 2011: p. 388) of unemployment, loneliness and fear. To 
respond to his despair, I decided to point to the possibility of training, and, 
thereby, to conjure up a path to a future in Germany.
My response to Mo was surely affective and embodied. Nevertheless, as 
I have suggested to posit the Ausbildungsduldung as a solution presupposes 
a reductive reading of his now. At the least, it presupposes what Hage has 
called a ‘labour of disentanglement’ (2018: p. 204) of the different waiting(s) 
producing his condition. As Hage notes, when researchers ‘produce one 
form of waiting as an ethnographic example, they surely must have already 
disentangled it from other forms of waiting it coexists with’ (2018: p. 204). 
Thus, he argues, it is crucial that researchers make visible their analytical 
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labour of disentanglement. What I want to point out here, however, is that 
the labour of disentanglement that make the Ausbildungsduldung appear as 
a solution, simultaneously implies an act that ‘envelops other kinds of times’ 
(Chakrabarty 2000: p. 16) and future horizons in the time of the Spur – the 
time defined through the German state and its economic interests (Mitrić, 
2013; Drangsland, 2020). Mo’s answer demonstrates that for him waiting for 
Aufenthalt was ‘fused’ (Hage, 2018: p. 204) with his mother’s own waiting 
for him to send money. It was fused in ways that make full-time training (no 
work-income) undesirable as a solution.
When Mo rejects training on the grounds that ‘he cannot wait,’ he clearly 
refers to the obligation to provide for his family immediately. Mo’s family, 
who at that time lived in Iran, struggled to make a living in the context of 
poverty and a precarious legal status (for research on Afghan migrants in 
Iran, see Christensen, 2016; Khosravi, 2017). Mo’s obligation to send money 
highlights a general obligation prevalent amongst my Afghan and West Af-
rican interlocutors, and underlines the usefulness of remittance as a lens 
from which to grasp migration as a transnational phenomenon (Nieswand, 
2014). Mo’s mentioning of his mother, however, captures a broader concern 
for his family that fused with his fear of deportation and the uncertainty 
regarding his legal status.
In 2018, two of Mo’s siblings in Iran married. The expectation on Mo 
to contribute economically to their weddings became a core topic of our 
conversations, as did the sense of frustration and longing since he could 
not attend their weddings. Furthermore, their marriages implied that his 
aging parents would now be living alone, which raised his concerns. Then, 
in the spring of 2018, international occurrences gave a new dimension to his 
waiting. Mo used to show me his family pictures or newsfeeds of Taliban 
killings of Hazara people, the ethnic group to which he belonged, on his 
phone. In the spring 2018, he started showing me newsfeed articles quoting 
the president of the United States of America, Donald Trump, threatening 
Iran, in relation to Iran’s nuclear program. Rising food prices throughout 
2018 and 2019, in the context of the USA sanctions, affected Mo’s family 
and put a pressure on him, affectively and economically, that fused with 
his navigations of awaiting the asylum decision and later (in the autumn of 
2018) receiving the Duldung.
Mo’s situation illustrates how ‘the self is ultimately tied to the social,’ as 
Vigh (2008: p. 15) puts it. Furthermore, his embodied condition of waiting 
appears as produced through relations spanning (and producing) spaces and 
spatiotemporal scales (as the scale of international politics, life course). Im-
portant to the argument here is Massey’s (2005) insight that to acknowledge 
space and people’s lives as produced through interrelations, that is, through 
‘interactions, from the immensity of the global to the intimately tiny’ (2005: 
p. 9), opens up for thinking the ‘now’ (be it of a place, a thing, a subjectiv-
ity) as a constellation of a multiplicity of forms of living and temporalities 
‘which puls[ate] at different beats’ (Massey, 2005: p. 158). The ‘now’ thus 
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appears as heterogenous and as imbued with change. Drawing on Massey 
(2005), Mo’s condition (of waiting) might be approached as a constellation 
of interrelations, that are biological, material, legal and affective. Impor-
tantly, these are also relations of power (in which the researcher is situated). 
To start understanding Mo’s movement towards ‘crazy,’ which importantly 
involves more fully grasping the effects of waiting as a bordering technique, 
one must, to put it simply, understand that his now is also his mother’s now. 
Furthermore, one must understand that this heterogenous and relational 
now cannot wait, as Mo says. While, as mentioned, he surely refers to the ur-
gent needs of his family, I suggest that his statement prompts a more general 
consideration of the role of time and change when thinking of waiting. The 
urgency of his now points towards manifold futures, appearing in his strug-
gle in Hamburg as, to paraphrase Chakrabarty ‘a movement of existence, 
whose direction is futural’ (2008: p. 251). This futural direction is visible in 
his will to work and to be a good son, his siblings’ marriages, his mother’s 
possible exhaustion. By grasping the relational character of waiting, the an-
alytical optic might be opened for a consideration of time in terms of change 
and becoming in ways that complicate a reading of migrants’ now from the 
perspective of a foretold future.
‘I cannot wait’
In ethnographic research on irregular migration, waiting is often described 
as a condition of immobility and slowness (Griffiths et al., 2013; Andersson, 
2014). Such a sense of slow time and existential immobility (Hage, 2009) was 
tangible in my fieldwork, especially in the camps and for people without a 
work permit (Mitrić, 2013; Drangsland, 2020). However, this temporalisa-
tion of time was deeply entangled with a sense of life not waiting. Indeed, an 
experience of the world’s uncontrollable movement shaped my interlocutors’ 
negotiations of spatial and existential immobility.
This entanglement of stasis and change, which also comes across in Mo’s 
story, was forcefully present in my work with people from West Africa. With 
the exception of one older man, all were in the age of childbearing, as de-
fined biologically (especially for women) and through gendered and heter-
onormative norms. A common theme in our conversations was a painful 
sense of time passing in terms of ‘age going,’ as one Ghanaian man put it, 
without having children because of an insecure legal and material situation. 
Their considerations recall Clark’s (1999) research amongst Asante traders 
who, she argues, ‘consider parenthood an essential element of both male 
and female gender and of personhood in the deepest sense’ (1999: p. 417). 
I often discussed these issues with John (36), a Ghanaian IT-engineer who 
had lived unauthorised in Hamburg for 2 years, working two hours daily 
washing dishes. Reflecting about his own and other Ghanaians’ situation as 
‘undocumented’ (his words) in relation to the importance of parenthood, he 
once said: ‘You have to be careful or else you can stay three or four years in 
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this situation. You are not growing any younger. If you do not watch out, age 
will catch up with you.’
John’s description of competing with the uncontrollable passing of time, 
of struggling not to be overhauled, but without the necessary means to do 
so, illustrates a common topic when my interlocutors described their (gen-
dered) situation. It recalls Bourdieu’s theorisations of waiting as a relation 
to time that occurs when people ‘feel directly the breaking of the tacit col-
lusion’ (2000: p. 209) of their socially grounded life expectations and the 
course of the world (astronomical, social and biological processes) over 
which they have no or little power. Indeed, for John, the condition of waiting 
and ‘watching out’ in Hamburg, was in some sense a break of his ‘normal’ 
life in Ghana, where he had enjoyed a high rank in his congregation, and 
in periods earned good money from selling fish. However, for many people 
I worked with, who had been unemployed or worked in precarious condi-
tions in Ghana or elsewhere, their situation in Hamburg formed part of ‘a 
persistent circumstance’ (Vigh, 2008: p. 9) of fragmentation and ‘somatic, 
social and existential incoherence’ (Vigh, 2008: p. 9), as Vigh puts it in his 
endeavour to rethink crisis away from its analytical association with rup-
ture. Interestingly, after he had returned to Ghana and was struggling to 
find work and rebuild his life there, John told me: ‘Life in here is no different 
from being undocumented in Hamburg. You still struggle to make a move; 
the only difference is you do not fear deportation,’ subsequently explaining 
that to ‘make a move,’ means to become a parent/have children.
To highlight and question waiting’s analytical association with a ‘break,’ 
is indeed important in the context of irregular migration, where, as already 
mentioned, this break easily is spatialised as a break with the territorial or-
der of nation-states. There is however another aspect of this association of 
waiting with a break or rupture, that is important to my argument. John’s 
practice of ‘watching out’ in Hamburg – which illustrates a general sense of 
alertness to the stakes of being ‘undocumented’ amongst my interlocutors – 
points to how his condition of waiting, rather than a break with, is im-
bricated in the ‘course of the world’ (Bourdieu, 2000: p. 209) in terms of 
biological processes and social, normative and material relations (Massey, 
2005). What fuels John’s statements with such urgency – indeed, what de-
fines his ‘relation to time,’ to use Bourdieu’s words – is the embodied ex-
perience that life, when waiting, does not wait (see also Povinelli, 2011). 
When age ‘catches up with him,’ the future he has envisioned for himself 
(defined through fatherhood) will not be obtainable. The insight he conveys 
for thinking of waiting, I suggest, is that to grasp the stakes of people’s 
struggles, the conceptualisation of waiting’s now in relation to a future that 
is ‘too slow in coming’ (Bourdieu, 2000: p. 209) must be fused with an im-
age of the future, or rather, futures, as always in becoming (Massey, 2005). 
This insight, furthermore, implies also recognising how people envision 
different futures for themselves; futures that are also differently spatialised 
(Vigh, 2008).
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Concluding discussion: ‘to read “lack” otherwise’
Starting out with ‘Mo’s challenge’ to my thinking, as he counters my 
quite-hesitant suggestion regarding Ausbildung, this chapter’s objective has 
been to investigate the analytical optic of waiting in relation to methodo-
logical nationalism, and to unpack some ramifications of these imaginaries 
for how researchers understand migrants’ now(s), their lives and struggles. 
Such an investigation, which involves being reflexive about one’s (my) own 
research practices, is important in the context of a growing literature ad-
dressing migration through the analytical lens of waiting, and, furthermore, 
in relation to the prevalence of techniques of deferral in the bordering prac-
tices of Germany and the European Union (Bagelman, 2016; Will, 2018).
A core argument in this chapter is that the temporal structure of waiting, 
when used as an analytical optic in ethnographic work on irregular migra-
tion, makes it susceptible to methodological nationalism. I have identified 
this temporal structure as an orientation towards an (awaited) future and 
a related reading of the now in terms of lack in relation to this future. Em-
ployed in research on irregular migration, the analytical lens of waiting eas-
ily, I suggest, conjures up a story about migrants’ now(s) as tending towards 
a future (waiting’s end) that is spatialised as reinsertion into a nation-state.
Such a reading entails a reductive understanding of migrants’ lives and 
might reinforce the nation-state frame. Stating this, I do not intend to di-
vert attention away from how migrants’ lives are conditioned by the ab-
sence of legal rights. Indeed, waiting gains analytical power exactly from 
its ability to capture how borders operate through deferral and tenuous 
future promises (Andersson, 2014; Bagelman, 2016; Barber & Lem, 2018; 
Drangsland, 2019). In other words, as an analytic optic waiting enables 
ethnographers to see how insecurity and absence of legal rights materialise 
in migrants’ lives as poverty, deteriorating health and legal and material 
obstacles for pursuing life projects. This context exhausts people, such as 
Mo. On the contrary, it is the acknowledgement of the importance of ex-
ploring the predicaments of those who are made waiting (Bourdieu, 2000) 
that makes it pertinent to thinking through waiting’s temporal structure 
when putting it to analytical use.
I have suggested that one possible move to strengthen the analytical use-
fulness of waiting, by way of wrenching it out of the ‘one story’ structure, is 
to rethink the ‘now’ of waiting in terms of relationality and heterogeneity.
In some ways, to think waiting through a notion of relationality and het-
erogeneity could be framed as an act, to quote Chakrabarty out of con-
text, to ‘read “lack” otherwise’ (2000: p. 34). In this chapter, I have used the 
notion of ‘lack’ to capture how the analytical imaginary of waiting, when 
used in migration research, might enforce a reading of migrants’ ‘now’ as 
incomplete in relation to a future nation-state reinsertion. In ethnographic 
work with irregular migrants however, ‘lack’ also manifests materially in 
irregular migrants’ ‘nows,’ in the sense that their lives are shaped through 
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violent techniques of suspension, immobilisation and spatial confinement. 
To read lack otherwise in this sense, thus, would involve more fully grasping 
the predicaments of those made to wait. Indeed, to rethink the time of wait-
ing in terms of temporal heterogeneity and relationality furthers the con-
cept’s analytical purchase for grasping the temporal dimensions of borders. 
It opens the analytical lens for the stakes of Mo’s answer. This approach 
conjures into sight that because Mo’s relationally lived now ‘cannot wait,’ the 
Ausbildungsduldung, with its suspension of work-income and prohibition to 
travel, implies for him not movement, but immobility. His life is made up of 
other trajectories than the ‘lane’ of the Ausbildungsduldung and of other fu-
tures than its foreseen end-station. In other words, Mo’s answer makes vis-
ible that narrating the Ausbildungsduldung in terms of movement, not only 
works to conceal its effects of stasis and deferral, but that this imaginary 
paradoxically also occludes movement and change, in the sense of occluding 
the other trajectories, ‘lanes’ and movements that form his life.
This leads me to another meaning intended by my suggestion to read lack 
otherwise. For Chakrabarty (2000), to ‘read “lack” otherwise,’ was part of 
his critique against how historicism situated the Indian subject in terms of 
failure or lack in relation to modernity. To him, to read lack otherwise was 
certainly not a quest for better grasping lack and absence. On the contrary, 
it was a quest for an inversion; to read ‘plenitude’ and ‘creativity’ instead 
of lack (Chakrabarty, 2000: p. 34). In relation to waiting, to read lack oth-
erwise in this sense, implies rethinking the now; from its conceptualisation 
as a ‘not yet’ of reinsertion into the national order, to a lived, relational and 
spatially embedded ‘now.’ To start understanding Mo’s challenge, in other 
words, involves grasping the various ways he and other people struggle to 
make a life for themselves, in relation to violent border practices.
In different ways, both Chakrabarty and Massey highlight that to think 
time in terms of relationality and heterogeneity opens for questioning stories 
that posit people and places as heading towards an already defined, foretold 
future. To acknowledge (places and) people’s lives as produced through in-
terrelations and the now as inherently heterogeneous is, Massey (2005) ar-
gues, a condition for thinking politics at all, because it entails thinking the 
future as open (see also Chakrabarty, 2000; Grosz, 2011). Recalling this ar-
gument here, I am not making a claim for approaching irregular migrants’ 
waiting in terms of becoming or potentiality in any celebratory manner. 
Indeed, Mo’s condition of moving towards ‘becoming crazy’ shows how 
waiting is a ‘corrosive’ (Mulhall, 2014) and exhaustive condition. Peoples’ 
ability to create liveable futures for themselves is unevenly distributed, and 
the relations through which people’s lives are shaped are, as Massey (2005) 
argues, always relations of power. Yet, to acknowledge that things could 
be otherwise and to open up for the multiple ways of living and practicing 
futures is a prerequisite for a critical engagement with methodological na-
tionalism (De Genova, 2013b). Here lies also a critical potential of opening 
the lens of waiting to temporal heterogeneity and relationality.
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Notes
 1 The term ‘now’ is problematical. My choice to use ‘now’ comes from my effort 
to figure out what is at stake in Mo’s reference to a ‘now.’ At the outset, I define 
it loosely as a lived present. My discussions of temporal imaginaries will add 
substance to this definition.
 2 A ‘Dublin decision’ refers to the fact that other European Union countries are 
held responsible for their asylum applications according to the European Union 
Dublin Regulation. 
 3 In 2017, Ghana, Senegal, Albania, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Serbia were defined as secure third countries. 
 4 Afghans were the third largest group of asylum seekers in Germany in 2017. 
However, in the same year only around 45% of Afghans received some form of 
protection (Gesamtschutzquote; (cf. Deutscher Bundestag, 2018).
 5 All conversations with Afghan and Syrian interlocutors were held in German, 
while my conversations with West-Africans were held in English.
 6 My thinking here is inspired by Chakrabarty’s (2000: p. 8) discussion of waiting 
and the ‘not yet’ of historicism.
 7 The (politically contested) notion ‘Spurwechsel’ was used by politicians, human-
itarian actors and public media in relation to Germany’s first Skilled Immigra-
tion Act (Fachkräfteeinwanderungsgesetz), which was ratified by the Bundesrat 
in June 2019 as part of a package of migration laws (Migrationspaket). The no-
tion describes more generally a policy that facilitates a transition from asylum to 
work as a path to a German residence permit, of which the Ausbildungsduldung 
is one of several measures (see e.g. Bojadzijev et  al., 2016: p. 269, Will, 2018: 
p. 173).
 8 For a discussion of such mechanism in Germany, see Mitrić (2013) and (Niess, 
2018).
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Introduction
Three months before I began my fieldwork in June 2015 in eMalahleni, a 
coal-mining town in South Africa’s Mpumalanga Province, the government 
had launched a major nationwide crime-fighting blitz code named Oper-
ation Fiela. ‘Fiela’ in Sesotho means ‘sweep away,’ hence the operation’s 
aim was to sweep away crime in South Africa. The police, accompanied by 
the military and immigration officials, launched numerous raids across the 
country in neighbourhoods, taxi ranks and other places suspected of har-
bouring ‘criminals.’ However, civil society groups condemned the operation 
as ‘state-sponsored xenophobia’ (Velapi, 2015) after noting that it largely 
targeted ‘illegal’ foreign nationals as the most likely perpetrators of crime. 
The numbers behind the operation corroborated these claims: 1,123 of the 
2,908 arrests made on July 30 and 31, 2015, countrywide were undocumented 
migrants; between April and July the same year, government deported over 
15,000 people who were in South Africa ‘illegally’ (Maromo, 2015). Civil 
society organisations recorded several cases where foreign nationals were 
rounded up in pre-dawn raids, denied access to legal representation or de-
ported without due process (Allison, 2015). The period of Operation Fiela 
turned into a ‘moment of acute deportability’ (Ellis & Stam, 2017: p. 333), 
wherein increased migration enforcement repeatedly reminded undocu-
mented migrants of their susceptibility to arrest and deportation.
In eMalahleni, police officials continued launching sporadic smaller-scale 
raids searching for undocumented migrants even after the end of Operation 
Fiela. Sometimes, the raids were dramatic, especially in Elandeni,1 an in-
formal settlement on the outskirts of eMalahleni town, where most of the 
undocumented Zimbabwean migrants lived. The police would unpredict-
ably descend on Elandeni in convoys, armed with guns, and round up un-
documented migrants. Sometimes they would conduct arbitrary stop and 
search missions, stopping suspected migrants in the streets and other public 
spaces and demanding to see their passports or permits. These enforcement 
practices, representing what De Genova (2002: p. 436) calls ‘the spectacle 
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of enforcement,’ constantly re-enacted undocumented migrants’ sense of 
deportability, which is the state of living with arrest and deportation as a 
ubiquitous possibility, even if not actually effected (De Genova, 2002).
In this chapter, I examine how migration control in South Africa informs 
undocumented migrants’ sense and use of time. By making the prospects of 
arrest and deportation more perceptible, I suggest that migration control 
not only accentuates undocumented migrants’ sense of deportability but 
also plunges them into a profound state of ‘temporal irregularity.’ Social 
life, that is, social situations, events and activities, according to Zerubavel 
(1981), is fairly structured on the basis of time. Zerubavel has importantly 
highlighted four major dimensions of the temporal profile of any situation 
or event. First is the sequential structure of situations and events, which 
tells us in what order they take place. Second is their duration, which tells us 
how long a situation or event will last. Third is the temporal location, which 
designates when an event or situation will take place. And the fourth param-
eter is the rate of recurrence that tells us how often an event or situation (re)
occurs. These parameters establish and maintain temporal regularity and 
thus stability in people’s lives. Temporal regularity helps considerably in 
developing a sense of orderliness. By providing a ‘highly reliable repertoire 
of what is expected, likely or unlikely to take place within certain temporal 
boundaries, [temporal regularity] adds a strong touch of predictability to 
the world around us …’ (Zerubavel, 1981: p. 12). Accordingly, on the other 
end, temporal irregularity contributes to the development of a strong sense 
of uncertainty.
Temporal irregularity, I suggest, is conceptually significant in studying 
the lived experiences of deportable migrants who are always subjected to 
the threat/possibility of arrest and deportation. It draws attention to how 
unpredictability and uncertainty both in terms of future horizon and daily 
routine can negatively affect migrants’ well-being. In this chapter, I show 
that the discursive and material mobilisation of deportation by the South 
African state as well as its citizens drew my interlocutors into a temporal 
experience where they lived contemplating, fearfully, the possibility of ar-
rest and deportation, but remained unsure when and how this would hap-
pen. I frame this temporal paradox of deportability, in which deportation 
was experienced as an inevitable prospect, but with no certain timeframe, 
as an experience of waiting whereby deportable migrants in South Africa 
anticipate and ‘wait’ for the ultimate materialisation of deportation. All of 
my research participants initially arrived in South Africa to look for work 
and imagined deportation as inevitable. This was because the country’s 
highly selective and restrictive skills-based migration policy availed very 
limited opportunities for so-called ‘less-skilled’ migrant workers to obtain 
work permits or regularise their stay, making deportation their ultimate fate 
(Dlamini, 2019).
The undocumented migrants who participated in this study were men 
and women between the ages of early twenties to late forties who worked 
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as domestic workers, private security guards, casual workers in the con-
struction sector as well as daily-wage workers. Some were living with their 
families in eMalahleni, while others had close family members, including 
children, who they were financially supporting back in Zimbabwe. Through 
in-depth interviews and informal conversations, my interlocutors told me 
their experiences of encounters with migration control. There was a gen-
eral consensus that migration control makes the risks and costs of mobility 
significantly high, producing ‘processes of entrapment’ (Núñez & Heyman, 
2007; Talavera et al., 2010) for undocumented migrants within the borders 
of South Africa. Such entrapment was not about migrants being absolutely 
nailed to the ground but more about how they were constricted by the high 
risks and costs of movement (Núñez & Heyman, 2007).
In the sections below, I situate migration control in South Africa within 
existing debates on the control of migration and how migration enforce-
ment makes deportability more palpable to undocumented migrants. I then 
examine how both migration policing and the heightened sense of deport-
ability engender a temporal experience of waiting among undocumented 
migrants, whereby they wait for something that can happen anytime, or 
rather hope for something not to happen – namely, arrest and deporta-
tion. Finally, I examine how the consequences of anticipating deportation 
as highly likely become the central organising condition in undocumented 
migrants’ lives.
Migration control and deportability
In response to the increased movement of people across national bounda-
ries, migrant-receiving countries around the world have ratcheted up their 
efforts to control migration (Walters, 2002; Cornelius & Tsuda, 2004). 
Many countries have militarised and intensified the control of border areas 
and surveillance of interior spaces (Nevins, 2001; Fassin, 2011), tightened 
restrictions on the employment and access to other services for undocu-
mented migrants (Perea, 1997) and imposed harsher sanctions on those who 
defy immigration regulations (Campbell, 2006). Deportation is increasingly 
becoming the ‘ubiquitous penalty for any immigration violation’ (Stumpf, 
2009: p. 1684) and a normalised practice of migration control (Bloch & 
Schuster, 2005). Deportation not only forces undocumented migrants to 
leave a certain state territory but also propagates anxiety and terror among 
those who remain as not-yet-deported but facing the prospect of arrest and 
deportation (De Genova, 2002; Willen, 2007).
One of the objectives and functions of South Africa’s migration control 
regime, according to the Immigration Act No. 13 of 2002, Section 2 (1)(g), is 
to promote ‘a climate within the Republic, which encourages illegal foreign-
ers to depart voluntarily.’ The aim is to unsettle undocumented migrants 
through regular and systematic intimidation so that they will be forced by 
circumstances to leave ‘voluntarily’ (Klaaren & Ramji, 2001).
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Political debates on migration in South Africa are awash with fear- 
mongering assertions that ‘illegal’ migrants are flooding the country and are 
viewed as a major impediment to the country’s ambitious agendas of politi-
cal transformation, economic development and poverty alleviation (Vigne-
swaran, 2011). Undocumented migrants are blamed for the socio-economic 
malaise in the country: Unemployment, crime and poor service delivery 
among others (Minnaar & Hough, 1996; Danso & McDonald, 2001; Alfaro- 
Velcamp & Shaw, 2016). The then Deputy Minister of Police, Bongani 
Mkongi, during a press-briefing in July 2017 following his visit to Hillbrow 
Police Station in Johannesburg to assess issues of crime and illegal trading 
in Hillbrow and surrounding areas, lashed at foreigners:
How can a city in South Africa be 80% foreign nationals? That is dan-
gerous; that in Hillbrow and surrounding areas, South Africans have 
surrendered their own city to the foreign nationals… if we do not de-
bate that, that necessarily means the whole of South Africa could be 
80% dominated by foreign nationals and the future president of South 
Africa could be a foreign national… . The arms that are being used here 
in Hillbrow, are arms of war which are unlicensed. The hijacking of 
buildings here in Hillbrow it’s a sign of taking over power… by people… 
that we don’t know… . These buildings are being hijacked by criminals. 
(Lekabe, 2017)
While Bongani Mkongi’s claim that 80% of the people in Hillbrow and sur-
rounding areas were foreign migrants was dismissed as unsubstantiated 
according to existing data (Africa Check, 2019; Heleta, 2019), the Deputy 
Minister of Police portrayed undocumented migrants (‘people that we don’t 
know’) as invading Hillbrow and South Africa at large. His message implied 
that South Africa was under attack from a foreign enemy, who put the na-
tion and its people at risk, and, therefore, called for a fight back. His com-
ments reflect the general sentiment across the country – citizens and some 
politicians have been accusing the government of failing to act decisively to 
stop ‘illegal foreigners’ from entering the country (Dodson, 2000; Crush & 
McDonald, 2001; Crush & Dodson, 2007; Tati, 2008; Vigneswaran, 2011). 
There has thus been an increasing call for the tightening of border controls, 
intensification of in-country migration control measures and deportation as 
the most prudent remedies to the problem of ‘illegal’ migration.
However, scholars have lamented that South Africa’s migration control 
regime lacks a coherent policy framework, which has caused a disjuncture 
between policy in principle and practice (Vigneswaran, 2011). Vigneswaran 
notes that senior government officials were doubtful of the effectiveness of 
a control-oriented migration policy to stem the problem of ‘illegal’ migra-
tion. For example, in 2003, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, then minister of the de-
partment of home affairs (DHA), came to the morose conclusion that ‘to 
think we will ever overcome the problem is a dream’ (Peta, 2003; cited in: 
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Vigneswaran, 2011: p. 110). Paradoxically, while policy-makers in senior gov-
ernment positions admitted to the failures of a control-oriented approach, 
policy implementers on the ground were quite active in enforcing controls, 
which resulted in a hard-line policy framework (Vigneswaran et al., 2010; 
Vigneswaran, 2011).
Police officials are thus publicly known in South Africa to invest consid-
erable time and energy in arresting and detaining undocumented migrants. 
In Gauteng Province, which is the major destination for many migrants, 
police officers spend more than a quarter of their time at work searching 
for, arresting and deporting foreign nationals (Vigneswaran & Duponchel, 
2009). In that respect, Vigneswaran (2011) notes that there has been no clar-
ity on what an alternative policy might look like. Landau (2005) has made a 
similar observation, noting that South Africa’s migration policy tacitly cre-
ates and legitimises parallel systems of migration control that often involve 
exceptional, extra-legal practices in policing foreigners.
While state officials are the major actors in instituting the deportation 
regime, citizens have also been tasked with detecting ‘illegal’ foreigners. The 
police encourage ‘community enforcement’ measures that place the onus on 
citizens to report the presence of ‘illegal’ foreigners (Vigneswaran, 2011). 
Furthermore, until the late 1990s, the DHA even established a toll-free 
number and offered reward money to those who reported undocumented 
migrants (Klaaren & Ramji, 2001). Landau (2005) lamented that such 
extra-legal policing practices license the targeting and restraining of ‘illegal’ 
foreigners by whatever means state officials and citizens deem appropriate. 
This, therefore, makes undocumented migrants vulnerable to vigilante ‘jus-
tice’ enacted by citizens, which often result in violent anti-immigrant at-
tacks. The latest of such attacks happened at the beginning of September 
2019. Such acts of vigilantism resemble the Minutemen Project in the United 
States of America (USA) in April 2005, which saw citizens, who were dis-
gruntled by the failure of the US government to secure the borders against 
the ‘millions of illegal migrants’ allegedly flowing into the USA, set up ‘cit-
izen patrols’ along the Arizona–Mexico border to monitor and report ‘ille-
gal’ migrants (Chavez, 2007).
South Africa’s control-oriented approach to migration has produced a re-
markable rise in deportation numbers. Between 1995 and 2010, South Africa 
deported more than 150,000 people every year (Vigneswaran, 2011). From 
April 2009, deportations nonetheless plummeted after the DHA declared 
a moratorium on the deportation of Zimbabweans and launched instead a 
special legalisation programme – the Dispensation of Zimbabweans Project 
(DZP) – specifically dealing with Zimbabweans who had been in the country 
‘illegally.’ The moratorium ended in July 2011. In the 2013–2014 reporting 
year, deportations rose again to over 130,000 (DHA Annual Report, 2014).
However, these policies hardly achieved the presumed goal of mass de-
portation; rather, while some undocumented migrants were deported, 
most remained un-deported subjected to the threat of deportation, that is, 
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deportability (De Genova, 2002). Below I illustrate how the omnipresent 
prospect of deportation came to define the temporal horizons of undocu-
mented Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa. 
Deportation: an inevitable but indeterminate prospect
In eMalahleni, besides the larger nation-wide operations targeting undocu-
mented migrants such as Operation Fiela, the more basic migration control 
measures include random passport inspections and police raids. These in-
creased the chances of migrants encountering the everyday forms of police 
surveillance, thereby compounding the risk of arrest and making the threat 
of deportation more apparent. My interlocutors reported that the police 
often target those places where migrants are easy to find such as Isibindi 
Center, a shopping mall where daily-wage workers, predominantly men, 
congregate to be picked for a day’s work, or Elandeni.
Just like the larger operations, the police conduct these more basic control 
measures as a spectacle. Rutendo Mutero, who worked as a live-out domes-
tic worker and lived in Elandeni with her husband and two children, told 
me she has always been surprised to see armed police entering in convoys 
into Elandeni ‘just to look for people with no papers.’ Rutendo was indeed 
perplexed by the amount of resources and energy the police expended on 
searching for migrants with no papers. ‘If you [were to] see them coming 
here,’ she told me, ‘you would think that they are going for a war. But they 
are just looking for people who have no papers.’ Rutendo condemned the 
practices of policing migrants as affirming the stereotypes that associate 
‘illegal’ migrants with criminality; she said: ‘Precisely because when [South 
Africans] see [the police] coming here in their cars and with guns like that, 
doing what they do to us, they would just think that we are criminals.’
In another interview, Earnest Mudzviti, a daily-wage worker in his 
mid-forties, expressed shock at the way the police stopped migrants and 
demanded their passports without ascertaining whether one was a migrant 
or not, to the extent that he believed migrants were easily identifiable. He 
recounted an incident when the police stopped him and his two friends as 
they were walking along a road leading to Elandeni after a day’s work. The 
police, imitating an action-movie-style raid, abruptly stopped them; before 
the vehicle came to a complete halt, two gun-wielding police officers jumped 
out of the moving car, pointed guns at them and ordered at the top of their 
voices: ‘Show us your passports!’ Earnest and his friends were stupefied by 
the way the police officers acted as if they had seen some dangerously armed 
criminals. Feeling completely helpless, he and his friends just froze, raised 
their hands in surrender as the police officers carelessly ransacked their 
pockets. Neither Earnest nor his friends had passports. The police officers 
eventually released them, not before taking all their earnings for that day – 
about R550 (approximately US$40) – and threatening them with arrest and 
deportation were they to catch them again not carrying their passports. 
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This was not the first time Earnest was randomly stopped by the police; he 
told me they once stopped him in Johannesburg and asked for his passport, 
and again, only released him after extorting money.
The two incidents above show how the police make migration control 
a spectacle, which renders migrant ‘illegality’ spectacularly visible as an 
embodied signifier of difference and danger or criminality. As Rutendo 
remarked, this consolidates the stereotypical representation of undocu-
mented migrants as dangerous criminals that should be dealt with violently. 
But more importantly, such encounters pose a major risk of arrest and de-
tention for purposes of deportation to those migrants who have ‘no papers.’ 
Likewise, given that in such encounters the police officials’ personal discre-
tion and ultimate decision-making power is almost absolute (Vigneswaran 
et al., 2010), there is a huge risk of migrants losing money through extortion 
as Earnest and his friends’ case may testify. While extortion often led to the 
release of the undocumented migrants from the hands of the police, they 
were always threatened with the promise that ‘the next time’ they are caught 
they would be arrested and deported.
The threat of arrest and deportation did not only become palpable when 
the migrants came in direct contact with state officials. Some migrants im-
agined and anticipated arrest and deportation even when they were not in 
the immediate clutches of migration control. Many with whom I spoke en-
visaged the potentiality of their arrest and deportation by drawing on or 
relating to stories of other ‘illegal’ migrants’ experiences. The possibility of 
arrest and deportation gravitated towards reality when the undocumented 
migrants heard stories of the arrest and deportation of other undocumented 
migrants. They would begin to feel that their time is running out as well, 
fearing that they would be next. Rumbidzai Chikono, who worked as a live-
out domestic worker, discussed how she imagined deportation as something 
that would also happen to her even though she had not encountered the po-
lice: ‘I know about this [deportation]; it happened to others who did not have 
papers like me; if this happened to them, it can also happen to me.’ Clearly, 
the stories of other undocumented migrants who have been arrested and 
deported were a constant reminder to those that were still un-deported that 
their time (to be arrested and deported) would also come.
As I mentioned earlier, South African citizens are a significant stakeholder 
in the deportation regime. However, they hardly play their officially sanc-
tioned role of reporting ‘illegal’ foreigners to state officials (Vigneswaran, 
2011); instead, they make the threats of deportation more perceptible through 
threatening to violently expel foreigners. As Tsitsi Shumba puts this:
With [South Africans], anytime chinogona kungo colour (tensions can 
escalate); they can start saying: ‘We don’t want to see [illegal] foreign-
ers here; they must go back to their country.’ When they start saying 
that then you know that it is now dangerous; you should be prepared 
to leave.
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Such threats are often an overture for xenophobic violence. The study par-
ticipants revealed that sometimes citizens circulate the message that ‘we are 
coming for you’ to foreigners through social media platforms like WhatsApp 
and Facebook or other media-like flyers. The most recent occurrence took 
place in early September 2019. Days before the violent attacks on foreigners, 
Nyevero, one of the people I maintained contact with after I left eMalahleni, 
forwarded me a message that was circulating on WhatsApp warning of a 
mass shutdown and calling on South Africans ‘to come together as South 
Africans with one voice of enough is enough, on selling of drugs, on prop-
erty theft, and on our work [being] taken by foreign nationals.’ The message 
concluded with the phrase, ‘South Africa for South Africans. This is not 
xenophobia but the truth.’ Because of these publicised threats, my interloc-
utors apprehensively anticipated deportation as an unpredictable, dreaded 
and inevitable socio-political predicament. The threats worked as a discipli-
nary instrument that perfectly served to remind them of their unbelonging 
and that their presence in South Africa will someday be terminated.
For these undocumented migrants, the threat of deportation was tremen-
dously productive in shaping their consciousness of being ‘illegal,’ unwanted 
and deportable, as the following response shows:
We know that this [being in South Africa as an illegal foreigner] will end 
one day. [But] you never know when you are going to be arrested and 
deported. My brother, I am not a prophet, but I know that one day [we] 
will be chased out of this country. 
(Taonga Makombe)
While Taonga’s assertion elicits some degree of certainty over the immi-
nence of undocumented migrants’ expulsion from South Africa, it is also 
coloured with a lack of certainty over when (and how) this is likely to hap-
pen. Again, given the different actors involved in the deportation regime, 
the migrants were also uncertain over who would cause their expulsion – is 
it state officials or the generality of South African citizens?
Living in a state of anticipatory preparedness
The temporal paradox of deportability in which undocumented migrants 
imagined deportation as an inevitable prospect which has no certain time-
frame for its actual materialisation thrust some undocumented Zimbabwean 
migrants into a state of anticipatory preparedness where they lived in antic-
ipation of expulsion. Highlighting this state of anticipatory preparedness, 
Precious Tirivanhu, a domestic worker in her late thirties, stated that un-
documented migrants ‘must be prepared for anything’ as they can be forced 
out of South Africa any day either through deportation or xenophobic vio-
lence. Being ‘prepared for anything’ means being vigilant and calculative of 
the risks and costs of remaining in South Africa. It is this anticipation and 
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readiness to leave that invokes the idea of waiting as ‘a sense of anticipatory 
preparedness – a lying-in-wait-for’ (Bissell, 2007: p. 282). As the migrants 
wait for arrest and deportation to materialise, they also vigilantly wait for 
the risks and costs of remaining in South Africa to reach a certain threshold 
beyond which they see life in South Africa as unbearable; until then, they 
‘must be prepared’ to leave.
The inability to accurately map or predict what would likely happen to 
them as the threat of deportation intensified, pressured some to leave ‘vol-
untarily.’ For example, Taonga Makombe, who I met in June 2015 after he 
had been in South Africa as a first-time arrival for 5 months, complained 
after experiencing the intense policing of migrants during Operation Fiela 
that: ‘I can’t live like a criminal, always running away from the police; this 
is not a life at all. I would rather suffer [in Zimbabwe] and enjoy my peace.’ 
When I returned to eMalahleni in August 2015, I was told that he had in-
deed ‘packed his bags’ and returned to Zimbabwe. For Taonga, being al-
ways on the lookout for the police and unable to know what would happen 
forced him to ‘choose’ to return to Zimbabwe. Deportability placed Taonga 
in a state of complete uncertainty, confirming Bourdieu’s (2000: p. 228) ob-
servation that absolute power places others ‘in total uncertainty by offering 
no scope to their capacity to predict.’
For those who remained in South Africa, the constant threats of arrest 
and deportation, and xenophobic attacks discouraged them from making 
any durable investments in Elandeni as Beulah’s case aptly demonstrates. 
When I visited her for the first time in 2015, she took me to her home, a 
single-roomed shack built on a cement slab with loosely joined and rusty 
corrugated iron sheets. The gaps in the walls were stuffed with rags to block 
wind and dust, which made the room poorly lit. Inside was a visibly old 
double bed on one side of the walls and piled in a corner were two large suit-
cases. In the opposite side of the bed was the kitchen. Offering me a 20-litre 
plastic bucket and desperate to make me understand why she was living 
under such poor conditions, Beulah said:
Your niece has no chair in the house uncle; you have to sit on this 
bucket. Tiri vana Mugaradzakasungwa ([It’s because] we are people who 
live with bags packed.) We don’t know what can happen, anytime things 
can escalate and we will be chased out.
I turned the bucket upside down and sat behind the half-opened door.
Living in a scantily furnished house in an informal settlement, with bags 
packed, demonstrated Beulah’s preparedness to leave, and is an important 
trope signifying the life of people who, when things escalate, were ever-ready 
to ‘pick up’ their bags and leave. Beulah did not have many possessions in 
her house because, due to the threat of expulsion, the possibility of long-
term settlement remained uncertain. Having a chair in such circumstances 
would imply a relaxed lifestyle, which was far from real for her and the other 
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undocumented migrants. The understanding that at any time they could be 
forced to leave South Africa forced Beulah to tolerate a life of discomfort. 
This did not mean she distasted living comfortably; instead, she feared that 
in the event of deportation, she would lose her property.
Indeed, previous research on the deportation of undocumented migrants 
from South Africa found that migrants are not usually given the chance to 
take their possessions during deportation (Human Rights Watch, 2007). The 
fear of losing possessions during the process of deportation caused Beulah 
to defer the possibility of a comfortable life to her probable return to Zimba-
bwe. She saw her present lifestyle of discomfort and squalor in South Africa 
as temporary. Despite living in an informal settlement and sleeping on a torn 
old bed, Beulah boasted that in Zimbabwe, she has already built for herself a 
two-bedroom house furnished with a comfortable bed. She was now saving 
money to buy sofas to send home. So, the life she lived in Elandeni suited her 
condition of being deportable and she summed it by saying ‘Izvi ndezvekuno’ 
(This [life of discomfort] is just for the meantime, while we are here.)
Just waiting?
The perceived inevitability of deportation, and fear thereof, created some 
form of existential hiatus which some of my interlocutors captured in the 
phrase ‘we are [now] just waiting… .’ Due to the ever-present threat of de-
portation that was re-enacted through the everyday practices of migration 
control, Sam Tizora felt that remaining un-deported ‘does not help at all 
because we are going to be chased out anyway.’ Donald Mutsvedu, who was 
working as a security guard, recounted how the police had intensified mi-
gration control in the name of fighting crime and said: ‘Now we are just wait-
ing to be chased out of the country.’ Sam and Donald lived their lives in a 
narrowly circumscribed present where they lived ‘just’ waiting for their fate. 
For them, ‘just waiting’ was a discursive way of underlining their heightened 
sense of vulnerability to deportation based on feelings of being unwanted, 
which strengthened their experiences of deportability.
Donald’s statement that ‘We are [now] just waiting …’ thus evokes a state 
of total resignation to fate wherein he was expecting his ultimate deporta-
tion while time just passed by. Such form of waiting, as a subjective experi-
ence of undocumented migrants’ time in South Africa, suggests an interval 
of suspension or pause in action while waiting for the actual deportation 
to happen. In other writings on waiting, the time of anticipation is simi-
larly portrayed as ‘sitting’ and/or ‘doing nothing’ (Tirado, 2018); or useless, 
wasted time (Schweizer, 2008). This suggests that the lives of people in wait-
ing are put ‘on hold’ (Bloch, 2014) – they just (sit and) wait.
However, as Jacobsen and Karlsen highlighted in the introduction to this 
book, the idea of conceptualising waiting as a temporal disjuncture has 
some analytical deficits. This is so because, I suggest, beyond the narrative 
of ‘living with our bags packed [and waiting]’ and ‘just [sitting and] waiting,’ 
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my interlocutors were hardly trapped in a temporal fixity where they just 
‘sit,’ ‘do nothing’ and wait. The idea of ‘just waiting’ leaves one wonder-
ing what waiting is and uncovers how difficult it is to delimit the temporal 
boundaries of where waiting begins and ends. Importantly, the assumed 
empty time of waiting was brimming with activity; the deportable migrants 
were not in fact ‘just [sitting and] waiting.’ Rather, they were involved in dif-
ferent activities such as working or looking for work during the week, as well 
as in various social activities such as attending church services on weekends.
The understanding that anytime one could be arrested and deported, left 
my interlocutors feeling as if they were living off borrowed time; that they 
had no more time left to remain in South Africa. This strongly incentivised 
some of them to maximise their time. They saw the time of their precarious 
presence as a precious resource that ought to be used productively. Tsitsi 
Shumba worried about this:
Every day I pray to God that we can be here (in South Africa) for a little 
longer; my child is still in school in Zimbabwe. How will I pay for his 
fees if I am deported?
Because of her parental responsibilities, Tsitsi wished her deportation would 
only happen in the far future. For Tsitsi, the threat of deportation made her 
treasure her time before the ‘inevitable’ manifestation of deportation and 
wished for actual deportation to be delayed. Remaining un-deported pro-
longed the time to work and be able to accrue more, albeit under uncertain 
and exploitative conditions. For this reason, Tsitsi prayed thanking God 
for protection every day when she reached home safely from work without 
getting into trouble with the police.
While it appears difficult to mark the boundaries between the beginning 
and ending of waiting, scholars have underscored a common characteristic 
of waiting; it is an ambivalent time and space, an ‘in between’ (Sutton et al., 
2011). This means that there is always a ‘before’ and an ‘after’ in relation to 
waiting, which implies linear time (waiting for the arrival or fulfilment of 
the object being waited for). For deportable migrants, their waiting time 
sits between the time before their potential apprehension and the time after 
their eventual deportation; hence Donald Mutsvedu’s remark that ‘…we are 
just waiting to be chased out of the country,’ meaning their time of waiting 
ends with their deportation. While the migrants revealed that those who 
get deported may be able to re-enter ‘illegally,’ the costs of re-entry may be 
so high that it could be delayed as one tries to raise enough money, or com-
pletely abandoned if one fails to raise the necessary funds.
Turner (1983: p. 308) hypothesised that prolonged experiences of waiting 
‘lead to a declining sense of urgency and correspondingly reduced vigilance 
and preparedness.’ This hypothesis predicts no loss of conviction that the 
object being waited for would eventually come; instead, people just become 
less vigilant. This is also true for some undocumented migrants who had 
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lived in a palpable sense of deportability for a long time; their fear that is 
incited by the threat of deportation had reached a point of saturation, and 
as such, they cared less about the possibility of deportation. In fact, many 
had mastered the art of avoiding detection and arrest. Sthabile Mnyulwa, 
who had been in South Africa since 2005, said she was now less afraid of 
the police because she could mask her foreignness and ‘illegality.’ ‘I’m not 
afraid of them anymore,’ she told me. ‘I now speak Zulu fluently and if they 
stop me, they will think I am a South African.’ Indeed, I met some undoc-
umented Zimbabweans whom, before I was told were Zimbabweans, I had 
initially mistaken them for South African citizens.
Temporal irregularity and uncertainty in everyday life
So far, I noted that undocumented migrants’ experiences of deportability 
lacked a fixed temporal specificity, which is a specific timeframe or precise 
deadline as a promise for the actual materialisation of the event being waited 
for – arrest and deportation. Rather, deportability subjected the migrants 
to a state of indefinite waiting; it could either be very long, or there could be 
a sudden dramatic end to one’s time of being present in South Africa. The 
ever-present threat of deportation and migrants’ inability to predict when 
arrest and deportation would materialise made such waiting a period of 
uncertainty as attested by Rumbidzai Chikono: ‘Sometimes you go to work, 
but you don’t know whether you will come back or not. You can be arrested 
anytime.’ Migration control practices made life for many undocumented 
migrants a game of hide-and-seek with the police, in which the stakes were 
high. Arrest could result in deportation or extortion of money.
The urgency to want to make the best of their time in South Africa com-
pelled many to work as hard and as long as possible no matter the condi-
tions of employment; some even doing multiple jobs. Oliver Chiororo, James 
Mago and Tobby Murazvo all had incredibly difficult work arrangements, 
working double shifts each day. At night they worked as security guards and 
during the day they worked as ‘contracas’ (contract workers) in construction. 
For these men, their daily routines of work and home time were not as rigid 
as other people, who moved regularly from their homes to the workplaces 
and back. Instead, they juggled between different jobs every day with little 
or no time to rest because, according to Oliver, they had ‘no time to waste.’
Sometimes unpredictable encounters with migration control completely 
disrupted the socio-temporal order in undocumented migrants’ daily lives; 
they would fail to do what they expected within certain temporal boundaries. 
For example, David Gomo and Temba Mhuru, who worked for a subcon-
tracted construction company, were unexpectedly stopped on their way to 
work by police officer, who then demanded their passports, which they did 
not possess; neither did they have money to bribe the officers for their free-
dom. The police consequently locked them in the back of the police van and 
drove with them around eMalahleni. When the police officers finally stopped, 
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the two men pleaded to be released. The police released them, but not before 
taking, or in the words of David, ‘wasting’ a greater part of their time.
Vigneswaran et al. (2010), writing on the informal migration control prac-
tices by the police in South Africa, note that not all encounters between 
undocumented migrants and the police resulted in the arrest of the undoc-
umented migrants. The police regularly bend the immigration laws in their 
own favour, but also often do so to benefit the undocumented migrants who 
may escape arrest if they were sufficiently ‘congenial,’ ‘respectful’ or ‘obe-
dient’ (Ibid). David and Temba were expecting to get to their workplace by 
half past seven in the morning, but they arrived very late that day after their 
close brush with migration control.
The threat and fear of deportation resulted in some undocumented Zim-
babwean migrants redefining the meaning of work. They ceased to solely see 
work as a vehicle for goal attainment. Despite the possibility of workplace 
raids, some migrants saw work or being in a work environment as a shield 
against possible encounters with the police. Those who were not working 
and spent much of their daytime in Elandeni felt caged and vulnerable to 
police arrest. When Rutendo Mutero first came to South Africa, she had no 
intentions of doing wage-work because her husband was working and pro-
viding for the family. She was doing the unpaid childcare at home. However, 
some time in 2015, the police raided Elandeni searching for ‘illegal’ foreign-
ers. Rutendo was arrested while sitting outside her home and she spent 12 
days in police custody with her toddler. She went to court and was fined 
R500 (approximately US$40). She was then ordered to leave the country. 
After her release, however, Rutendo immediately began looking for a job as 
a live-out domestic worker. That was so because she felt it was safer to spend 
the day working in someone’s house than being in Elandeni. For her, work-
ing was just a way of keeping herself away from the menacing presence of 
the police in Elandeni. In much the same way as Willen (2007) analysed how 
migrants’ homes in Tel Aviv lost their role as safe havens during Israel’s de-
portation campaign in mid-2002, Rutendo’s story indicates the penetrability 
of ‘illegality’ in the home and the porousness of the home to immigration 
enforcement. Other undocumented migrants shared Rutendo’s sentiments 
that it was safer to spend the day at work and come home in the evening as 
the police conducted most of their operations during the day when most 
people were at work.
Conclusion
This chapter examined the effect of migration control in South Africa on 
undocumented migrants’ sense and use of time. I argued that migration 
control, by subjecting undocumented migrants to the threat/possibility of 
deportation, drives them into a state of temporal irregularity in which they 
remain uncertain about the exact temporal juncture at which they will face 
arrest and deportation. The threat of arrest and deportation continuously 
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reminds undocumented migrants that their time in South Africa is in fact 
ephemeral and could be terminated any day. This evokes a temporal ex-
perience in which the undocumented migrants anxiously anticipate arrest 
and deportation as an inevitable prospect. I framed this as an experience 
of waiting. The concept of temporal irregularity is deployed in this chapter 
to analyse how the arbitrariness of migration control disrupts the socio- 
temporal order in the lives of undocumented migrants. Here I followed 
Zerubavel (1981), who argued that temporal irregularity contributes to the 
development of a strong sense of uncertainty.
Temporal irregularity in the lives of undocumented migrants is primarily 
a result of the contradictions in South Africa’s migration policy formulation 
and policy implementation regarding the effectiveness of a control-oriented 
approach in solving the ‘problem’ of ‘illegal’ migration. This has opened 
gaps for opportunism and invention particularly among the lower and local 
level state functionaries like the police. What this means is that immigration 
law enforcement is left to the discretion of the officials on the ground. Of-
tentimes, the police officials bent the laws in their favour for their own per-
sonal gain (Vigneswaran et al., 2010). The situation is made worse by the fact 
that South African citizens are also a powerful stakeholder with informal 
deporting powers to enforce migration control. This leaves undocumented 
migrants more vulnerable to abuse and creates a lot more uncertainty in 
their encounters with the regime of migration control. Because the threat of 
expulsion is constantly re-enacted in their lives, either through the threats 
of arrest and deportation by the police or threats of violent expulsion by the 
citizens, the undocumented migrants cannot determine with certainty what 
will likely happen to them within certain temporal boundaries, or how long 
they will likely remain in South Africa. This temporal uncertainty adversely 
affects their everyday lives to the extent that most of them live with a sense 
of anticipatory preparedness (waiting) for their ultimate fate.
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Introduction
‘I give it one more year,’ Aziza1 said resolutely. ‘If nothing changes, I’ll go 
to the police and tell them they can send me wherever they want to. I don’t 
care.’ We were just leaving Stella, the Red Cross Women’s Centre in Oslo 
where we had met for a coffee and a catching up chat a cold November 
day in 2012. Aziza had applied for asylum 4 years earlier and had remained 
when her application was denied. The week before our coffee chat, Aziza 
had been notified by the Directorate of Immigration that she would be for-
mally expelled with a 5-year re-entry ban due to violation of the immigra-
tion regulations. When I had met her briefly a couple of days earlier, Aziza 
having just received the letter was shocked, not knowing what to do. To 
Aziza, the expulsion letter was not only a severe setback to her hopes of reg-
ularisation but also to her attempts to expand her family. During her time in 
Norway, Aziza, who was in her late 30s, had married and they were trying 
to have a child. Although her husband had permanent residency in Norway, 
their religious marriage was not recognised by the Norwegian state due to 
her lack of legal status.
This was not the first time Aziza had mentioned her plan of giving it one 
more year. Exactly what she would do in a year’s time was unclear. She could 
try to apply for asylum in another European country but knew this would 
probably be futile due to what she called ‘the fingerprint system,’ that is the 
Dublin agreement. This is an agreement that determines which European 
country is responsible for processing an asylum application. If returned to 
Ethiopia where she was born, she could perhaps apply for family reunifica-
tion, she mused. However, the 5-year re-entry ban complicated this. Could 
she ask her husband to wait that long? Aziza realised that her plans had 
problems. As she put it, ‘I know that it’s veeery hard. But I don’t have any 
options at this stage. Because if you are living illegally, the more you stay 
illegally, the more you become illegal. This stresses me even more.’ However, 
when I returned to Oslo in the autumn of 2017 for a new period of fieldwork, 
Aziza was still living in Norway – illegally.
The presence of irregular migrants such as Aziza, who remain for years 
despite harsh living conditions and formal membership being denied, 




remains a conundrum for policy-makers in many destination countries, 
including Norway (Van Houte & Leerkes, 2019). Since 2004, Norway has 
increasingly limited irregular migrants’ access to welfare services and work, 
making the living situation for irregular migrants more precarious (Karlsen, 
forthcoming). These restrictive policies are largely informed by an assump-
tion that the lack of such benefits and opportunities will form a disincentive 
to coming or remaining in the country illegally. As such, they rest on a ra-
tional choice model of human agency, seeing migrants as strategic agents 
whose decisions are driven by basic calculations of push and pull factors. 
This model has, for good reasons, been criticised for being overly simplistic, 
and for putting too little emphasis on the ways in which migrants act within 
complex social relationships (Carling & Collins, 2018).
In this chapter, I will explore what it means to endure or ‘wait out’ the 
condition of illegality in Norway. Illegality is here understood as a his-
torically specific, socially, politically and legally produced condition (De 
Genova, 2002), which profoundly affects migrants’ social relations as well 
as mode of being in the world (Willen, 2007). Scholars have particularly 
highlighted how the persistent possibility of deportation shape existence 
under this condition, rendering life both more unpredictable and exploitable 
(De Genova, 2002; Machinya, 2020).
The notion of endurance or ‘waiting out’ can be understood as a particu-
lar way of inhabiting the temporal category of waiting. One waits to see what 
happens or for something bad to end, rather than waiting in anticipation of 
a specific future event (Hage, 2009). The emphasis is on living through the 
present conditions. Scholars have importantly drawn attention to the am-
bivalent nature of endurance. It can be approached both as a governmental 
tool that encourages self-control in times of prolonged crisis and as affects 
and practices that allow people to persevere under unfavourable conditions. 
Through these practices and affects new forms of life can emerge (Povinelli, 
2011). It is this ambivalence between subjugation and potentiality, I sug-
gest, that makes endurance a productive lens for analysing people’s attach-
ments to an undesirable present. Exploring this ambivalence, I will in the 
following examine the social, affective and temporal dynamics of ‘waiting 
out’ illegality in Norway. What practices and affects of endurance emerged 
under this condition? How did ‘waiting out’ work as a mode of governing? 
I will also unpack how this mode of waiting was entangled with a sense of 
 spatio-temporal entrapment and the more hopeful form of ‘waiting for.’
Fieldwork
The chapter builds on two extended periods of ethnographic fieldwork. The 
first was conducted at various lengths and intensities between October 2011 
and October 2013 in Bergen and Oslo, the two largest cities in Norway, as 
part of an interdisciplinary project on the provision of welfare to irregu-
lar migrants. The second consisted of 5 months of intensive fieldwork in 
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Oslo in the autumn of 2017, as part of a larger project on the temporalities 
of irregular migration. Contact with irregularised migrants were made in 
various ways during both fieldwork periods: Through the healthcare centre 
for undocumented migrants in Oslo, through non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) and activists, gatekeepers in ethnic communities and at public 
events organised for and by irregular migrants. During the fieldwork in 2017, 
I also spent time with an organisation called People in Limbo (Mennesker 
i Limbo). This was an organisation for and by ‘long-staying undocumented 
migrants,’2 which organised a mixture of political and social activities. The 
organisation was initiated in Oslo in 2016 with the support of the health-
care centre for undocumented migrants and the Church Outreach mission. 
Branches have since been established in several cities in Norway.
My analysis in this chapter draws specifically on my encounters with 
women from East Africa and the Middle East, who had stayed between 
5 and 20 years in Norway after their application for asylum was rejected. 
In the Norwegian public debate, rejected asylum seekers who remain for 
years without state authorisation are often labelled, and label themselves, 
as ‘long-staying’ (lengeværende) asylum seekers/undocumented migrants or 
‘unreturnable’ (ureturnerbare). Norwegian Association for Asylum Seekers 
(NOAS) defines children who have stayed in Norway for more than 3 years 
and adults who have stayed for more than 5 years as ‘long-stayers.’3 ‘Unre-
turnable’ refers generally to people who are difficult to deport, either due 
to lack of identity papers, lack of return agreements or political reluctance 
and unstable conditions in their countries of origin. Although the term has 
gained some acceptance politically, and within the bureaucracy (e.g. the 
Granavolden platform4), the position of Norwegian authorities has mainly 
been that no one is ‘unreturnable’; there are only ‘return refusers’ (returnek-
tere) (Lønseth, 2011). A key issue at stake in these different labels is who is 
to be held morally responsible for the current impasse – the migrants them-
selves or the state that fails to deport them (Karlsen, 2017).
Not all my interlocutors were difficult to deport. State efforts to secure 
new return agreements importantly changed the situations for some over 
time. For example, rejected asylum seekers from Ethiopia constituted one of 
the main groups of those considered ‘unreturnable’ during my first period of 
fieldwork. However, changes in the return agreement in 2017 and 2019 made 
it easier for the state to carry out deportation to Ethiopia. In the following, 
I will refer to my interlocutors as ‘long-stayers’ due to the temporal focus of 
this chapter but also because of this label’s centrality to how my interlocu-
tors conceived of themselves.
Spatio-temporal entrapment
Endurance generally emerges in situations where someone else is calling the 
shots, or when something compels one to stay on and keep trying (Frosh, 
2015). As such, it can appear to be a default outcome or response to what 
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Hage (2009) has conceptualised as ‘stuckedness’ or existential immobility. 
Based on his work among Lebanese migrants and white racists in Australia, 
Hage (2009) suggests that some form of imaginary mobility, a sense that one 
is going somewhere in one’s life, is essential for a liveable life. ‘Stuckedness’ 
thus refers to a specific form of waiting that emphasises a limit to future- 
oriented actions (Straughan et al., 2020). Scholars observing an increasing 
disconnect between conditions and aspirations presented by contemporary 
capitalism in a variety of contexts have further suggested that migration is 
increasingly positioned as a spatial answer to an inability to experience pro-
gress in time (Ferguson, 2006; Mains, 2007). However, as migration control 
intensifies, leading to fewer legal possibilities for settlement and increasing 
the cost of renewed mobility, migration may be the cause of renewed stuck-
edness in destination countries (Pettit & Ruijtenberg, 2019). I suggest that 
to understand how endurance emerged among my interlocutors as a way of 
orienting oneself temporally, it is necessary to appreciate how the condition 
of illegality was experienced as a form of spatio-temporal entrapment.
Reflections on stuckedness were recurrent throughout my interactions and 
conversations with various long-stayers in Norway. As Aziza, for example, 
would put it when we discussed her situation in 2017: ‘The years are running, 
but you are in the same place. You don’t study. You don’t work.’ Overall, she 
and my other interlocutors tended to foreground a sense of waiting that was 
all encompassing and disempowering, but which also reflected a normative 
valuation of a linear and progressive forward movement in time as a condi-
tion for ‘good lives.’ This points to how the sense of ‘stuckedness’ reflect spe-
cific temporal norms regarding what makes life meaningful and valuable.
Scholars of social time relate a future-oriented temporality to the insti-
tutionalisation of chronological time, and the onset and global spread of 
capitalist modernity (Adam, 2003; Jeffrey, 2010). This, they suggest, has pro-
vided powerful temporal templates for how social lives should be mapped 
onto abstract units of time such as days, weeks, months, years and decades. 
The notion of life course provides, for example, not only gendered expecta-
tions about when and in what sequence in one’s life course one should study, 
work, marry, etc., it also produces measures from which one can evaluate 
one’s progression and productivity. Linear time and the associated notion 
of progress and productivity that ascribes monetary value to time further 
produces a temporal hierarchy that distinguishes between those who are 
investing time/losing time or spending meaningful time/empty time (Lahad, 
2017). In this context, waiting carries pejorative connotations, and is asso-
ciated with wasted time and wasted lives. Scholars have noted how modern 
temporal templates continue to have normative force even though neolib-
eral policies and increased precarisation of work life have eroded the possi-
bilities for progressive linear life courses for an increasing number of people 
all over the world (Kleist & Jansen, 2016). This may be particularly so when 
one owns existential immobility is contrasted to others who are still seen to 
move ahead in a linear progressive fashion (Lahad, 2017).
Waiting out illegality in Norway 117
A central challenge for Aziza and other living in a condition of illegality 
in Norway was that there was no obvious pathway to regularisation, nor a 
spatial way out of their current impasse. The sense of not being able to move 
forward in life was thus closely connected to a sense of spatial entrapment. 
As Aziza put it in the same conversation: 
It is very difficult to keep waiting. But we have no choice. Some people 
try to go other places. But there is the problem, you know, with finger-
prints. They try to go somewhere else, and they are still in the same 
situation [i.e. without legal status].
Similarly, Adila, an elderly woman from the Middle East and one of my 
regular interlocutors during my fieldwork in 2017, would whenever I met her 
start exclaiming ‘where to go, where to go?’ I learned quickly that it was not 
a question she expected me to answer, but a way of expressing the pervasive-
ness of the spatial and temporal entrapment she experienced and the ways it 
provoked distress. The question was the one she was thinking about ‘all the 
time,’ ‘every day and night.’
Adila had at one time tried to go to Sweden but had been deported back 
to Norway under the Dublin regulation. Adila was not the only long-stayer 
whom I met who had tried to go to another European country. While some 
would continue to move between different European countries, others had, 
like Aziza, contemplated re-migrating at an early stage, but had over the years 
abandoned such plans as they learned of the challenges others had faced. My 
interlocutors did not conceive of return to their country of origin as a viable 
option, and expressed many different and individual mixtures of reasons for 
why return was experienced as impossible. Some maintained strongly that a 
return would be dangerous; others had families, including children with Nor-
wegian citizenship that they did not want to leave behind. Others again had 
applied and been denied assisted return with the International Organisation 
for Migration (IOM).5 Additionally, the investment and risk they had taken to 
migrate, and the years spent waiting, made contemplating return even more 
difficult. As Aziza explained it: ‘We don’t have any future. Because we are not 
developing, we are not learning. And even if you go back to your country after 
20 years, you will need everything. Your age, your ability to work, everything 
has changed. Even the culture isn’t yours anymore. It’s not so easy.’
In addition to being stuck, limbo, imprisonment and entrapment were 
metaphors used by my interlocutors to articulate an experience of waiting 
as imposed spatial and temporal immobility.6 The sense of entrapment was 
also conveyed in the logo of the organisation: People in Limbo. When I 
started my fieldwork in 2017, they used as logo an image of people trapped 
in a bottle, with the bottleneck being marked with one-way street signs in-
dicating one could go in, but not out. Worried that the image of the bottle 
could be misunderstood as referring to alcoholism, they changed it to an 
image of a crouched person inside a locked padlock.
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Waiting for and waiting out
So, how does one, in such situations when spatial mobility no longer rep-
resents a way out of stuckedness, plot a movement from the present to an 
imagined and desired future? Is it at all possible? Within anthropology, the 
concept of social navigation has gained traction as a tool to address how 
people act in difficult or uncertain circumstances. Social navigation encom-
passes, according to Vigh, ‘both the assessment of the dangers and possibili-
ties of one’s present position as well as the process of plotting and attempting 
to actualise routes into an uncertain and changeable future.’ The concept of 
navigation thus designates a ‘movement through both the socially immedi-
ate and the socially imagined’ (Vigh, 2009: p. 425). However, stressing how 
social navigation is always contingent on power relations, Ramsay contends 
that not all situations are navigable. Non-navigable situations are those, she 
argues, where ‘the possibility of a self-directed future is constrained by ex-
ternal forces’ (Ramsay, 2019: p. 4). The condition of migrant illegality can 
be conceptualised as such a non-navigable situation, where the future is not 
only uncertain, but is determined by forces that are outside of one’s direct 
control. Yet, endurance or ‘waiting out the crisis’ could also be conceptual-
ised as a form of ‘social navigation,’ where the emphasis is on living through 
the present conditions rather than moving forward.
My material indicates, however, that ‘waiting for’ and ‘waiting out’ are 
not necessarily a simple binary but a constant and often simultaneous orien-
tation. My interlocutors would, for example, respond differently in the same 
conversation to questions regarding the future depending on how I framed 
the questions. If I asked how they saw their future, the most common answer 
was that the future was ‘black,’ indicating an enforced presentism in which 
it was impossible to envision a future. As Nala, a woman in her twenties 
from Ethiopia put it: ‘When you have things in place you can think about 
the future. Right here and now, when you have nothing, you can’t think of 
the future.’ Aziza also stressed that thinking about the future made her sick. 
Headaches, stress, sleeplessness and depression, health problems that were 
largely attributed to their difficult life situation were common among my 
interlocutors.
When I asked my interlocutors what they would do if they got residency, 
they would often elaborate quite detailed plans or desires (what they would 
like to study or the type of work they wanted, even where in the city they 
would like to live), thus expressing a clear vision of how they hoped a future 
life in Norway would be. This difference, I suggest, highlights the tension 
between desired futures and present possibilities of realising it but also how 
waiting in the context of migrant illegality in Norway is ambiguous in its re-
lation to the present and the future. For while the future was unimaginable, 
the present was made uninhabitable by the intensification of exclusionary 
practices towards irregularised migrants (Karlsen, forthcoming). For my in-
terlocutors there was thus a constant oscillation, or even blurriness, between 
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waiting for regularisation or deportation and waiting out the condition of 
illegality. This included a continuous engagement and disengagement with 
the system of applying for asylum, between trying to find a way to live with 
the present and trying to realise the desired future by becoming regularised.
In the Norwegian system, the UDI (Directorate of Immigration) makes 
the initial decision in asylum cases. In case the UDI rejects an application, 
it can be appealed to the independent Immigration Appeals Board (UNE). 
If UNE rejects the appeal, it is referred to as ‘the final decision.’ If the re-
jected asylum seeker does not leave before the departure date set for him/
her, his/her stay is generally no longer considered legal. However, rejected 
asylum seekers can continue to request a reversal (‘omgjøringsbegjæring’) 
from UNE. To reverse the decision, UNE requires new pertinent informa-
tion or new documentation regarding one’s case, or that one’s situation has 
changed significantly (e.g. that you have become seriously ill). However, the 
threshold for UNE to reverse a case is high. Length of time in Norway is on 
the balance counted negatively. There is also the option to bring the case 
before the courts. This can be both a lengthy process and quite costly as one 
would have to pay for the lawyer and risk being accountable for the state’s 
costs. A few organisations provide free legal aid, most importantly NOAS.
All my long-staying interlocutors had requested a reversal more than 
twice, sometimes with the assistance of NOAS, by hiring a private lawyer, 
or simply writing a letter on their own. Some of my interlocutors seemed 
relentless in their determination to retry their cases, starting preparation 
(gathering documents, saving money for lawyers) for a new appeal or a court 
case as soon as they received the rejection. Others expressed resignation and 
lack of faith in the system but would still apply at times. For all, appealing 
marked a renewed intensity of waiting, producing both heightened anticipa-
tion and hope, but also stress, anxiety and fear, before yet another crushing 
disappointment. As Liya, who had stayed for more than 10 years and ap-
plied several times, put it when I asked if she would try again, ‘I go crazy 
if I get one more rejection!’ So, why do rejected asylum seekers continue to 
appeal their case?
Technologies of patience
‘The government gives us two and a half options,’ Aziza explained to me 
one autumn day in 2017 while we were walking towards the mosque so she 
could pray. Aziza had just been to see her lawyer to discuss the possibility 
of bringing her case to the court, but they had decided it was ‘not the right 
time.’ In her words, the first option was to be sent out of Norway to an un-
known fate. The other was ‘a bit of bread and a place to stay.’ The latter was 
a reference to the government’s offer to accommodate rejected asylum seek-
ers in asylum reception centres.7 According to Aziza, most people choose 
this option. The half option, she explained, was the hope that the politics 
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would change so that they could stay. ‘Together, the second and the half 
option destroy people’s life,’ she concluded.
A few weeks later, sitting in a café at the Oslo Central Station, I prodded 
Aziza further on what waiting meant to her. I had heard her previously jok-
ing with a friend in a similar situation about how they were ‘learning to wait’ 
in Norway. I asked whether she had experienced the same sense of waiting 
during the 10 years she worked and lived without a legal status in the Middle 
East, before coming to Norway. ‘It was worse there,’ she started explaining – 
‘physically.’ She described how she could not talk or move around freely, 
how she was at the mercy of her employers. In Norway, though, it was not 
physical hardship and constraints, but ‘mental torture’ that was the main 
challenge. ‘There you knew already that you didn’t have any rights. But you 
had a plan,’ she explained further. ‘You still had hope that you could leave 
the country. But this [Norway] is a democratic country. You don’t want to 
leave without hope.’ In the end, she concluded: ‘You know why we are wait-
ing here so long? Because we know this is a democratic country. Tomorrow 
something can happen.’
Hernandez-Carretero (2016), in her study of Senegalese migration to 
Spain, found that the interplay between hope and uncertainty affected mi-
grants’ willingness to take chances. While her interlocutors communicated 
a sense of positive anticipation when recounting their initial decision to mi-
grate, they stressed concerns about preparedness, failure and shame when 
discussing return. Hernandez-Carretero thus suggests that the contrast 
in migrants’ attitudes to uncertainties upon emigration and return lies in 
hope’s power to mediate uncertainty. Aziza’s response to my questions res-
onates to some extent with this point, but her answers also draw attention 
to the enduring affective power of the liberal societies’ promise of future 
possibilities and progress. Waiting for regularisation or ‘politics to change’ 
names in this sense a cruel attachment to a compromised condition of pos-
sibility (Berlant, 2011: p. 24).
Cruel optimism is, according to Lauren Berlant (2011: p. 28), a technology 
of patience that enables a concept of the later to suspend questions about 
the cruelty of the now. The concept allowed Berlant to explain how liberal 
societies maintain their legitimacy despite the capitalist destruction of life. 
What makes an optimistic attachment cruel, according to Berlant, is not 
only that the object of desire is itself a threat to one’s well-being, but that ‘its 
life-organizing status can trump interfering with the damage it provokes’ 
(Berlant, 2011: p. 227). Hence, for people who lack control over the material 
conditions of their lives, the fantasy of the normative good life may be what 
makes life bearable.
In the context of migrant illegality, the concept of cruel optimism provides 
a vantage point for inspecting migrants’ continuing affective investment in 
the promise of asylum and citizenship, despite the fact that the nation-state 
system actually produces their illegality. Waiting for regularisation can, 
for example, work as a technique of governing by temporally ‘bracketing’ 
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present harm through the promise of a future residency permit, as argued 
by Drangsland (2019). Analysing an offer of possible regularisation that the 
Hamburg Government presented to a group of 350 West-African migrants 
in 2013, she showed how the offer made waiting appear as a redemptive 
state. In the case of my interlocutors, the redemptive promise of future res-
idency was more ambiguous as there was no specific offer of regularisation. 
Although the asylum system continued importantly to shape their future 
horizon, I suggest that it was a combination of ‘waiting for’ and ‘waiting 
out’ that together formed a continuing imperative to stay. As technologies 
of patience, they differ slightly from each other.
Unlike the German Government, which has opened various pathways 
to regularisation for tolerated migrants due to criteria of economic self- 
sufficiency and language skills (Drangsland, 2020), shifting Norwegian 
governments have insisted that ‘return,’ assisted or forced, should be the 
primary pathway out of illegality. Norway’s deportation rates have, in con-
sequence, been among the highest in Europe (Van Houte & Leerkes, 2019). 
Yet, despite a political consensus concerning this exclusionary approach, 
smaller humanitarian mechanisms and programs have been implemented in 
response to public concern, primarily regarding so-called long-staying asy-
lum children.8 For adults there were, as already mentioned, the continuous 
possibility to request a reversal from the appeal board (UNE) or to take the 
case to court. Even though only few cases are reversed, such exceptions con-
tinue to foster a certain hope of regularisation despite this not being a relia-
ble pathway for most. To paraphrase Povinelli (2011: p. 190), the ‘incitement 
to wait, to be patient, to bracket harm until the impasse has been resolved’ 
was still key to how power worked in this case. Among my interlocutors, 
there were different ways of making sense of the system. One way was to 
see it as an unpredictable lottery. While this fed into a sense of unfairness, 
it still incited people to keep trying. The other way emphasised the need to 
work hard on your case, gathering the right documents and contacts. In 
either case, the continued promise of regularisation as the route to ‘the good 
life’ served to individualise and internalise a mode of governing the self into 
waiting orderly. The continuous engagement with the system required sig-
nificant investment in terms of affect but also time and money. It also con-
tinued to re-affirm the authority of the state to decide on their status.
‘Waiting out’ as a mode of governing the self, works by valorising the 
ability to suffer and yet persist. With reference to neoliberal Australia, Hage 
(2009) suggests that a particular celebration of the heroism of being stuck 
has given rise to a deeper form of governmentality, in which a capacity to 
stick it out and ‘get stuck well’ becomes a marker of good citizenship. This 
is, for example, seen, he suggests, in the vilification of those who do not wait 
well, such as the ‘queue jumping’ irregular migrant.
Various scholars have noted how irregular migrants in their regularisa-
tion efforts have drawn on notions of good citizenship to claim belonging 
(Anderson et al., 2011, Bendixsen, 2013). However, there is generally little 
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heroism associated with waiting out the condition of illegality. In some 
countries, social participation over time can create grounds for legalisation 
as proof of attachment and deservingness (Chauvin & Garcés-Mascareñas, 
2012). Yet, in most cases it simply works to document lengthy breach of 
immigration law, thus making it a more serious offence in the view of the 
immigration authorities. As Aziza put it earlier: ‘If you are living illegally, 
the more you stay illegally, the more you become illegal.’ Still, I suggest that 
endurance even in the context of migrant illegality denotes a mode of gov-
erning the self through its emphasis on coping under, rather than changing, 
the existing order. It is to the ambivalence between subjugation and potenti-
ality in ‘waiting out’ that I will turn to now.
Surviving in the impasse of the present
In sporadic conversations over the years, I had noticed how Aziza’s determi-
nation to leave after a year kept being postponed until it completely faded. 
Instead, she started increasingly to bring up in our conversations how she 
tried to learn to be content with what she had, and not stress too much about 
her lack of legal status and what would happen in the future. As she put it in 
a conversation in 2017: ‘Me and my husband have discussed it, and lately we 
have decided that we could live like this, even though I don’t get residency.’ 
Another time she elaborated: 
I’m lucky. I have a husband. I know where I live, even though I can’t 
contribute economically. (…) If I cannot do anything with my legal sit-
uation, I must accept these things. I cannot study, I cannot work, I can-
not travel, but I must accept what I have in my hands now. That is why 
I try every day to be active.
Aziza and her husband had not been able to have a child, but after years 
of economic difficulties, her husband had obtained stable and decent em-
ployment and they had been able to move into a larger and nicer apartment. 
Aziza who could not work legally, had involved herself in diverse forms of 
volunteer work as a way of keeping herself active.
Aziza did not completely abandon attempts to get regularised, but there 
was, as the quotes indicate, a slight shift of emphasis towards finding ways to 
endure. She was not alone in this reorientation. During my time in the field, 
I observed the emergence of a determined effort among my interlocutors 
and their supporters to find ways and techniques to cope with the insecurity 
and stress of being an irregularised migrant, to find meaning in their present 
lives even if they could not get regularised. In 2012, when I first started do-
ing fieldwork in Oslo, the volunteer-run healthcare centre for undocumented 
migrants had operated for 2 years. One of the central challenges they expe-
rienced when providing healthcare to this group was that the cause and cure 
for the patients’ ill health was not necessarily found within the traditional 
Waiting out illegality in Norway 123
biomedical perspective (Karlsen, forthcoming; Ottesen et al., 2015). For ex-
ample, a certain level of stability is usually understood as a professional and 
ethical requirement for initiating trauma treatment. However, this stability 
is difficult to achieve when faced with irregular migrants whose continuous 
life crisis is a consequence of a deliberate policy of exclusion.
In the period from 2011 to 2014, the healthcare centre initiated a pilot 
project with group consultations that attempted to develop appropriate 
techniques for the stabilisation of trauma symptoms and the management 
of daily stress for their patient group (Mburu et al., 2015). As part of their 
psychosocial strategy, the centre also started facilitating venues for social-
ising and mutual support, and offered some of their regular patients the 
opportunity to work as volunteers at the healthcare centre, either as com-
munity workers who would welcome and provide newcomers with informa-
tion while they were waiting for their appointment, or by making food to 
the volunteer healthcare providers. They also reached out to other organisa-
tions to facilitate more opportunities for volunteer work.
The aim of these initiatives was to create meaningful and routine activi-
ties as a tool for irregular migrants to deal with the daily stress of illegality. 
In this sense, they were designed to address what was seen as the challenge 
of an excess of time. By being formally excluded from institutions such as 
work and education, the condition of illegality was often experienced as a 
form of enforced idleness. As Janet, a Ugandan woman who had lived in 
Norway for 10 years, expressed it, ‘After all I’ve been through, waiting here 
is the hardest thing. For me, a hard-working girl, I never sat still in my life.’ 
Awate, originally from Eritrea, made similar remarks, ‘We are not beggars. 
(…) If we are not sick, we work. Hard work is in our culture.’ Scholars have 
pointed out that such statements must not be understood just as conveying 
an aspect of their identities but also as challenging the discursively and insti-
tutionally produced positionality of the ‘unproductive Other’ (Haas, 2012: 
p. 253, Bendixsen, 2013). As normative judgments are attached to how people 
spend their time, the challenge of too much time was not only that it made 
it difficult to escape pervasive and distressful thoughts, but that it was also 
in itself felt as a source of shame. This points to how a temporal hierarchy 
of moral worth, in which unequal relationships to time signal differences in 
status and privilege (Sharma, 2014), is internalised. When time becomes a 
question of vice (wasting time, passivity) or virtue (patience, keeping active), 
waiting becomes an action that may be done well or badly.
The healthcare centre’s initiatives to create regular activities resem-
ble what Feldman (2015) describes as humanitarian ‘endurance projects.’ 
Working in Palestinian refugee camps, she uses the term to describe a range 
of interventions that were aimed at helping people in the camps live better 
with circumstances they cannot change. These projects, she argues, make 
the claim that there is value to Palestinian lives even if they can never be 
improved. This claim, however, made such projects in part contentious, as 
they do not ‘challenge the deep inequality of lives’ (Feldman, 2015: p. 430). 
124 Marry-Anne Karlsen
They do not resolve the fundamental problem, but ‘put the question of how 
to live a better way, even when one cannot live a better life, at the core of 
their concerns’ (Feldman, 2015: p. 431). According to Feldman, endurance 
projects are dogged by a sense of failure: ‘The very fact that endurance may 
be the only option available to people indicates a failure of other (more ac-
tive, more strategic, even more revolutionary) pathways’ (Feldman, 2015: 
p. 435).
In my field, the various initiatives of the healthcare centre seemed to have 
had a clear positive impact on my interlocutors who had been involved. In 
addition to how the activities served to distract them from their problems, 
Aziza and others who volunteered emphasised that they experienced in-
creased self-worth. Yet, as endurance projects, they kept being dogged by 
the future horizon being restricted. While the initiatives served to organise 
and regulate thoughts and activities, they did not necessarily create a tem-
poral horizon that would give the wait meaning. Aziza would, for example, 
continue intermittently to express a sense of overwhelming stuckedness, as 
in this quote from the same conversation in 2017, in which she expressed a 
determination to focus on what she ‘had in her hands now’; ‘I cannot do 
anything for myself. Of course, I can do something, so I don’t feel stressed. 
I can do voluntary work with different organisations. These things help me. 
But you do not know what is happening tomorrow.’ Later she added, ‘You 
always think: What happens tomorrow? What can I do for the future?’ This 
suggests that, as argued by Brux et al. (2019: p. 1454), it is not necessarily 
enough to participate in a socially validated, chronological and sequential 
everyday time without the ability to emplot this and render it meaningful 
within a comprehensible biographical and social narrative.
Aziza’s resolution to focus on the positive sides of her life, of her present, 
would also frequently be derailed, such as when she learned that someone 
she knew had been deported to Ethiopia. ‘I have my suitcases ready,’ she told 
me shortly after the deportation of her acquaintance. ‘Well, they are not ex-
actly packed,’ she corrected, ‘but I have made a mental plan and have sorted 
my things, so that I can easily put them in my suitcases if they come for me.’ 
The endurance projects were as such also dogged by the government’s policy 
of actively making the present uninhabitable for irregular migrants, both 
through the ‘spectacle of deportation’ (De Genova, 2013; Machinya, 2020), 
and by restricting access to healthcare and work.
The latter was something People in Limbo tried to address at different 
levels. While the healthcare centre’s psychosocial initiatives were mainly 
individual endurance projects, People in Limbo engaged in what can be de-
scribed as a more collective endurance project. Regularisation remained a 
key objective for the organisation, but most of their political efforts were 
directed at the right to healthcare and the right to work without legal sta-
tus. This was mainly a strategic decision, as these claims were seen as more 
feasible in the Norwegian political climate. The decision was also related 
to the significant experience of some of their members, including Liya, that 
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the uncertainty regarding the possibility to remain was increasingly inter-
twined with an uncertainty regarding the possibility of gaining access to 
material resources, such as food, housing and medical services.
Liya was one of several rejected asylum seekers who previously had regu-
lar and stable employment of which they paid tax. In 2000, the Immigration 
Act and associated regulations explicitly allowed rejected asylum seekers 
to be granted temporary work permits until deportation or assisted return 
could be effectuated. The practice of granting work permits was cancelled 
through a circular issued by the directorate of immigration in 2003. Tax 
cards were, however, issued automatically to previous tax cardholders until 
2010, when a clean-up in the tax administration put a stop to the practice. 
The change in work permit policy and practice was part of the larger at-
tempted clampdown on irregular migration. While there is little indication 
that this policy change had the intended effect, it clearly aggravated the sit-
uation for people like Liya, making their lives more precarious. Many found 
it difficult to find work without a tax card and were largely left to rely on 
help from friends or family or move back into the asylum reception centre.
People in Limbo’s efforts went beyond simply campaigning politically for 
the right to work. Two of the main activities carried out during their weekly 
meetings consisted in making a sort of identity cards for new members and 
registering them for a staffing agency for rejected asylum seekers. PLOG 
AS, the staffing agency, was initiated by the Norwegian Arne Viste in 2015. 
Viste’s aim was to be prosecuted so he could test whether denying rejected 
asylum seekers work permits contradicted the Norwegian constitution. 
PLOG would collect fees from companies that used the employees’ services 
and pay salaries to the workers after withholding tax duties, as required un-
der Norwegian law. The aim of this mechanism was to shield both the com-
panies PLOG cooperated with and the migrants they employed from legal 
repercussions. Everything though was done openly and PLOG would regu-
larly update authorities and report the activities to the police. As the police 
was reluctant to prosecute, PLOG kept challenging bureaucratic structures 
that ignored the existence of rejected asylum seekers by consistently trying 
to pay taxes.
Between 2015 and 2019, PLOG issued approximately 700 ‘work permits,’ 
referring to the Norwegian Constitution and the Human Rights Act.9 Re-
jected asylum seekers were encouraged to bring this ‘permit’ to the places 
they were seeking work. While the ‘work permits’ had no legal validity, the 
arrangement PLOG offered encouraged some employers, who would not 
otherwise have done so, to hire rejected asylum seekers. In other cases, it 
helped workers who were already employed informally to negotiate more 
stable work arrangements and better pay. A total of 70 migrants were at one 
point hired through PLOG. For some, it amounted to stable employment 
over time. For others, the work was only a few hours for a short period. 
Yet, the work represented a value that went beyond the economic gain. For 
example, I asked Liya whether the few hours she was employed through 
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PLOG were worth it. Rather than emphasising the economic side of it, she 
answered: ‘At least it is a few hours I don’t sit at home watching films.’ Oth-
ers expressed that it gave them a sense of dignity.
Beyond the individual level, the initiative gave People in Limbo a collec-
tive purpose. People who were not necessarily employed through the agency 
provided support by recruiting and registering potential workers. While 
Viste’s pursuit of a court case produced a sense of movement and hope for 
change, the more mundane activities People in Limbo and PLOG engaged 
in gave a sense of purpose in the present. Moreover, the activities afforded 
to some extent, I suggest, the opportunity to build networks and exist in 
ways different from those prescribed by the state. ‘Waiting out’ or enduring 
the condition of illegality could in this sense be seen as a refusal to accept 
state power to categorise people and circumscribe their lives.
Concluding remarks: subjugation and potentiality
I started the chapter by noting how the ambivalence between subjugation 
and potentiality makes endurance a productive lens to analyse why irreg-
ularised migrants remain, even when faced with exclusion, hardship and 
suffering. How can we appreciate the potentiality of such alternatives in a 
condition framed as futureless by the political regime? To Povinelli (2011), 
endurance makes a difference even if it does not immediately produce social 
transformation as it allows people to be something else than simply defeated 
by the circumstances. To avoid romanticising forms of suffering, scholars 
have also stressed the need to be clear about the tenuous and contingent 
conditions of these alternatives when exploring the potentiality of endur-
ance (Neale, 2012; Wool, 2017). Without problematising the broader systems 
in which some groups must endure while others prosper, a turn to endurance 
may serve to normalise adaption to unfavourable conditions and foreclos-
ing wider socio-political questions of power and representation (Feldman, 
2015). Endurance risks simply becoming a gradual slow wearing out.
Among the long-staying rejected asylum seekers in my study, endurance 
emerged in relation to an overwhelming sense of spatio-temporal entrap-
ment. Both future-oriented actions and spatial mobility were experienced as 
severely circumscribed. ‘Social navigation’ thus became increasingly about 
living through the present conditions, or ‘waiting out the crisis.’ The individ-
ual and collective endurance projects that emerged in this context to assist 
long-stayers to find better ways to live or to cope in the present certainly 
contributed to making irregularised life more bearable. Also, a form of lived 
alternative sociality emerged to some extent through the practices aimed at 
waiting better. Yet, they remained somewhat dogged by the lack of a future 
horizon. The opposite of endurance, exhaustion, was thus never far away.
In the context of migrant illegality in Norway, the asylum system contin-
ued importantly to shape rejected asylum seekers’ future horizon even after 
the so-called final rejection. I therefore suggest that it was a combination of 
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‘waiting for’ and ‘waiting out’ that together formed a continuing imperative 
to stay. As technologies of patience, they work slightly different. In addition 
to ‘bracketing’ present harm through the promise of a redemptive future 
(Drangsland, 2019), ‘waiting for’ relies on a certain sense that the ‘queue’ 
one is in, is actually moving, even if it is infinitely slow (Hage, 2009). ‘Wait-
ing out,’ in contrast, invites self-control through internalising a temporal 
hierarchy of moral worth by positioning waiting as something that can be 
done well or badly.
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Notes
 1 All interlocutors’ names are pseudonyms. Due to strong privacy concerns when 
doing research with irregular migrants, I have also in some cases chosen to alter 
what I considered non-essential information (i.e. country of origin, age, years in 
the country, etc.).
 2 ‘Papirløs’ is the main term used by NGOs in Norway for irregularised migrants 
from non-EU countries. The direct translation is ‘paperless’ or ‘without paper,’ 
however in the chapter I will mainly translate the term to ‘undocumented,’ as 
this is more commonly used in English.
 3 Numbers are notoriously unreliable, but during the period of my study (2011–
1018), NGOs working in the field estimated that there were between 3,000 and 
5,000 rejected asylum seekers that had remained in the country for more than 5 
years.
 4 The political platform for the Norwegian Government, formed by the Conserv-
ative Party, the Progress Party, the Liberal Party and the Christian Democratic 
Party, 17 January 2019, proposes a one-time solution for older ‘unreturnable’ 
asylum seekers who have lived in Norway for more than 16 years.
 5 In a few cases it was disputed which was their country of origin, and neither 
of the embassies in question was willing to grant papers when they were ap-
proached. These included, for example Eritreans born in Ethiopia and Iranian 
Kurdish refugees in Iraq. See also Brux et al. (2019).
 6 See also Øien et al. (2011), Drevland et al. (2017), Brux et al. (2019) for similar 
observations.
 7 Until 2004 and since 2011, rejected asylum seekers have been offered state ac-
commodation in regular asylum reception centres. In 2012 and 2013, rejected 
asylum seekers constituted the largest group of people living in these centres. 
In 2013, 5,700 people with a so-called duty to leave (utreiseplikt) lived in recep-
tion centres, which constituted 35% of all residents. In 2017, this number had 
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dropped to 1,421 persons, which constituted about 28% of all residents (UDI 
annual reports 2011–2017).
 8 These include two limited on–off programs in 2004 and 2013 through which ap-
proximately 1,000 and 300 children and their families were regularised, respec-
tively. To be eligible to apply, the child had to have stayed in Norway for more 
than three years. In 2007, Norway also implemented an ongoing regularisation 
mechanism, which was further strengthened in 2013. Through this, children, 
and their families, can be granted a residence permit on the grounds of strong 
humanitarian consideration on a case-by-case basis.
 9 The police formally charged PLOG AS and Viste in April 2019, and operations 
were suspended.
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Introduction: coming to Kenya
In an interview with world-famous artist Wolfgang Tillmans for Vice in 
2019, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI)1 refugees in 
Kakuma Refugee Camp in Kenya were asked a series of questions about 
what would help their community, what resources might be provided and 
what actions or strategies might assist them. Their responses to every ques-
tion seem to be directed towards a global audience: they are most strikingly 
comprised of a repeated and singular emphasis on the need for resettlement.
J: Resettlement to countries that recognise the rights of LGBTI people 
is all that would help.
R: We are still failing to convince Africans to accept LGBTI people. 
The UN’s hands are tied when it comes to finding security for us, or re-
settlement, but it’s trying to do everything it can. We can speak through 
people like you, people who come and listen to us, we can make noise in 
foreign countries and hopefully change minds. 
(Tillmans, 2019)
Established in 1992, Kakuma is located in north-western Kenya, near the 
Kenya–Sudan border in the semi-arid desert environment. Not only is Ka-
kuma near the Sudanese border, but – as pointed out by the camp’s LGBTI 
residents, many of whom are Ugandan – it is also nearer to Uganda than 
it is to Kenya’s capital, Nairobi (Mbaziira, 2018). Comprised of Kakuma 
1, 2, 3 and 4, the camp has an estimated population of 180,000 people. The 
governance of the camp, along with humanitarian aid, is administered by 
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Due to re-
strictions on refugee movement, the overall arid environment, the distance 
from Nairobi and the lack of available employment, the population of the 
camp is almost entirely reliant on aid for survival. Since the 2013 passage 
of Uganda’s now infamous Anti-Homosexuality Bill (AHB), the number of 
African LGBTI people on the move and seeking sanctuary has increased.2 
Given it contains one of the five largest UNHCR-mandated operations in 
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the world, of which Kakuma is a part, Kenya has long been a hub for refu-
gees and asylum seekers in the region (Garlick et al., 2015: p. 97). Although 
homosexuality remains criminalised within Kenya’s borders, these refugees 
and asylum seekers have, since 2013, increasingly included LGBTI people 
from the region. This is largely due to a somewhat peculiar role played by 
the UNHCR, which has run what we might understand as a parallel legal 
regime within the country (Nanima, 2017) – one in which they provide le-
gal protection to those the Kenyan state criminalises, or considers illegal: 
LGBTI refugees and asylum seekers.
Given this tenuous legal position, resettlement has been the only dura-
ble solution available to LGBTI refugees in Kenya. Utilised in situations 
where there is a special need for protection, resettlement is defined as: ‘the 
transfer of refugees from a State in which they have sought protection to 
a third State which has agreed to admit them “as refugees” with perma-
nent residence status’ (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
n.d.). It is an extraordinary experience of spatial and temporal uncertainty, 
marked by the not knowing when (and if) departure might take place and 
where one might end up. In her work Nadia El-Shaarawi (2015: p. 39) de-
scribes this temporal and spatial uncertainty as a type of suspension, being 
‘stuck between places and between past and possible future lives.’ This un-
certainty is coupled with, following Bissell (2007) and Rotter (2016), what I 
propose is the event of waiting or a waiting event – an event-to-come which 
necessitates and brings about the ‘experience of waiting’ (Bissell, 2007: 
p. 282). In such waiting events ‘the individual plays a small part and exer-
cises limited control in complex, interdependent processes’ (Rotter, 2016: 
p. 80). For refugees, resettlement is a complex lottery where vulnerability 
remains a key comparative that sets some groups, as more vulnerable, apart 
from and therefore more in need, than others. The places made available for 
resettlement are few and the numbers of refugees are many. Given the ‘ka-
leidoscopic nature of subjectivities,’ Bissell (2007: p. 278) entreats us to pay 
particular attention to the spatial and temporal enmeshments of waiting 
experienced within specific mobilities.
Almost as soon as LGBTI refugees entered Kakuma, a series of fundrais-
ing campaigns started by LGBTI refugees calling themselves ‘Refugee Flag 
Kakuma’ on the donation-based platform GoFundMe, with titles like ‘HELP 
LGBTI REFUGEES IN KAKUMA,’ began to circulate online (Mbaziira, 
2017). GoFundMe pages are of a standard format, comprised of a title ban-
ner such as ‘HELP LGBTI REFUGEES IN KAKUMA CAMP,’ under 
which appears an image or a set of images specific to the campaign, a share 
counter indicating the number of times the campaign has been posted on 
social media, followed by a description of the campaign and its leaders. To 
the right of this information, adjacent to the images, appears a blue cash bar 
indicating donations made towards the goal set by the campaign (although 
money can be withdrawn without reaching said goal). Below the cash bar 
are the names of donors and at the very bottom of the page any messages 
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from donors. These Internet campaigns called on countries, groups and in-
dividuals in the Global North for assistance, and, crucially, accelerating the 
resettlement process from not just Kenya but, specifically, from Kakuma.
In this chapter I provide a close reading of several of these online cam-
paigns, considering the framing of their calls in relation to the supportive 
commentary from donors and the work of the temporal markers of the dona-
tion bar. I argue that for those who are both criminalised and paradoxically 
legally protected in Kenya – LGBTI refugees – these online campaigns, by 
their very nature as active platforms of engagement, transform what Aren 
Azuira (2018) might call the ‘temporal suspension’ of this waiting event. This 
chapter explores what these digital campaigns, in their global circulation 
via the Internet, can tell us about the ‘temporal and spatial enmeshments’ 
of waiting for resettlement as an event from within Kakuma for LGBTI 
refugees. I suggest that LGBTI refugees’ prolific self- publication and use of 
GoFundMe projected from the waiting space of the camp, specifically coun-
ters some of the adverse spatial logic of refugee camps. In reaching out to a 
perceived global public beyond the confines of the camp, LGBTI refugees 
appeal directly to a donor public who might witness both their existence and 
their waiting time thereby crafting a temporality online. This access to the 
virtual means that they are not solely confined to the physical space of the 
refugee camp but are actively projecting themselves into their future goal of 
resettlement thereby transforming the experience of waiting in their present.
Refugees in Kenya
In 1991, the Kenyan refugee system faced a total crisis and eventual col-
lapse when the war in Somalia, in combination with the arrival of ‘The Lost 
Boys of Sudan,’ stretched to breaking point a structure based on processes 
of individual case determination overseen by the Kenyan government and 
not designed to deal with an unexpected influx of large numbers of people.3 
To secure resources necessary to address this situation, the Kenyan govern-
ment accepted the assistance and guidance of the UNHCR and set aside 
land that would soon be partitioned into camps, among these is Kakuma 
Refugee Camp (Verdirame, 1999). The UNHCR then contracted non- 
governmental organisations (NGOs), as implementing partners, to assist 
with the provision of basic necessities in these camps which, as a response 
to an emergency situation, were to act as temporary shelters. At the same 
time, all camps and status determination came under the administration 
of the UNHCR. Along with the establishment of the camps came the legal 
requirement, described by Guglielemo Verdirame (1999: p. 6) as ‘bureau-
cratic jargon of the post-1991 refugee regime in Kenya.’ This demanded 
that ‘refugees have to reside in camps until a durable solution is found’ 
(Verdirame 1999: p. 6). From this moment on, the government began to un-
derstand Kenya’s role as a ‘transit country where refugees are allowed to re-
main provided that they receive assistance from the UNHCR in the camps’ 
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(Verdirame, 1999: p. 7). The structure of the refugee regime in Kenya is 
such that refugees’ ability to participate in broader society is limited. In 
addition to being encamped, refugees have no right to work in the formal 
sector and no access to social services. Camps attract international assis-
tance (Crisp & Jacobsen, 1998: p. 28), and the provision of international 
aid allows the Kenyan state to ensure that its own resources and benefits 
remain focused on Kenyan citizens. To this end, the government provides 
little assistance in terms of humanitarian aid – and the encampment policy 
provides little incentive to do so.
The Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) is the bureaucratic depart-
ment within the Kenyan government, which deals with refugee issues. 
Strategically, it is actively separated from all other spheres of government 
in order to ensure that the refugee regime is cordoned off from the immi-
gration system and other arms of the state, by extension thus also keeping 
perceived financial burdens separate from financial possibilities. This sepa-
ration is critical on another count: there are no explicit protections relating 
to gender identity or sexual orientation in Kenya’s 2010 constitution and, 
furthermore, the Kenyan Penal Code actively criminalises LGBTI people, 
carrying a 14-year sentence for sodomy and a 5-year sentence for ‘sexual 
practices between males’ termed ‘gross indecency.’4 Kenya, much like its 
neighbours, has been known to use these laws to actively harass and arbi-
trarily detain Kenyan LGBTI individuals (Zomorodi, 2016: p. 92). In terms 
of societal homophobic attitudes, Kenya differs little from Uganda and in-
deed many of its neighbours. The 2013 Pew Survey, for example, noted that 
96% of Ugandans and 90% of Kenyans questioned do not believe society 
should accept homosexuality (Pew Research Center, 2013).
The first visible group to move across the border from Uganda into Kenya 
arrived at the UNHCR offices on 11 March 2014 (Wesangula, 2017). Be-
cause they were the first to arrive in Kenya following the passage of the 
AHB, and because of the illegality of same-sex sexual activity in Kenya, 
these 23 LGBTI Ugandans were treated as exceptional cases. Asylum seek-
ers in Kenya usually wait for months to be notified whether they qualify for 
official refugee status, and then several more years for consultations on the 
possibility of resettlement. In this particular case, however, the UNHCR 
decided to fast-track the group’s claims while providing them with special 
protection, safe housing and financial support: an almost unprecedented 
level of support and attention. That the group’s housing in Kenya’s capital, 
Nairobi, was funded by the UNHCR for the duration of their stay indicates 
an acknowledgement, on the part of the latter, that the standard practice of 
waiting for resettlement in Kakuma Refugee Camp would put the group’s 
lives at risk – their ability to remain outside the camp, meanwhile, was 
dependent on the ongoing lax enforcement of the Kenyan law requiring 
all refugees to live in the camps (Kushner, 2016). At that point, it was not 
yet known what long-term impact the AHB would have on movement and 
migration in the region.
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At the time of the arrival of the first group of LGBTI refugees, Kenyan 
men who were assumed to be gay were being forced by the legal system to 
undergo anal examinations (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Given this, we 
might wonder why the Kenyan state would allow, or at the very least ig-
nore, the presence of LGBTI people seeking asylum from its neighbour. The 
DRA, as a cordoned-off entity, allows the Kenyan state to recognise the 
refugee status of LGBTI people – through the UNHCR and under its inter-
national obligation ratified in the country’s Refugee Act – without directly 
recognising the rights of LGBTI people. Moreover, as Marijke Kremin 
(2017) argues, because resettlement has from the outset been the proposed 
option, the Kenyan government has been more willing to turn a blind eye. 
In essence:
Its robust resettlement program, with an emphasis on expedited resettle-
ment for LGBTI means that the government and local communities are 
not as concerned with the lasting cultural impact of recognising people 
as refugees on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity. 
(Kremin, 2017: p. 68)
Following the reintroduction of Uganda’s AHB in November 2014, the num-
bers of LGBTI Ugandans seeking safety began to rise, so much so as to be 
considered a visible population group seeking asylum in Kenya (Zomorodi, 
2015: p. 12). This increase in movement coincided with two distinct occur-
rences. The first was a belief on the part of LGBTI refugees in Kenya, that 
resettlement would be swift, given the tenuous nature of their legal right 
to be in Kenya as LGBTI people (criminalised by the Kenyan state) and as 
refugees (protected by the UNHCR). This belief was fuelled by rumours of 
housing, a stipend and fast-track processing. According to Gita Zomorodi 
(2015: pp. 13–14), one new arrival to Kenya in February 2015 stated that they 
only expected to ‘be in Kenya for three months and be resettled to the West.’ 
The second, distinct occurrence was the Kenyan state’s implementation of 
‘Operation Usalama Watch,’ which drastically shifted conditions of recep-
tion and possibility for refugees within the country. The arrival of larger 
groups of LGBTI people seeking asylum coincided with increased fears, 
within Kenya, relating to terrorism and, in particular, the terrorist group al 
Shabaab. In response to these fears, the Kenyan state issued a strict direc-
tive requiring all refugees in Kenya to move back to the camps – in essence, 
reissuing the government’s encampment policy making it illegal for refugees 
to live outside of designated camp areas (Millo, 2013: p. 16).5 The majority 
of LGBTI refugees in the country were remanded to Kakuma.
Encampment and discretion
Kakuma authorities usually give refugees construction materials to build 
their own houses (Kushner, 2016). In an effort to protect the LGBTI arrivals 
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from the almost immediate hostility of other refugees in the camp, the UN-
CHR set the group up with a plot of land and worked with a partner organ-
isation to construct a set of small huts for them to reside in. A makeshift 
border was created around the compound with thorny shrubs; it is unclear 
if this was to keep the LGBTI refugees in, or the threatening elements of the 
wider refugee population out. And, presumably in order to further limit in-
teractions with other refugees, a tap with running water was placed near the 
enclosed area. All of this was largely unheard-of treatment. The UNHCR 
explicitly intended to assist the group in acclimating to the camp while caus-
ing the least amount of upheaval for both LGBTI refugees and the camp’s 
already existing population (United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees, 2019: p. 3). This was a space created with the protection of the group 
in mind, a space constructed with the express intention of having LGBTI 
refugees await resettlement while encamped within it.
The designers of this solution thus obviously hoped that being 
cordoned-off, the LGBTI group might be better able to remain inconspic-
uous. Since the arrival of LGBTI people in the camp, however, there have 
been numerous incidences of reported violence and targeted harassment. 
In response to this, LGBTI members of the camp mounted protests while 
accusing both the police and the UNHCR of negligence, incompetency and 
abuse. Meanwhile, handwritten signs appeared periodically around the 
camp, stating, for example – ‘If you don’t leave the camp, we are going to 
kill you one by one, and we mean it. Enough is enough’ (Power, 2018b). The 
former director of resettlements for the UNHCR, Inge De Langhe, noted in 
a 2015 interview that, as an organisation, the UNHCR simply did not ‘have 
the capacity to protect each and every individual’ (Kushner, 2015). Instead, 
she stressed that it would be best if those LGBTI people encamped within 
the camp maintained a certain level of discreetness while waiting for reset-
tlement (Kushner, 2015). A controversial request, discretion has often been 
used historically as a basis to reject asylum claims, due to the belief that 
persecution can be avoided if an applicant would only hide or conceal their 
sexual or gender identity (Spijkerboer & Jansen, 2011: p. 13).
Refugee camps like Kakuma are a particular spatial and temporal man-
ifestation. They are bounded entities, existing somewhere between the tem-
porary and the permanent (Turner, 2015: p. 140), which do not appear on the 
official maps of countries (Agier, 2008: p. 44). In this sense they occupy space – 
they are spatial configurations – but remain sites hidden from view; they 
are, in a sense, non-places. For Michel Agier, those within camps become 
agglomerated, via administrative labels such as ‘refugee,’ into a homoge-
nous whole representative of the non-place (Agier, 2017). Lisa Malkki (1992) 
argues that camps impose ‘refugeeness,’ a term which she posits ‘denotes an 
objectified, undifferentiated mass’ (p. 34). She proposes that the ways stand-
ardised discursive and representational forms are used to discuss refugees 
and the ‘refugee problem’ have made their way in mainstream journalism, 
and media have had far-reaching, cross-border implications for refugees 
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globally, including ‘the systematic, even if unintended, silencing of persons 
who find themselves in the classificatory space of “refugees”’ (Malkki 1996: 
p. 386). Furthermore, she suggests that when refugees become objects of 
care to organisations, such as the UNHCR, they essentially enter into an 
‘anonymous corporeality and speechlessness’ (Malkki, 1996: p. 386).
Indeed, camps in their ‘temporal and spatial architectures’ (Keshavarz, 
2016: p. 239) are such that, though intended to do otherwise, they actually 
impede rather than foster human rights by ‘limiting, controlling and regu-
lating the life of undesirables’ (Keshavarz, 2016: p. 239). For Svetlana Sytnik 
this is built into the very nature of the camp and ensures that as an undif-
ferentiated mass, whose time in this non-place becomes one of protracted 
waiting, the only human right that refugees eventually find themselves left 
with is a right to life (Sytnik, 2012: p. 26). Those living in camps, classified as 
refugees, thus find themselves in a perpetual waiting for resettlement, return 
or host country integration. Camps are not built with the intention of being 
a permanent solution; rather, they are explicitly designed as temporary wait-
ing spaces. This is the main reason they remain unmarked on maps – they 
are not meant to stay. Yet, though they are treated as temporary solutions, 
increasingly, refugee camps are becoming permanent fixtures (Mohdin, 
2015). According to statistics, the ‘average duration’ in waiting ‘is now well 
over twenty years’ (Do & Devictor, 2016).6 This waiting, in the camp spe-
cifically, as a site of restricted spatial ability, can also according to Rotter 
(2016: p. 89) facilitate ‘a sense of suspension of movement in time.’ Camps 
then can be understood both in their spatial manifestation as non-places 
and their temporal construction as waiting zones, as indicative of a kind of 
suspension.
It is arguable that, encamped within the camp, LGBTI refugees became 
the undesirable of undesirables. In relation to Kakuma, Jansen (2008: 
p. 570) argues that when they are unable to access available humanitarian 
structures, refugees who are considered vulnerable are overlooked. The re-
quest for LGBTI people to practice discretion and concealment can be un-
derstood as an expectation that they actively enter the camp’s structure of 
‘anonymous corporeality and speechlessness’ (Malkki, 1996: p. 386). The 
UNHCR is clear in its guidelines that discretion should never be a require-
ment in the process of asylum (UNHCR, 2012). Since discretion entails 
blending into the masses, coupled, in this instance, with the very real possi-
bility of being subsumed into the forgotten space of the camp, many could 
not acquiesce and many more actively refused (Kushner, 2015). Seemingly 
paradoxically, by corralling LGBTI people in a singular area, this encamp-
ment rendered the group increasingly visible to threatening elements of the 
camp. At the same time, this encampment increased their vulnerability to 
broader invisibility, as just another group of vulnerable refugees, waiting 
in Kakuma. As one refugee explained, to be discrete would be to become 
‘invisible, as if you cease to exist … you know we need the visibility so much 
because if you’re just there … [in the camp] … you’re just there no one knows 
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anything that is happening here’ (Camminga, 2020). When one ceases to 
exist while waiting, suspended between resettlement and nowhere, as one 
among the masses, in a ‘radically disparate’ system such as resettlement, one 
runs the risk of a wait without end.
Go and fund me!
Aren Aizura (2018: p. 20) argues that occupants of a space designated for 
waiting can ‘push on the space and invent temporalities that refuse the 
suspension of waiting.’ As LGBTI refugees entered Kakuma, campaigns 
started to appear online, aiming to raise money for food, medication, cloth-
ing and other emergency items while consistently underlining that these 
were needs to be provided for in having to wait for resettlement. Based in 
the USA, GoFundMe is the largest crowdfunding platform on the Internet, 
generating as much as $140 million a month in donations – what Ainsley 
Harris, in a review of the company, calls ‘flickers of hope – in the form of 
digital payments’ (Harris, 2017). GoFundMe is described by its CEO as a 
‘digital safety net – with more than 25 million donors eagerly holding it up’ 
(Harris, 2017). Visitors to a campaign page are given three options: Donate, 
share on Facebook or tweet. Automated emails acknowledging donations 
encourage donors to share the campaign ‘by telling people how much their 
promotion could be worth, in dollar terms, based on analyses of past cam-
paigns’ (Harris, 2017). Campaigns are monitored for interesting content or 
for spikes in donations. These are then pitched as stories to news media in 
the US, including popular digital media outlets such as BuzzFeed (Harris, 
2017). The platform has been praised for ‘democratising help – with a few 
clicks a person can now mobilise their family, friends, community and even 
the world to help anyone, anywhere’ (Solomon, 2016). This geographical dis-
persion of investors is considered one of the platform’s most ‘striking char-
acteristics’ (Agrawal et al., 2010: p. 1).
The key to crowdfunding on GoFundMe is creating a campaign, telling 
a story, providing photos and sharing it widely. Campaigns ‘walk a careful 
line between revealing an extremely vulnerable situation […] and indicating 
the worth of the person or people in need’ (Paulus & Roberts, 2018: p. 66). In 
a narrative analysis of GoFundMe campaigns, Paulus and Roberts note that 
actual requests for funds typically emerge as secondary to the discursive 
tactics used to ‘manage identity and present the person in need, and situ-
ation, as worthy of support’ (Paulus & Roberts, 2018: pp. 66–67). Accord-
ing to Paulus and Roberts, the biggest contribution of sites like GoFundMe 
are, perhaps surprisingly, not their financial possibilities but their ability 
to emphasise and bring attention to personal struggles, which may other-
wise would have remained unknown or invisible (Paulus & Roberts, 2018: 
p. 70). Donations are, relatedly, empathy-based, offering no ‘perk’ beyond the 
purely affective. The ‘Tell your story’ section of a GoFundMe page is where 
campaign creators are expected to explain the reason for these campaigns. 
LGBTI asylum seekers in Kakuma 139
Here, LGBTI refugees virtually project their needs and experiences of wait-
ing as an event in relation to resettlement. For instance, the ‘7 LGBTs need 
to raise the roof’ campaign:
Please help the Kakuma 7 build the plastic housing the UN cannot pro-
vide. These donations will build the new shelters and leftover money 
will by reputable over the counter medicine for common camp ailments 
like diarrhoea (sic) and headaches […] Every human deserves a safe, se-
cured, dry place to sleep. Until the Kakuma 7 can travel to their Amer-
ican Dream, let’s be the ones who send it to them. 
(Mbaziira, 2017)
Across campaigns, then, the core call is a virtual projection of the needs and 
experiences of waiting while consistently underlining the necessity for re-
settlement. Crucially, as evidenced by ‘their American Dream,’ this is an in-
vestment in a future horizon where the needs of having to wait, which make 
explicit the event of waiting in the present, are investments in survival until 
that future moment. In another campaign entitled ‘We Stand with LGBT 
refugees,’ the campaigns creator explains:
I am humbly begging for funds for shelter, medication, and food for 
myself as well as my brothers and sisters here at the center (there are 
5 of us). This fundraising goal will help us sustain ourselves for two 
months. We all hope and pray for the day where we are resettled and 
have a chance at a future where we are able to love our selves (sic) and 
each other. 
(McGaughey, 2019)
These campaigns through their ‘share counters,’ indicating the number of 
times the campaign is shared across social media, and rising bar of dona-
tions, indicating cash donations given, can therefore be understood as active 
markers of this waiting time. Indicators such as ‘help us sustain ourselves 
for two months,’ when they appear alongside the rising cash bar, act as tem-
poral markers of need. Moreover, the engagement by campaigners suggests 
a kind of active waiting, one which is projected into the future space of the 
‘American Dream,’ a time where campaigners might be able ‘to lover our 
selves and each other.’ The engagement in the form of donations and the 
subsequent messages from donors, which often accompany donations, help 
to cultivate connection beyond the physical space of the camp. Donors’ mes-
sages include such statements as: ‘We are all a family, global and we need 
to stick together’ (sic) (Patton et al., 2019); ‘please stay strong and know you 
have people thinking of you!’ (Dumford, 2018); and – ‘Queer solidarity from 
the UK. You deserve a home. You deserve to have your humanity recog-
nised and celebrated. You deserve to feel safe’ (McGaughey, 2019). These 
campaigns refuse suspension by actively and intentionally bringing to life 
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the contours of the waiting event via the Internet (Bissell, 2007). It informs 
a would-be audience for the needs of which this waiting is comprised in re-
lation to their particular subjectivities, as LGBTI people, and their desired 
mobility, a desire for resettlement.
Those interviewed on various media platforms also punted their funding 
pages. In Tillmans’ (2019) interview, for instance, Refugee Flag Kakuma, 
an LGBTI organisation established in direct response to their encamp-
ment within the camp called on readers to visit their Facebook-linked 
GoFundMe page and make contributions should they feel ‘sympathetic 
enough’ (Tillmans, 2019). According to Bram J. Jansen, ‘representing vul-
nerability and using identity to negotiate access to opportunities is the es-
sential resource for refugees, because many other resources are lacking’ 
(Jansen, 2008). Vulnerability, which is a precondition of resettlement, is 
also a critical resource on the Internet. The very names of these campaigns – 
for example, ‘HELP LGBTQ+ REFUGEES IN KENYA’ (Bossa, 2017), 
‘Uganda LGBT Refugee Assistance Fund’ (Wood, 2018), ‘LGBT Refugee 
Emergency Safe Shelter’ (Nathan, 2018), ‘Help LGBT in Kakuma Refu-
gee Camp’ (Mariadas, 2018), ‘LGBTI Refugee Coalition in Kenya’ (Clark, 
2018), ‘7 LGBT refugees need to raise a roof’ (Borden, 2018) – consistently 
mark the connection between geographical regions (Kenya or Kakuma, or 
both) and the acronym ‘LGBTI.’ The latter is invested in as an indicator 
of the group’s vulnerability and difference from other refugees, and, by 
extension, their needs.
These campaigns map life in Kakuma often in the very way in which they 
are titled, for instance ‘Help LGBT in Kakuma Refugee Camp’ (Mariadas, 
2018). They transform the non-place of the camp, and the suspended expe-
rience that is the event of waiting for resettlement, by making their waiting, 
themselves and the camp, visible to a global public, and thus countering the 
precarious position of encampment within the camp. Lastly, and perhaps 
most critically, the online campaigns are used as a way to restructure time 
by informing the world of the duration of their waiting, the temporal flow 
of which is marked not by the ticking away of ‘clock time,’ but by the rise 
of the money or donation bar and the increase in the number of ‘shares’ 
on social media a campaign garners. It is less about the actual marking of 
the bar climbing upwards in value than it is about the ticking over of both 
financial investment and social media interest of a readership that is global, 
already waiting in the future time and space of resettlement. This crowd of 
readers and donors thus becomes a veritable lifeline beyond the camp and 
encampment. These campaigns can consequently be read as a direct refusal 
of discrete waiting; one which is not only a structuring experience of time 
but an event that has material effects. Centrally, it brings their plight to a 
global public, which, given the tenuous legal position of the relevant groups, 
would have remained largely unaware of the experiences of LGBTI refugees 
in a country that does not recognise LGBTI people, without the power of 
the Internet.
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A Google search of ‘LGBT refugee Kakuma Kenya’ yields 42,800 results 
spanning funding sites, articles, books and reports. The Internet is synon-
ymous with visibility. Due to ongoing criminalisation in combination with 
particular religious and cultural beliefs, the visibility of the LGBTI popu-
lation in Kenya creates social tension. It is often the case that this tension 
leads to challenge and persecution. Zomorodi (2015: p. 13) reports that these 
crowdfunding initiatives raised more than $125,000, seemingly redistributed 
to LGBTI refugees in Kenya, although this is difficult to verify. The cam-
paigns brought to a global audience what we might, following Aizura (2018), 
describe as the ‘temporal suspension’ of being both criminalised and legally 
protected as a recognised refugee waiting in Kakuma for resettlement. The 
campaigns constitute a refusal to inhabit this suspension. A refusal to re-
main discrete and fade into the fabric of the camp.
This is not to say that actual experiences of the time of waiting are not te-
dious or, as some refugees have stated, ‘unfulfilled…useless, oppressive even’ 
(Nusbaum, 2016). Much like trans people’s use of crowdfunding websites to 
seek funds to assist with affirming healthcare, as discussed by Megan Farnel 
(2015), it would seem that calls for assistance by LGBTI refugees in Ka-
kuma create conditions under which groups who are not refugees, primarily 
based in the Global North, ‘are deemed not only capable, but righteously 
able to define life and life-saving’ for these population groups (Farnel, 2015: 
p. 12). One of the appeals of crowdfunding is the degree of agency it gives to 
individuals. LGBTI refugees punctuate the time of waiting with stories of 
displacement, turning their vulnerability, their waiting, into a media event 
on a global platform.
Conclusion: the virtual and the real
Camps like Kakuma, which the UNHCR runs as protected spaces, fade 
into a kind of obscurity within their host countries (Verdirame, 1999: 
p. 18). Though they might be diverse internally, within the context of the host 
country those in the camp become a singular assemblage – ‘refugees.’ This 
can make differentiated protection needs extremely difficult to manage. The 
situation in Kakuma for LGBTI people is such that the request for their 
concealment and discretion alongside their particular encampment within 
the camp suggests that they should simply assimilate into the ‘objectified, 
undifferentiated mass’ (Malkki, 1992: p. 34). In requesting funding from 
a public located outside of the camp and particularly in the Global North, 
LGBTI refugees not only refused invisibility they also put Kakuma on the 
map. In doing so, they garnered interest from a foreign media, of which 
Tillmans’ article is but one example, telling their stories of waiting in the 
camp (see Kushner, 2015; Buchanan, 2016; Paperny, 2018). Tillmans’ article, 
which opened this chapter, can be understood as indicative of the reach and 
scope of these campaigns. Tillmans, a world-famous artist and contempo-
rary photographer whose work adorns the walls of museums, galleries and 
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night-clubs such as the famous Berghain in Berlin, is not generally known 
for being a journalist. His article nevertheless featured across several widely 
read mainstream digital media platforms including Vice and I-D. Critically, 
the article ends with Tillmans’ (2019) plea to readers ‘To learn more about 
the situation in the Kakuma Refugee camp and how can you help (sic), please 
visit the Refugee Flag Kakuma Facebook page.’ This plea also includes a 
request to ‘please help spread the word’ (Tillmans, 2019). Importantly, Till-
mans is not alone. The various GoFundMe campaigns have appeared in ar-
ticles describing life in Kakuma for LGBTI refugees in mainstream news 
websites such as the Washington Blade (Rosendall, 2018), as well as in more 
niche LGBTI publications such as MambaOnline in South Africa (Ntsabo, 
2018) and the UK-based GayStarNews (Power, 2018a). More broadly, Ken-
yan LGBTI refugees have received coverage across numerous platforms in 
the wake of their self-publication through these campaigns (Naluzze, 2018; 
Bhalla, 2019; Newman, 2019).
These campaigns have arguably brought the spatial structures of encamp-
ment to a public beyond the confines of the camp. Had the group acquiesced 
to discretion it is unclear whether, given the improbability of a group of 
LGBT refugees claiming asylum in a country that does not acknowledge 
LGBT people, the wider global public would even be aware of their exist-
ence, let alone their needs or their wait for resettlement. Returning to Ai-
zura (2018), the campaigns are in fact constituting a possible donor public 
defined by a virtual affective relationship to the LGBTI refugees; those sit-
uated beyond the fenced bounds of Kakuma who are ‘sympathetic enough.’ 
Appeals on GoFundMe are both a virtual projection of the LGBTI refu-
gees’ desire for a secure future and a refusal to experience their present as 
a time in which they can only passively wait because they are encamped. 
Their campaigns request funding for necessities while always directing the 
focus towards resettlement. In this way, they are a means through which 
this waiting event, which here distinctively relates to LGBTI people, is made 
public via its publication on the Internet. They project needs and desires 
which override the spatial and temporal rhythms that mark camps as non-
places and refugees as undifferentiated masses. The very names of these 
campaigns insist on geographical legibility – ‘Kakuma,’ ‘Kenya.’ They also 
facilitate a temporality, in which the passing of time spent waiting within 
the space of the camp is measured through need: ‘Transport, Accommoda-
tion, Food, Medication/Nutrition Supplements, Basic needs/Refreshments, 
Venue, Emergency Fee’ (Patton et al., 2019). This is marked by the rising 
bar of donations ‘$670 raised of $3,500 goal’ and the number of shares, ‘351’ 
via other social media platforms orientated always towards resettlement: 
‘Kenya is no safe a place to live in by LGBTI’s and all efforts should be 
made to solicit for more resettlement slots for them to third countries’ (Pat-
ton et al., 2019). As Paulus and Roberts (2018: p. 65) note, the scaffold pro-
vided by GoFundMe is, inherently, temporal. It must be stressed here that 
the point however is not the number of times a campaign is shared but about 
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achieving active engagement from an interested and financially invested 
public, ‘anonymous’ persons who pledged ‘$50 9 days ago’ living in the fu-
ture space of possible resettlement. Campaigns function as markers of time 
spent towards resettlement.
On 11 December 2018, LGBTI refugees in Kakuma staged a public march 
to the UNHCR offices protesting their insecurity, lack of provisions and 
the abuse and discrimination they experienced in the camp. En route, they 
were attacked by several other members of the camp. Some of the LGBTI 
refugees suggested that police also took part in the attack, although the 
police denied this accusation. Several protestors were severely injured and 
had to be hospitalised. In December 2018, following the march and the sub-
sequent attack, the UNHCR began to facilitate a process of moving LGBTI 
refugees out of the camp, which was no longer considered safe for them, 
into safe houses on the outskirts of Nairobi (Refugee Coalition of East Af-
rica, 2018). The UNHCR admitted that the LGBTI contingent of the camp 
would be far safer in and around Nairobi rather than in the camp (Ahmed & 
Mohan, 2018). In a press statement, a UNHCR spokesperson noted that 
while the UNHCR had undertaken great efforts to protect LGBTI refugees 
in the camp, arguing that ‘the Kakuma context does not provide a safe en-
vironment for LGBTI refugees and asylum-seekers […] UNHCR believes 
that the LGBTI refugees who were involved in this incident would be better 
protected outside Kakuma. The necessary measures have been taken to fa-
cilitate their removal’ (Bhalla, 2018).
One of the key demands of those encamped, articulated on their placards, 
was ‘quicker resettlement process before we all die in this hostile environ-
ment’ (Ahmed & Mohan, 2018). If there is one thing that is abundantly clear, 
it is that a visible contingent of refugees within the camp, as evidenced by the 
words ‘we will kill you one by one,’ did not want LGBTI people among them 
and were emboldened enough to state that openly. Faced with this threat, 
LGBTI refugees called for assistance beyond the borders of their encamp-
ment within the camp, beyond Kakuma and beyond Kenya. That this call 
was contingent on their visibility as LGBTI required putting consistent en-
ergy, even at the expense of their safety within the camp, into LGBTI visibil-
ity. This chapter is an outcome of that very visibility work, drawing from the 
campaigns and by extension the labour of ‘LGBTI’ as a marker of waiting 
time on the Internet. Through the campaigns, members of the group define 
themselves as not only LGBTI but LGBTI and refugees and waiting. Their 
campaigns highlighted their time in the camp and put the camp on the map, 
as a place unwelcoming to them. This was achieved via the signalling done 
by the request to ‘go fund me’ alongside the rising money counter on the 
website, in relation to the visibility work of ‘LGBTI’ and the mapping of ‘Ka-
kuma’ online. Returning to Tillmans’ interview, the campaigns not only aim 
to secure a future of resettlement beyond the camp and Kenya but also work 
to change the temporal structure of the present within the camp. The LGBTI 
refugees’ eventual relocation, the rescinding of their encampment within the 
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camp, can be read as the fruits of this refusal to merely become part of the 
waiting, speechless, anonymous, undesirable and undifferentiated masses – 
the refugees of Kakuma – on the grounds that to do so would be deadly.
Notes
 1 Campaigns mentioned in this chapter use both ‘LGBT’ and ‘LGBTI’ to refer to 
their members. Where this chapter refers to the name of a campaign or refer-
ences a particular campaign, I have followed the campaigns choice of acronym 
in all other cases I have used LGBTI.
 2 The Anti-Homosexuality Bill (AHB) was ratified by the Ugandan parliament in 
December 2013, signed into law in 2014 and struck down by the Constitutional 
Court of Uganda in August 2014.
 3 In the 1980s, war in Sudan forced young Sudanese children, many of whom were 
boys, to flee the country, crossing the Savannah desert into neighbouring Ethio-
pia. In 1991, those same children, an estimated 25,000, were expelled from Ethi-
opia and fled to Kenya arriving at the Kakuma Refugee Camp seeking shelter 
and safety (Geltman et al., 2005: p. 586).
 4 Section 162 of Kenyan Penal Code states that any person who has carnal knowl-
edge of any person against the order of nature or permits a male person to have 
carnal knowledge of him or her against the order of nature is guilty of a felony 
and is liable to imprisonment for 14 years; Section 145 of Ugandan Penal Code 
provides that any person who has carnal knowledge of any person against the 
order of nature or permits a male person to have carnal knowledge with him or 
her against the order of nature commits an offence and is liable to imprisonment 
for life (The Republic of Kenya, 2009). 
 5 Given the previously lax implementation of Kenya’s encampment policy, it is 
unclear whether this decision simply coincided with the sudden arrival of new 
LGBTI refugees, or a considered move on the part of the Kenyan state to justify 
the increased suppression of refugees and asylum seekers at large.
 6 For a disaggregation of numbers and the difference between median and aver-
age, see Do and Devictor (2016).
References
Agier, M. (2008) On the margins of the world: The refugee experience. Cambridge, 
Polity Press.
Agier, M. (2017) Migrant nation. 1 June 2017. Le Monde diplomatique. Available 
from: https://mondediplo.com/2017/06/08camps. (accessed 4 June 2019).
Ahmed & Mohan. (2018) LGBTIQ protest interrupted by violence outside UNHCR 
sub-office. 31 December 2018. Kakuma News Reflector - A Refugee Free Press. 
Available from: https://kanere.org/lgbtiq-protest-interrupted-by-violence-outside- 
unhcr-sub-office/ (accessed 16 January 2019).
Aizura, A.Z. (2018) Mobile subjects: Transnational imaginaries of gender reassign-
ment. Durham and London, Duke University Press.
Bhalla, N. (2018) U.N. moves LGBT+ refugees to safe houses after Kenya camp at-
tacks. 13 December 2018. news.trust.org. Available from: http://news.trust.org/
item/20181213171702-0m48g/. (accessed 14 December 2018).
Bhalla, N. (2019) LGBT+ refugees in Kenya accuse U.N. of failing on protection, 
shelter. Reuters. 11 January. Available from: https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-kenya-lgbt-refugees-idUSKCN1P51Q2. (accessed 8 February 2019).
LGBTI asylum seekers in Kakuma 145
Bissell, D. (2007) Animating suspension: Waiting for mobilities. Mobilities. 2 (2), 
277–298.
Borden, S.I. (2018) Click here to support 7 LGBT refugees need to raise a roof or-
ganized by Sarah Imes Borden. 31 August 2018. gofundme.com. Available from: 
https://www.gofundme.com/61sm91k. (accessed 31 January 2019).
Bossa, H. (2017) Click here to support HELP LGBTQ+ REFUGEES IN KENYA or-
ganized by Fierse Hydary Aidan. 9 January 2017. gofundme.com. Available from: 
https://www.gofundme.com/help-lgbtiq-refugees-in-kenya. (accessed 31 May 
2017).
Buchanan, E. (2016) Meet the LGBTI Ugandan community living in fear in Ken-
ya’s Kakuma refugee camp. 21 June 2016. IBTimes UK. Available from: http://
www.ibtimes.co.uk/meet-lgbti-ugandan-community-living-fear-kenyas-kakuma- 
refugee-camp-1566516. (accessed 18 October 2016).
Camminga, B. (2020) Encamped within a camp: Transgender refugees and Kakuma 
refugee camp (Kenya). In: Bjarnesen, J. & Turner, S. (eds.) Invisible displacements 
in African transnational spaces. London, Zed Books pp. 36–52.
Clark, M. (2018) Click here to support LGBTI refugee coalition in Kenya organ-
ized by Michael Clark. 19 June 2018. gofundme.com. Available from: https://uk. 
gofundme.com/RefCEA. (accessed 31 January 2019).
Crisp, J. & Jacobsen, K. (1998) Refugee camps reconsidered. Forced Migration Re-
view. 3, 27–30.
Do, Q.T. & Devictor, X. (2016) How many years do refugees stay in exile? 15 Sep-
tember 2016. World Bank Blogs. Available from: http://blogs.worldbank.org/
dev4peace/how-many-years-do-refugees-stay-exile. (accessed 2 December 2019).
Dumford, M. (2018) Click here to support emergency help for LGBTI refugees 
organized by Mike Dumford. 15 December 2018. gofundme.com. Available 
from: https://www.gofundme.com/f/help-lgbti-refugees-in-kakuma. (accessed 2 
December 2019).
El-Shaarawi, N. (2015) Living an uncertain future: Temporality, uncertainty, and 
well-being among Iraqi refugees in Egypt. Social Analysis. 59 (1), 38–56. DOI: 
10.3167/sa.2015.590103.
Farnel, M. (2015) Kickstarting trans*: The crowdfunding of gender/sexual re-
assignment surgeries. New Media & Society. 17 (2), 215–230. DOI: 10.1177/ 
1461444814558911.
Garlick, M., Guild, E., Procter, C. & Salomons, M. (2015) Building on the founda-
tion: Formative Evaluation of the Refugee Status Determination (RSD) Transition 
Process in Kenya, p. 113. Available from: https://www.unhcr.org/5551f3c49.pdf. 
(accessed 24 January 2019).
Geltman, P.L., Grant-Knight, W. & Mehta, S.D. (2005) The ‘lost boys of Sudan:’ 
Functional and behavioral health of unaccompanied refugee minors resettled in 
the United States. Archives of Pediatrics & Adolescent Medicine. 159 (6), 585–591. 
DOI: 10.1001/archpedi.159.6.585.
Harris, A. (2017) How Crowdfunding Platform GoFundMe Has Created A $3 Bil-
lion Digital Safety Net. 13 February 2017. Fast Company. Available from: https://
www.fastcompany.com/3067472/how-crowdfunding-platform-gofundme-has- 
created-a-3-billion-digital (Accessed: 2 October 2019)
Jansen, B.J. (2008) Between vulnerability and assertiveness: Negotiating resettle-
ment in Kakuma refugee camp, Kenya. African Affairs. 107 (429), 569–587. DOI: 
10.1093/afraf/adn044.
146 B Camminga
Keshavarz, M. (2016) Design-politics: An inquiry into passports, camps and borders. 
Doctoral Dissertation in Interaction Design. Sweden, Malmö University. Availa-
ble from: http://muep.mau.se/handle/2043/20605. (accessed 1 March 2019).
Kremin, M. (2017) To be out and in: Influencing factors in the recognition of SOGI-
based asylum claims in South Africa and Kenya. Human Rights Studies Master of 
Arts Program. Graduate School of Arts & Sciences, Columbia University. Avail-
able from: https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8474H5N. (ac-
cessed 26 February 2019).
Kushner, J. (2015) Inside the nightmares of Africa’s LGBT refugees. 26 June 2015. Pub-
lic Radio International. Available from: https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-06-26/
inside-nightmares-africa-s-lgbt-refugees. (accessed 14 February 2018).
Kushner, J. (2016) The brutal consequences of Uganda’s infamous anti-gay law. 17 
March 2016. Vice. Available from: https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/5gqz5x/ 
on-the-run-kenya-lgbt-v23n1. (accessed 16 January 2019).
Malkki, L. (1992) National Geographic: The rooting of peoples and the territoriali-
zation of national identity among scholars and refugees. Cultural Anthropology. 7 
(1), 24–44. DOI: 10.1525/can.1992.7.1.02a00030.
Malkki, L. (1996) Speechless emissaries: Refugees, humanitarianism, and 
dehistoricization. Cultural Anthropology. 11 (3), 377–404. DOI: 10.1525/
can.1996.11.3.02a00050.
Mariadas, A. (2018) Cliquez ici pour soutenir la campagne Help LGBT in Kakuma 
Refugee Camp organisée par Ayden Mariadas.14 August 2018. gofundme.com. 
Available from: https://www.gofundme.com/help-to-lgbt-people-in-kenya. (ac-
cessed 31 January 2019).
Mbaziira, I. (2017) Click here to support HELP LGBTI REFUGEES IN KAKUMA 
CAMP organized by Isaac Mbaziira. 14 March 2017. gofundme.com. Available 
from: https://www.gofundme.com/n237wb-help-lgbti-refugees-in-kakuma-camp. 
(accessed 22 June 2017).
Mbaziira, M. (2018) Letter to SOGI Listserv: Peaceful parade at UNHCR Kakuma 
sub office by LGBTQI refugees and asylum seekers as on 11/12/2018.
McGaughey, W. (2019). We Stand with LGBT Refugees. 2 December 2019. Gofundme.
Com. Available from: https://www.gofundme.com/f/we-stand-with-lgbt-refugees.
Millo, Y. (2013) Invisible in the city: Protection gaps facing sexual minority refugees 
and asylum seekers in urban Ecuador, Ghana, Israel, and Kenya. Available from: 
https://www.hias.org/sites/default/files/invisible-in-the-city_0.pdf. (accessed 15 
March 2019).
Mohdin, A. (2015) When refugees camps last three generations, we must accept 
they’re not going anywhere. 30 November 2015. Quartz. Available from: https://
qz.com/560768/when-refugees-camps-last-three-generations-we-must-accept-
theyre-not-going-anywhere/. (accessed 2 December 2019).
Naluzze, S. (2018) LGBT+ Ugandan refugees in Kenya face assault and harass-
ment. 31 October 2018. news.trust.org. Available from: http://news.trust.org/
item/20181031104239-gn3xw/. (accessed 1 November 2018).
Nanima, R.D. (2017) An evaluation of Kenya’s parallel legal regime on refugees, 
and the courts’ guarantee of their rights. Law, Democracy & Development. 21 (1), 
42–67. DOI: 10.4314/ldd.v21i1.3.
Nathan, M. (2018) Click here to support LGBT Refugee Emergency Safe Shelter 
organized by Melanie Nathan. 30 August 2018. gofundme.com. Available from: 
https://www.gofundme.com/lgbt-refugee-emergency-safe-shelter. (accessed 31 
January 2019).
LGBTI asylum seekers in Kakuma 147
Newman, R. (2019) Inside the lives of LGBT refugees in Kenya. 19 November 2019. 
BBC News. Available from: https://www.kenyamoja.com/video/inside-lives- 
ugandan-lgbt-refugees-kenya-bbc-africa-bbc-africa-64106. (accessed 3 December 
2019).
Ntsabo, M. (2018) Group appeals for funds to feed LGBTQ refugees in Kenya camp. 
17 July 2018. MambaOnline—Gay South Africa online. Available from: https://
www.mambaonline.com/2018/07/17/group-appeals-for-funds-to-feed-lgbtq- 
refugees-in-kenya-camp/. (accessed 3 December 2019).
Nusbaum, R. (2016) The coolest handbags we’ve ever seen were made by this LGBT 
refugee. 12 September 2016. HIAS. Available from: https://www.hias.org/blog/
coolest-handbags-weve-ever-seen-were-made-lgbt-refugee. (accessed 2 June 2017).
Paperny, A.M. (2018) A precarious haven: Africa’s LGBT+ refugees teeter on the 
brink in Kenya. Reuters. 31 October. Available from: https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-kenya-lgbt-refugees-idUSKCN1N5205. (accessed 16 January 2019).
Patton, S., Mbazira, M., Ladies of the Lake & Luna Loveagoodtime. (2019) Refugee 
Flag Kakuma. 19 November 2019. gofundme.com. Available from: https://www.
gofundme.com/f/refugee-flag-kakuma. (accessed: 2 December 2019).
Paulus, T.M. & Roberts, K.R. (2018) Crowdfunding a ‘real-life superhero:’ The con-
struction of worthy bodies in medical campaign narratives. Discourse, Context & 
Media. 21, 64–72. DOI: 10.1016/j.dcm.2017.09.008.
Pew Research Center. (2013) The Global Divide on Homosexuality Greater Accept-
ance in More Secular and Affluent Countries. Washington, DC, Pew Research 
Center.
Power, S. (2018a) African LGBTI refugees come together to celebrate Christmas. 
16 November 2018. Gay Star News. Available from: https://www.gaystarnews.
com/article/after-hardships-african-lgbti-refugees-come-together-to-celebrate- 
christmas/. (accessed 14 December 2018).
Power, S. (2018b) Death threats for LGBTI refugees who threw pride parade at Kenyan 
camp. 21 June 2018. Gay Star News. Available from: https://www.gaystarnews.
com/article/death-threats-for-lgbti-refugees-who-threw-pride-parade-at-kenyan-
camp/. (accessed 29 January 2019).
Refugee Coalition of East Africa. (2018) Crisis Worsens for LGBTQI Refugees 
in Kakuma. 14 December 2018. Refugee Coalition of East Africa. Available 
from: https://refugeecoalition.com/blog/f/crisis-worsens-for-lgbtqi-refugees-in- 
kakuma. (accessed: 16 January 2019).
Rosendall, R.J. (2018) Ugandan refugees cling to hope. Washington Blade: Gay News, 
Politics, LGBT Rights. 16 April. Available from: https://www.washingtonblade.
com/2018/04/16/opinion-ugandan-refugees/. (accessed 3 December 2019).
Rotter, R. (2016) Waiting in the asylum determination process: Just an empty inter-
lude? Time & Society. 25 (1), 80–101. DOI: 10.1177/0961463X15613654.
Solomon, R. (2016) GoFundMe Hits $2 Billion Raised. 16 February 2016. Medium. 
Available from: https://medium.com/@Robsolomon1/gofundme-hits-2-billion-
raised-55e119a751f0. (accessed: 1 October 2019).
Sytnik, S. (2012) Rights displaced: The effects of long-term encampment on the 
human rights of refugees. Refugee Law Initiative. Working paper 4, 1–32.
The Republic of Kenya. (2009). Laws of Kenya: The Penal Code. Nairobi, Govern-
ment Printers.
Tillmans, W. (2019) Fighting for LGBTI rights in Kakuma refugee camp. 4 January 
2019. I-D. Available from: https://i-d.vice.com/en_uk/article/kzv5gz/fighting-for- 
lgbti-rights-in-kakuma-refugee-camp. (accessed 9 January 2019).
148 B Camminga
Turner, S. (2015) What Is a Refugee Camp? Explorations of the Limits and Effects 
of the Camp. Journal of Refugee Studies. 29 (2), 139–148. DOI:10.1093/jrs/fev024.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2019) Contextual information 
and observations on LGBTI asylum-seekers and refugees in Kenya. Available from: 
https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=34418. 
(accessed 4 October 2019).
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (n.d.) Information on UNHCR 
Resettlement. UNHCR. Available from: https://www.unhcr.org/information- 
on-unhcr-resettlement.html. (accessed 8 June 2019).
Verdirame, G. (1999) The rights of refugees in Kenya: A social, legal study. Available 
from: repository.forcedmigration.org/pdf/?pid=fmo:199. (accessed 1 March 2019).
Wesangula, D. (2017) On the run from persecution: How Kenya became a ha-
ven for LGBT refugees. The Guardian. 23 February. Available from: https:// 
www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2017/feb/23/
on-the-run-from-persecution-how-kenya-became-a-haven-for-lgbt-refugees? 
CMP=share_btn_tw. (accessed 7 June 2017).
Wood, M. (2018) Click here to support Uganda LGBT Refugee Assistance Fund or-
ganized by Mitchell Wood. 24 February 2018. gofundme.com. Available from: 
https://www.gofundme.com/uganda-lgbt-refugee-assistance-fund. (accessed 31 
January 2019).
Zomorodi, G. (2015) SOGI-related forced migration in East Africa: Fleeing 
Uganda after the passage of the anti-homosexuality act. Available from: https:// 
globalphilanthropyproject.org/2016/03/15/sogi-related-forced-migration- 
in-east-africa-fleeing-uganda-after-the-passage-of-the-anti-homosexuality-act/. 
(accessed 29 January 2019).
Zomorodi, G. (2016) Responding to LGBT forced migration in East Africa. Forced 






Marseille, 21 November 2017: It’s late afternoon, and around 40 ‘migrant 
minors’ accompanied by members of collectives and non-governmental or-
ganisations (NGOs)1 are occupying the Saint-Ferréol Church, located at the 
Old Port in the city centre near the town hall. The occupation took place at 
the end of a rally to denounce the situation of an estimated 150 migrant mi-
nors, who were sleeping on the street. In the early 1990s, these minors were 
described as jeunes errants (young wanderers), which was also the name of 
the first organisation created in Marseille in 1994 to make this issue visible 
at a national level (Vassort, 2004; Duvivier, 2009; Lodwick, 2016). Later, 
migrant minors came to be known as ‘isolated foreign minors’ (mineurs 
isolés étrangers). Although French authorities adopted in 2016 the category 
used in Europe – ‘unaccompanied minors’ (UAMs) (Etiemble, 2018) – the 
category of ‘isolated foreign minors’ continues to be widely used by stake-
holders. More than 20 years have passed since undocumented migrants first 
occupied the Saint Bernard Church in Paris, an event that made a lasting 
impression (Blin, 2008). But the main concern for the Saint Bernard pro-
testers was for ‘the legal status of undocumented migrants to be resolved.’ 
Times have changed: ‘The State must protect isolated minors,’ read several 
posters and a sheet hung on the outside wall of the St. Ferréol Church. The 
church occupation in 2017 was not a protest for the rights of all undocu-
mented migrants, but for what in the meantime had come to constitute a 
new humanitarian population – the UAMs.
The occupation of the Saint-Ferréol Church took place 2 months after 
the launch of the ‘warning, mobilisation and denunciation’ national cam-
paign, which later became a nationwide collective called ‘Justice pour les 
jeunes isolés étrangers’ (justice for isolated foreign minors). November 2017 
was also the month that the humanitarian NGO Médecins Sans Frontières 
(Doctors Without Borders) opened a reception centre for isolated foreign 
minors in Pantin, a Paris suburb. Even though Doctors Without Borders 
had ended its programmes in France in 2012, it set up an operation in 2015 
to provide medical assistance to migrants in transit or asylum seekers and in 
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2017 further decided to open a daytime reception centre, providing medical 
and administrative advice for UAMs after having identified ‘the vulnerabil-
ity’ of this population’ (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2019).
As part of the WAIT research project, I conducted an exploratory ethno-
graphic survey in Marseille between September 2017 and July 2019, which 
also included a bibliographic research into the issues surrounding age as-
sessments among migrant minors in France and Europe. The question of age 
determination and age assessments of minors seemed a perfect example of 
the social production of waiting and time: In ‘sorting’ minors, who are under 
child protection services, and distinguishing them from adults, to whom no 
shelter is offered, the objectified measure of time is key. One of the many tools 
used in this assessment, the ‘bone tests,’ points to the perspective of ‘the truth 
of the body.’ As I will discuss in this text, the body is extracted from historical 
and social context, and the bones count more than the narrative of the subject.
Having started my investigation among biological anthropologists with 
experience in forensic and identification processes, this study led me to law-
yers specialising in the defence of UAMs, researchers specialising in bone 
age and social workers and activists working with minors. I also observed 
gatherings and periods of occupation, such as the one discussed earlier. My 
bibliographic research explored the fields of forensic anthropology (Boyd & 
Boyd, 2018; M’charek, 2018), forensic medicine and bone age research, in a 
quest to understand the social history of the measurement tools used and 
the debates that they provoke. I have carefully read socio-anthropological 
studies and reports on migrant minors in France. I have also started to mon-
itor and follow-up the 2018/2019 controversies surrounding two main issues: 
First, the constitutionality of carrying out bone age tests, and second, the 
launch of a biometric database dedicated to unaccompanied migrant mi-
nors, which was permitted by the law ‘Controlled immigration, an effective 
right to asylum, and successful integration’ from September 2018.2
This chapter deals with the interface of age and migration control poli-
cies: What do age assessments of minors and time measurements teach us 
about the ‘age classifications’ of contemporary border policies? What kind 
of expectations do they give rise to, and how is this expectation described 
and discussed by the various protagonists of the ‘waiting apparatus,’ which 
includes scientists in forensic medicine, lawyers, judges, social workers, 
NGOs, national law courts as well as X-rays of wrist bones and teeth, em-
ployed in the process of age assessments?
A new ‘humanitarian population’?
Age classifications
Age is an ‘institution without walls’ (Peatrik, 2003). Every society socially 
shapes the different stages of life cycles and identifies the transition from 
childhood to adulthood, as shown in the considerable literature on initiation 
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and rites of passage in anthropology (Van Gennep, 1909, Turner, 1967). Age 
is therefore an essential element of social stratification, and its assessment 
is connected to other social institutions such as kinship, work, politics, reli-
gion and so on. An ‘ocean of ages’ (Peatrik, 2003) exists, in which absolute 
and relative ages can be distinguished, as can chronological and legal ages, 
which do not always coincide.
Civil age was born with the parish and state registration of new-born ba-
bies, and developed in Europe between the sixteenth and eighteenth centu-
ries. Michel Foucault identified this period as the emergence of biopolitics, 
with particular emphasis on population biopolitics and ‘anatomo-politics’ 
at the level of individuals (Foucault, 1997). Age, understood in a civil status 
sense, is therefore an essential condition for the emergence of the idea of 
‘population,’ of the modern-day State, and is a tool for managing, protect-
ing and controlling registered populations (Rennes, 2016). This reminder 
of the historical origin of civil age resonates with the fact that it can be 
‘untranslatable,’ a concept dear to the philosopher Barbara Cassin (Cassin, 
2004). With respect to her current project on a ‘glossary of French bureau-
cracy,’ aimed at explaining the cultural requirements that are embedded in 
administrative bodies, Cassin uses the example of civil officials working in 
Aubervilliers, who did not really understand why so many of the migrants 
originally from Mali were born on 31st of December or on 1st of January. 
Cassin explains that Malians do not easily disclose their date of birth. In 
the Soninke language, one would commonly say something that could be 
translated as ‘born around,’ rather than the exact date of birth. Cassin 
(2004) explicates that for some Malians, disclosing their exact date of birth 
is equivalent to giving information seen as an intrinsic part of who they are, 
and thus, a power that can be held over them.
Civil status is also a hotbed of inequality in the world. In 2013, UNICEF 
estimated that 230 million children ‘do not officially exist,’ of which 40 mil-
lion were in West Africa. Worldwide, one in seven children does not have a 
birth certificate. ‘In some countries, this is due to prohibitively high costs. 
In others, birth certificates are not issued, and no proof of registration exists 
for families’ (UNICEF, 2013). In 2015, the issues of civil status were put on 
the international political agenda when providing legal identity for all be-
came one of the Sustainable Development Goals (Goal 16.9), a commitment 
made by the United Nations and all international aid agencies. According 
to World Bank surveys, one billion people worldwide do not have identity 
documents, ‘of whom nearly half are Africans. In 2018, 494 million people 
were reportedly “undocumented” on the continent, that is to say 50% of the 
population’ (Dalberto et al., 2018: p. 10).
A ‘new’ population?
Since the early 2000s, increasing attention has been paid to the migra-
tion of children and minors throughout the world (UNICEF-IRC)3. This 
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phenomenon does not only concern Europe, and the recent news of the situ-
ation of children at the border between Mexico and the United States proves 
it; if any proof were still needed (Bhabha, 2014). However, the number of 
people declaring that they are minors is increasing internationally as well as 
all around Europe. In January 2018, the bipartisan mission on UAMs, com-
missioned in 2017 by the prime minister and the president of the Assemblée 
des Départements (the assembly of the Départements of France), reported 
that France experienced certain singularities in relation to data from the 
European Union, an area where the number of UAM asylum seekers quad-
rupled between 2014 and 2015. In France, 60% of these minors come from 
Guinea, Ivory Coast and Mali. The other main countries of origin are Tuni-
sia, Algeria and Morocco. Another distinctive feature is the low proportion 
of minors seeking asylum in France; instead, they tend to opt for access to 
child protection services (MSF, 2019).
Between 2014 and 2017, the number of UAMs in child protection systems 
tripled in France. According to the Ministry of Justice figures, nearly 15,000 
new UAMs were entrusted to French departments4 after a court decision in 
2017. The recognition rate of the age assessments of minors would thus vary 
from 9% to 100% depending on the department. This evidenced heteroge-
neous practices and was, in the eyes of the authorities, the main argument 
for transferring age assessments of minors from departments to the State, 
through the creation of a highly controversial UAM ‘national biometric 
database’ (UAM bipartisan mission report, 2018). UAMs are estimated to 
make up about 10% of the young people currently under child welfare ser-
vices, a departmental prerogative, and this proportion is on the increase in 
young offender institutions and institutions for the legal protection of young 
people. In 2018, the department of Bouches du Rhône, where Marseille is lo-
cated, was in second place nationally in terms of receiving UAMs. Halfway 
through 2019 the department had received 1,125 children,5 of which around 
half were placed in Marseille.
Age assessment procedures for distinguishing minors, who are under 
child protection measures from adults, whose social and administrative des-
tiny goes down a completely different route (treated mainly as illegal immi-
grants rather than children needing protection), lead to the creation of what 
might be described as a new humanitarian population. This population is 
characterised by vulnerability, since in order to be eligible, applicants must 
‘prove’ to the authorities that they are minors and are ‘isolated’ or ‘unac-
companied’ (without a legal guardian in the country).
Assessing minors
Age assessments of minors include a set of practices, which were consoli-
dated into domestic law in 2013 and 2016. However, not everyone is given 
access to age assessments. The deportation of minors arriving from Italy, 
Age assessments of minors in France 155
with or without birth certificates, has been documented by both NGOs and 
the press.6 When assessments are in fact available, the law details the social 
assessment procedure (MSF, 2019: p. 33). It must be ‘neutral and benevo-
lent,’ and multidisciplinary and it must allow the person in question to com-
municate in a language that they are fluent in (so that interpreters may need 
to be involved). The social assessment procedure should explore six topics: 
Civil status, family composition, living conditions in the country of origin, 
reasons for leaving and making the journey, living conditions after arrival, 
and the assessed persons intentions/plans for the future. These practices 
have been duly documented by several studies, mainly in the Ile-de-France 
region, all of which show that the ‘sorting’ logic used during social assess-
ments of age is being based on ‘inconsistencies in accounts’ (Bailleul & 
Senovilla Hernandez, 2016; Carayon et al., 2019; MSF, 2019). Here we see the 
issue of producing a self-narrative that is likely to be perceived as ‘credible’ 
or ‘coherent,’ which has already been documented for asylum seekers in gen-
eral (D’Halluin, 2012). The ‘co-production’ of age during the institutional 
journey (Perrot, 2019) has been analysed and documented.
In Marseille, references to inconsistencies in accounts are also very com-
mon. Lawyers and social workers mention examples of refusals based on 
physical appearance, behaviour towards the opposite gender (‘his flirtatious 
behaviour towards female staff’ is mentioned as a sign of maturity in an age 
assessment report) and ways of dressing which supposedly contradict the 
alleged age. The fact that they have migrated can also be seen in itself as a 
‘sign’ of maturity, as is having worked during the journey. One such oxymo-
ron, listed in an age assessment report cited by a lawyer, is that ‘her mod-
esty is blatant.’ Depending on the departments, these social assessments are 
highly heterogeneous, and a more in-depth investigation reveals ‘disparate 
and arbitrary’ procedures, as they are described by Médecins Sans Fron-
tières (MSF, 2019). ‘Bone tests’ are therefore one of the tools used for the age 
assessment of minors. These however must be requested by the departments 
and ordered by a judge or a prosecutor. Lawyers can also demand judges to 
authorise a ‘bone test,’ as we shall see further on.
Issues raised by the use of forensic expertise in age assessments
It is against this background that on 20 September 2017, a press release by 
the Council of Europe dealing with age assessment practices in 37 countries 
stressed the safeguarding of the ‘best interests of the child,’ enshrined as a 
cardinal principle of children’s rights, and a selection of the ‘least invasive 
methods’ when carrying out age assessments of young migrants.7 The use of 
bone age tests and forensics to determine whether migrants claiming to be 
minors are actually so have already been extensively documented in France, 
either to demonstrate their ethical and scientific illegitimacy or to describe 
them as ‘the technology of suspicion’ (Collectif ‘Cette France-là,’ 2010) or 
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‘Russian roulette.’8 Incidentally, disputes continued between 2017 and 2019 
between the legislative bodies and stakeholders from NGOs involved in de-
fending the rights of minors and foreigners. A priority preliminary submis-
sion on the issue of constitutionality was tabled in the French Constitutional 
Council at the end of 2018, and in March 2019 the council delivered a favour-
able opinion on maintaining them within the limits already set out in a legis-
lative amendment in 2016. In texts related to either reviewing or challenging 
bone age, one aspect stands out: The Greulich and Pyle Atlas. This atlas is 
the main reference on which the majority of assessments using X-rays of the 
left wrist are based. Newspaper and journal articles have described it as a 
study focusing on ‘white children of upper socioeconomic status (…) in the 
1930s in the United States’ (Etiemble, 2018). However, bone tests as used in 
UAM interventions have stakes and uses that go far beyond this.9
Since the early 2000s, different ethical and medical authorities have is-
sued opinions on the irrelevance of the use of bone tests for a precise eval-
uation of the age of 18. These include the National Advisory Council on 
Ethics in 2005; the National Academy of Medicine in 2007; the European 
Declaration of Health Professionals in 2010; and the Ethics Committee of 
the Centre Hospitalier Régional et Universitaire in Brest in 2018 (Chariot, 
2010; Kobanda Ngbenza, 2016). The recommendations of experts from in-
ternational scientific societies of paediatrics and forensic medicine have also 
been published (Schmeling et al., 2016), and these tests have been banned in 
England and Germany.
In 2015, an appeal published on 16 January in the daily newspaper Le 
Monde with the explicit headline ‘Let’s ban bone age tests on young im-
migrants’ led to a petition that gathered more than 13,000 signatures. The 
appeal mentioned the fact that other European countries have decided to 
ban them.10 Although bone tests were used from the 1990s to assess whether 
young migrants were minors,11 they have no legal basis other than being 
mentioned in the circular of 31 May 2013, known as Taubira, which stated 
that ‘if, and only if, doubt persists at the end of this stage,12 a medical assess-
ment of the age can be carried out after a request from the public prosecu-
tor’s office.’ This mobilisation resulted in several amendments being tabled 
to prohibit bone tests as part of the child protection law reforms of 14 March 
2016. Another circular of 25 January 2016 indicated ‘that in the event of 
persistent doubt, the judicial authority may order medical examinations, of 
which it will independently assess the conclusions.’13
However, it was through the law of 14 March 2016 that medical assess-
ments of bone age were incorporated into the civil code to determine which 
UAMs are indeed minors. This law clarifies three important points: Bone 
assessments from X-rays can only be performed after the person concerned 
has given their consent; the results of these examinations must specify the 
margin of error and cannot on their own determine whether the person is 
a minor because ‘this doubt benefits the interested party’; and finally, ‘age 
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assessments from an examination of the pubertal development of primary 
or secondary sexual traits can no longer be carried out.’
In 2018, following a Court of Cassation ruling that the use of forensic 
medicine for age assessments of minors had not ‘benefitted the interested 
party,’14 a priority preliminary submission on the issue of constitution-
ality was tabled in the Constitutional Council, supported by several 
organisations defending the rights of foreigners.15 In March 2019, the 
Constitutional Council validated the use of expert assessments, whilst 
‘warning magistrates about the misuse and excessive reliance on this 
examination.’16
Scenes from a medical visit to observe the use of forensic 
expert assessments
In July 2019, I visited the huge hospital at La Timone and made my way to 
the medico-legal forensic unit, in order to meet one of the members of the 
team authorised to carry out expert assessments of minors, among other 
procedures. A young female doctor had agreed to meet me in order to ex-
plain how she conducts this type of assessment, which since 2013, the year 
she joined the unit, she has exercised ‘only around fifteen times a year’… She 
explains to me:
So, we scan the collarbones, take an X-ray of the left wrist and a pano-
ramic dental X-ray, and then they come to us for the clinical examina-
tion knowing that it is quite limited, in the sense that since 2016 we are 
no longer allowed to look at their genitals, well, their sexual organs… 
Well obviously you have to have their agreement to examine them, and 
also for the Tanner stages but, well, anyway the issue is when they are 
around 18 years old it’s quite… they all have a Tanner stage greater than 
5, roughly up to 15 years old.
She shows me an illustration on her computer screen with the Tanner stages 
of the development of male sexual organs, and continues, ‘We ask them to 
place themselves on the scale, by choosing the picture that best represents 
what they look like. So sometimes we have big, hairy people who choose that 
one.’ She laughs while showing me stage 2.
Anyway, that’s not what’s going to make the difference… and so for the 
dental test we refer to the Demirjian publication; then for the wrist, it’s 
the Greulich and Pyle, and for the collarbone scan we use Schmeling, a 
German who has published a lot on the subject, so everyone quotes him. 
But the reference population is still the problem, it’s young people who 
were in good health… we bring together the three methods, but there is 
a window of doubt between 16 and 19 years old and the benefit of the 
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doubt always favours the minor, as we will never be able to say that he 
really is 18 years old: It depends on so many factors, I don’t know their 
diet, where they grew up, etc. (…) They often come accompanied by 
judicial police officers, I explain to them what’s going to happen, and if 
they don’t understand the language, interpreters are called in.
The Tanner scale is ‘one of the major tools through which the normal pu-
bertal development of both girls and boys is established and visually de-
fined’ (Piccand, 2016). The English paediatrician James Mourilyan Tanner 
produced a six-stage classification of the growth stages from childhood to 
adulthood, based on data he collected in a study which began in an Eng-
lish orphanage in 1948. Greulich and Pyle designed their atlas based on a 
group of 1,000 American individuals of a high socio-economic level living 
in Cleveland (Ohio, USA), who underwent X-ray examinations at regular 
intervals between 1931 and 1942 (Saint Martin, 2014: p. 31). Their aim was 
not to determine age but to study growth and weight delays.
The procedure described is perfectly in line with the legal framework in 
place since 2016, but La Timone is a ‘model’ university medical service and 
is at the cutting edge of research into bone age. In my field notes, one of the 
questions I jotted down at the end of this meeting was: 
What effect does it have when a young man presumed to be a minor 
has his sexual organs and hair examined by a female doctor, as could 
have been the case before 2016, or is asked by the same doctor to locate 
himself on such a scale?
At the time I was thinking of comments made by the lawyers I had met, and 
by a psychologist friend working with isolated foreign minors in MECS17 
before 2016, concerning forensic visits where young people were said to be 
extremely uncomfortable about undressing and showing their sexual or-
gans when they were taken to a medical examiner’s office by judicial police 
officers.
In his 2014 thesis on the life paths of isolated foreign children in France, 
Dieudonné Kobanda-Ngbenza, a sociologist and educator, writes:
In practice, as highlighted by the journalist Anne De Loisy, who in-
vestigated the Roissy-Charles De Gaulle Airport’s holding center, the 
isolated minor is handcuffed and taken to the forensic institute under 
police escort to be seen by a doctor who ‘analyses his dentition and the 
development of his sexual organs, and X-rays his wrist and his left hand. 
(De Loisy, 2005: p. 95)
During the medical assessment, doctors often resort to more humiliating 
examinations, which the young people we investigated talk about with em-
barrassment and reticence. In fact, medical assessments sometimes include 
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hair and genital examinations involving measuring the testicles of young 
boys or looking at girls’ breasts, or for both to have the hair under their 
armpits and their pubic hair examined’ (Kobanda Ngbenza, 2014: p. 166).
As highlighted by the speakers at a study day organised by IMéRA18 in 
June 2018, bringing together care workers, translators and anthropologists, 
the care relationship and the work of translation in places that confront the 
injunctions of migration policy (detention centres; shelters; juvenile prisons; 
and the OFPRA19) engage the question of modesty in multiple ways. Fur-
thermore, in 2015 France enshrined in law the examination of sexual organs 
as a tool for producing the physical evidence required to access human-
itarian protection and asylum for unaccompanied migrant minors.20 The 
law also included those who have a legal guardian on the territory, in the 
event of presumed female genital mutilation. A medical certificate must be 
produced and then a regular visit is considered in order to observe the ab-
sence of genital mutilation (OFPRA specifies an average of 5 years, except 
in cases stating an imminent threat). Again, the recognised expertise is that 
of doctors with a qualification in forensic medicine, as specified in the im-
plementation decree of 2018.21
Multiple timeframes and forms of waiting
Temporal issues involved in sheltering UAMs
‘Our waiting room is usually nicer, but we’ve had to put sheets over all the 
armchairs and chairs: There’s been a lot of scabies right now (laughs) so 
it’s better this way.’ This is said with the lightness of someone for whom 
these are everyday stories, by Anne, an associate of a firm of female law-
yers in Marseille, where the clientele are mainly migrant minors. Many of 
the young people she accompanies sleep rough in squats or on the streets, 
where they are also exposed to scabies and other dangers. Among lawyers, 
as among care workers and social workers, it is mainly women who accom-
pany the migrant minors. Anne exudes a contagious determination and dy-
namism, and has a bright smile that is sometimes still there when recalling 
situations and stories, which are often terrible.
But not always. There are also beautiful stories, and those end-of-the-
week moments when some of the young people she calls ‘my kids’ come to 
show her a perfect school report. The stories told by social workers and 
lawyers also mention people who ‘want to be an airline pilot’ and have ‘top 
marks’ in everything at school. Anne has defended young people declaring 
themselves minors in Marseille for over a decade, so she is able to speak with 
hindsight at this first meeting in October 2017, the first of a series of informal 
discussions and sometimes recorded interviews. Things were changing rap-
idly in this field, and a comparison of what she told me in October 2017 with 
the last interview conducted in July 2019 fully illustrates this observation 
that she had been asserting from the outset. In October 2017, a month before 
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the occupation of the Saint-Ferréol Church, relations between associations, 
lawyers and the departmental council, the body in charge of child protec-
tion, were very tense.
In Marseille, age assessments of minors are entrusted to a partner asso-
ciation of the departmental council, ADDAP 13. Clearly, ADDAP is not 
able to cope with the flow. A delay of nearly 3 months is currently almost 
the norm, resulting in a conflict over the definition of temporality and ‘tol-
erable’ waiting standards. When I mentioned that the research project to 
which I am associated studies ‘government through waiting,’ Anne burst 
out laughing: ‘Imagine that the term “waiting line” was replaced by “active 
file” at the ADDAP reception centre: The term “waiting line” was too de-
pressing for the young people!’ It is in fact to counter the waiting produced 
by the system that she regularly refers the matter to the children’s judge for 
a ‘provisional placement order’ (PPO), which requires the young person to 
be ‘sheltered’ so that he or she is no longer on the street. However, even with 
this order, which has the force of law behind it, her ‘kids’ are not always 
sheltered. The departmental council was convicted in June 2017 for non- 
compliance with one of these orders and then convicted again in December 
that year. Non-compliance happens despite the financial pressure to speed-
ily execute such court decisions, and is penalised with a 150-Euro fine that 
the department must pay if it does not execute the decision of provisional 
placement within 48 hours.
After the occupation of the Saint-Ferréol Church, the situation has 
changed, however. As Anne tells me: ‘What has changed is that civil society 
has taken over, with many volunteers sheltering minors who were previously 
on the street’ (Interview conducted in February 2019). This occupation also 
resulted in the opening of additional emergency reception centres by the de-
partment, for the UAMs awaiting their evaluation. But what allowed them to 
‘breathe,’ a term used by lawyers and other activists to signal relief from the 
pressure to find homes for the minors (and in particular by the association 
Katilla, dedicated to UAMs since January 2018), was the occupation on 18 
December 2018, of a building belonging to the diocese and located in front of 
the departmental council, the ‘59 St.-Just’ squat. It was occupied by a
collective of asylum seekers, unaccompanied minors and supporters 
who share their struggles: Access to accommodation provided for in 
the National Reception Scheme for adults and their children, access to 
the shelter for which the departmental council for isolated minors is 
responsible,
as the Facebook page reads. However, even if the ‘front’ is presented as com-
mon, the interests of the supporters of families and those of the UAMs may 
differ with respect to the strategy to adopt towards justice, since UAMs 
have a right to protection as minors that does not apply to adults identified 
as ‘irregular migrants.’
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‘Deminorisation’
In 2019, Anne’s temporal struggles increasingly concerned ‘deminorised’ 
young people. This is one of the first terms I learned in my discovery of the 
language of UAM supporters. The term describes the fact that a person 
may have been recognised as a minor in one department but when he or she 
arrives in another department, that department no longer recognises him or 
her as a minor. The threat of deminorisation may also be linked to inves-
tigations carried out after access to protection, leading to situations where 
people are ‘stuck between ages.’ This was the title that the daily Libération 
of 27 February 2019 gave the article by Kim Hullot-Guiot on the situation of 
N’Diawar, a young Malian resident in the department of Doubs whose age 
was under dispute. While N’Diawar stated 16 as his age, the authorities as-
sessed his age to be 19. In this case, the date of birth recorded for visa entry 
when the trip took place by plane had been changed by N’Diawar’s mother. 
But this is a common situation, and the date could also have been changed 
by ‘smugglers’22 or as a result of the use of false identity documents to travel. 
Together with Eurodac, Visabio is one of the mechanisms in the European 
Visa Identification System, a European Union database that came into force 
in October 2011. It collects biometric information, including the fingerprints 
and faces of all applicants for a short-stay visa in the Schengen area, and is 
one of the largest biometric databases in the world. In fact, it is in connec-
tion with this that the project for a biometric file of UAMs was designed, the 
principle of which came into force in September 2018.
The term ‘stuck’ is remarkable because it usually refers to movement and 
to the impossibility of movement. However, in this case it refers to a tempo-
ral rather than a spatial dimension, since it describes a ‘place’ between two 
ages. Moreover, it presupposes immobility and waiting, here subject to a ju-
dicial decision. It testifies to the liminality of the UAMs located at this stra-
tegic place between the two ‘thresholds’ of the transition from childhood to 
adulthood, described as a grey area by some social work professionals. It 
also testifies to the paradoxical nature of this form of waiting: Waiting for 
access to adult status is socially valued in many contexts, and behind every 
migratory project lies the expectation of social advancement and success as 
the only way to return ‘triumphant’ from the paths of exile (Sayad, 1991). In 
the case of age assessment of UAMs however, waiting is directed towards 
access to the status as minor – a status that will allow one to be recognised 
as still being a ‘child.’ Such waiting to obtain the status as a minor makes 
integrating into schooling or entry into training schemes difficult, and thus 
puts possibilities of social advancement and success on hold.
But liminality, which has often been seen as constitutive of waiting in sit-
uations of irregular migration (see Jacobsen & Karlsen, 2020 for a problem-
atisation of this approach), presents a singularity here. In the present case it 
concerns a liminal situation (Turner, 1967) which has been much researched 
in anthropology, the uncertain time between childhood and adulthood. 
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The migration of minors has been described by some anthropologists as a 
form of ‘rite of passage,’ aimed at making ‘real men’ of those who go down 
the road of exile and uncertain adventure (Monsutti, 2007). However, as 
Chiara Galli (2018) rightly points out in her ethnography of the judicial 
treatment of minors from Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala and Mexico 
City in the United States, the preparation of asylum applications by legal 
actors implies what she calls a ‘rite of reverse passage:’ The arguments put 
forward to be legitimately recognised as a child involve forming an infanti-
lising and victimising narrative, thereby erasing any form of agency, in order 
to gain access to a safe haven.
Another problem encountered by Anne, which has also been documented 
in other departments, is the widespread suspicion of the authenticity of 
the civil status documents produced. As a result, documents authenticated 
by embassies and consulates of the countries of origin can be seen as non- 
compliant. Some of the minors with whom she has been in contact have 
found accommodation at the Saint-Just squat; ‘they start school even faster 
through this squat than if they are followed by Child Welfare,’ she tells me. 
In April 2019, 179 minors left the squat after being taken into care as UAMs 
pending the results of their assessments. They were then mainly housed in 
hotels with a level of care described as ‘low cost’ by social work professionals 
specialised in their care. The ‘low cost’ dimension of this care in particular 
has been denounced after the suicide attempt in August 2018 of a 15-year-
old from Mali who had been staying at the hotel for several months after a 
gruelling journey.23 Waiting to finally continue his studies and the five hotel 
changes he had to make in a few months took away all hope. As a response 
to the suicide attempt, a rally that lasted for several days was mobilised in 
front of the departmental council. The banners of UAMs and their support-
ers denounced the lack of educational and social support for minors, who 
were supposed to be under the protection of the department.
Discursive uses of waiting
In the speech of the prime minister’s representative before the judges of the 
Constitutional Council at the March 2019 hearing about the biometric files 
put in place by the new asylum law, temporal arguments were crucial, even 
preceding that of the necessity of coordination.24 It was the much-needed 
speeding up of reception procedures and the end of long waits for protection 
that the highly controversial biometric database for UAMs was intended 
to achieve (see also Jacobsen, 2020). In so doing, as the lawyer represent-
ing UNICEF France pointed out, France offers two objectives considered 
irreconcilable by the applicants: Combating irregular migration and pro-
tecting children. An open letter addressed to the President of the Repub-
lic by a dozen or so departments declaring that they refused to set up this 
file25 brought their views to the forefront: The departments are responsible 
for child protection, not for the policy of combating illegal immigration. 
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The addition of a new player in the assessment process, the departmental 
prefectures, and the exchange of information between Child Welfare and 
the prefectures for the creation of this UAM file, turned departments into 
actors in a policy that was previously not theirs. For the first time in its his-
tory, UNICEF France, together with 18 other associations or professional 
organisations in the fields of child protection, justice and the defence of the 
rights of foreigners, engaged in a contentious appeal that the Council of 
State brought before the constitutional judges, arguing that the database 
was in breach of the constitutional principle of protection of children’s best 
interest.26 In the face of these arguments, it was the urgency of the ‘crisis’ 
that was highlighted by the Prime Minister’s representative, and the need 
to act faster and to put things in order by making use of this biometric file.
The feeling that they are agents of a policy that does not fall within the 
scope of child protection has also been expressed by social workers involved 
in the legal protection of young people and in the operation of ADDAP 13, 
the departmental child protection system in Marseille. This has manifested 
in professionals explicitly refusing to accompany minors to the prefecture 
to be registered on the biometric database by having their digital prints and 
a digitised photo taken before beginning the assessment process. The inten-
sity of the crisis is also experienced and reported locally, but by describing 
issues that are rarely raised: That of the barriers that the UAMs have to 
break through when those from the Maghreb are treated worse than their 
peers (e.g. refusal of admission to hostels, systematic evictions); as well as 
the differences between those who are ‘managed’ by institutions for the legal 
protection of young people and those who are ‘managed’ by Child Welfare. 
The price per day differs (sometimes as much as double) and the institutions 
for the legal protection of young people have much better facilities than the 
Child Welfare services. In view of the vulnerabilities mentioned, it is there-
fore very difficult to ‘find places’ in structures where real support work can 
be given. Finally, mention is also made of the barriers between UAMs and 
other minors under the jurisdiction of Child Welfare, an institution that 
has structural shortcomings that have been brought to the fore outside the 
UAM issue on several occasions in the past two years27 (Louffok, 2016).
‘Ils jouent la montre’ (they play for time) is the expression often used by 
Julie, an employee of the ADDAP 13 service dedicated to UAMs, when of-
fering me her observations: Difficulties finding accommodation that is not 
a hotel and the refusal to receive UAMs in the houses and hostels dedicated 
to UAMs due to competition with non-migrant minors. Moreover, in a con-
text where a growing proportion of these young people will soon turn 18, 
the means do not exist to deal with the multiple procedures and needs that 
this entails, such as the administrative procedures for regularisation or asy-
lum applications. Access to a ‘young adult’ status, which requires support 
beyond the age of 18 so that there is no sudden rupture in the follow-up, is 
now associated in law with having been in the care of Child Welfare for at 
least 16 months. This new element of ‘legally prescribed time’ could have the 
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effect of a self-fulfilling prophecy, and might actually condition the forms 
of accompaniment:
More and more young people are arriving at around the age of 16; by the 
time they have been received or recognised as minors, the system’s play-
ers already know that they will not get the 16 months of consecutive care 
before they turn 18, and that they will not really be able to accompany 
them. So they (foster homes and social workers) ‘play for time’ by man-
aging the wait until the age of 18 when they leave the system, because 
they already know they won’t be able to follow them beyond that… .
(Interview with an ADDAP 13 employee, August 2019)
Practices in the use of forensic medicine
For 2 years I regularly talked to Anne about the practice of resorting to 
bone tests in her experience as a lawyer. First of all, she explained to me that 
there is a wide range of appeals to medical experts requested by the prose-
cutor’s office or a juvenile judge. She has in her records X-rays of teeth only 
or wrists only, obtained by city medical practitioners without there having 
been a meeting with the alleged minor. Likewise, there are cases in which a 
margin of error was not specified. In November 2017, I received a message 
from Anne asking if I knew the authors of an article on the Greulich and 
Pyle Atlas, since it had just been used by the Air and Border Police to justify 
the relevance of bone tests. When I mentioned this to two of the authors of 
the article, they were very surprised that it had been quoted in such a con-
text. In our last interview, in July 2019, Anne gave me two examples of the 
practice of using these tests, while noting that she had little respect for them.
For a while we had these famous expert examinations that we tried to 
undermine. I have the impression that there are fewer like that. There is 
a doctor that I like very much because she does really detailed exami-
nations: She meets them, asks them about their background, what they 
ate, their social background, she takes the size, the weight, she looks at 
the bones of the hand, the teeth… the examination is 10 pages long. And 
for children between 16 and 19 years of age she is honest in saying she 
cannot know for sure! Yesterday I had the situation of a child who got a 
negative response from the border police, which I questioned. The judge 
was about to issue a Provisional Placement Order, and then relented 
and asked me what I thought of bone tests. Since we are more likely to 
get protection with a limited assessment, I agreed. And then the Judge 
says to me ‘it won’t be Doctor X (who she had just mentioned) at least?’ 
(she laughs) (…) And of the deminorised people that I had, two had 
received a negative assessment, and so in those cases I asked for bone 
tests in desperation.
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Given that bone tests generally resulted in more positive results for the pro-
tection of minors than social evaluations of age, Anne, while initially very 
critical of these tests, had actually resorted to asking for them. She also 
returned to the fact that a large number of minors are not in contact with 
a lawyer or the children’s judge. However, the figures for Paris and the Ile 
de France show that 50% of negative age assessments are overturned by the 
children’s judge.
Conclusion
Over the past two years, UAMs have become, in the words of Doctors With-
out Borders, ‘the symbol of an abusive policy’ (MSF, 2019). This report doc-
uments not only the multiple dimensions and health consequences of the 
migratory journeys experienced by these minors but also the impact of their 
living conditions on their health. Other reports from national institutions 
refer to this as a ‘humanitarian crisis.’
The creation of a new ‘humanitarian population,’ a place of tensions and 
controversies, offers major drawbacks to the logic of prioritisation. As has 
been documented in other contexts, ‘age disputes’ (Smith & Marmo, 2013) 
attest to the fact that the tools for its assessment have become biopolitical 
objects of and procedures for the government of borders. While the biome-
tric worlds of this government have been explored (Olwig, 2019), the fact re-
mains that identification is a central issue for managing migrants. The field 
of forensics should be studied as part of this management, both in terms of 
the ‘temporal violence’ of age assessment procedures and the postponement 
of access to protection and rights, and also as a key element of an e merging 
forensic infrastructure for the identification of the living and the dead 
(Cattanéo, 2019).
The situations mentioned are perfect examples of the plurality of forms of 
waiting and of temporalities: Waiting for shelter, for obtaining legal adminis-
trative status, for school or for professional integration is combined with so-
cial and legal timeframes, markers of differentiation and thresholds between 
childhood and adulthood. The entanglement of situational and existential 
waiting (Dwyer, 2009) is marked here by the ambivalence of the reverse rite 
of passage constituted by recognition as ‘minor.’ Social expectations of suc-
cess that often characterises the migration journey in the eyes of those who 
remain in the country (Sayad, 1999), or expectations to ‘become a man,’ can 
weigh on the shoulders of these young people when the status of ‘child’ is at 
the same time the only one that is deemed deserving of protection. 
Notes
 1 Emmaüs, Médecins du monde, La Cimade, RESF, Collectif soutien Migrants13/
Al Manba.
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 2 LOI number 2018-778 du 10 Septembre 2018 pour une immigration maîtrisée, un 
droit d’asile effectif et une intégration réussie.
 3 See the UNICEF-IRC research program titled ‘Children on the move.’ Avail-
able from: https://www.unicef-irc.org/research-watch/Children-on-the-move/. 
(accessed 15/05/2020).
 4 In France, the administrative units called departments are responsible for the 
reception and accompanying of unaccompanied minors.
 5 Notes taken as part of a meeting of a social workers’ collective, Marseille, June 
2019.
 6 In January 2018, the court of Nice overturned the decision of the authorities, 
which deported a 12-year-old Eritrean minor to the border (see https://france3- 
regions.francetvinfo.fr/provence-alpes-cote-d-azur/alpes-maritimes/ menton/
nice-tribunal-retoque-administration-avoir-reconduit-erytreen-mineur- 
frontiere-1407727.html; accessed 15 May 2020). ANAFE and Human Rights 
Watch reports on the French Hautes-Alpes (2019) have documented similar events.
 7 See https://www.ecre.org/council-of-europe-report-maps-age-assessment- practice-
and-issues-across-europe/. (accessed 15 May 2020).
 8 See https://www.nouvelobs.com/societe/20190906.AFP3953/majeur-ou-mineur-
d-un-departement-a-l-autre-la-roulette-russe-pour-les-jeunes-migrants.html. 
(accessed 18 May 2020). 
 9 The social history of reference atlases for bone X-rays and the range of uses and 
contexts of these tools will be the subject of another paper.
 10 Such as England or Germany.
 11 These were previously used in the context of crimes committed by people with-
out civil status documents.
 12 Civil status review and social assessment.
 13 Circulaire interministérielle du 25 janvier 2016 relative à la mobilisation des 
services de l’Etat auprès des conseils départementaux concernant les mineurs 
privés temporairement ou définitivement de la protection de leur famille et les 
personnes se présentant comme tels NOR: JUSF1602101C. See http://www. 
textes.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/JUSF1602101C.pdf.
 14 Judgement number 1020 of 3 October 2018 (18-19.442) – Court of Cassation – 
First Civil Chamber – ECLI:FR:CCASS:2018:C101020.
 15 These organizations include GISTI, Cimade, Doctors of the World, Catholic 
Relief and the Human Rights League.
 16 See https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2019/03/21/le-conseil-constitutionnel- 
valide-les-tests-osseux-pour-les-jeunes-migrants_5439373_3224.html. (accessed 
18 May 2020).
 17 Social children’s homes, structures financed by the Child Welfare Services.
 18 IMéRA is the Institute for Advanced Study at the Aix-Marseille University. See 
https://imera.univ-amu.fr/fr/agenda/journee-detude-corps-soin-pudeur-lexil-
lintime-au-politique. (accessed 15 May 2020).
 19 Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides (French office for the 
protection of refugees and stateless persons).
 20 Available from: https://www.ofpra.gouv.fr/fr/asile/la-procedure-de-demande-d-
asile-et#suivi_msf. (accessed on 15 May 2020).
 
 21 This measure can be interpreted as one of the modalities of ‘sexual humanitari-
anism’ referred to in the work of Mai (2018).
 22 For more on ‘smugglers’ and their practices, see, for example, Khosravi (2010). 
 23 See https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/200918/marseille-les-mineurs-
etrangers-sont-balades-d-hotel-en-hotel?onglet=full. (accessed 15 May 2020).
 24 Video available online at: https://www.anas.fr/Video-de-l-audience-au- Conseil-
Constitutionnel-de-la-QPC-n-2019-797-au-sujet-de-l-article-51-de-la-loi-asile- 
et_a1398.html. (accessed 18 May 2020).
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 25 According to the law there is no obligation to participate, it’s a principle of 
‘volontariat.’
 26 See https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/actualites/communique/decision-n-
2019-797-qpc-du-26-juillet-2019-communique-de-presse. (accessed 15 May 2020).
 27 See http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/15/rapports/miaidenf/l15b2110_ 
rapport-information. (accessed 15 May 2020).
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Introduction
The literature on refugees’ precarious legal status in the Global North has 
largely focused on three populations: asylum seekers (Mountz, 2011; Schus-
ter, 2011; Rotter, 2015), temporary protection visa holders (Bailey et al., 2002; 
Menjívar, 2006; Abrego & Lakhani, 2015; Tize, 2020) and people whose asy-
lum claims have been denied but who cannot or will not return to their 
countries of origin (De Genova, 2002; Griffiths, 2014; Hasselberg, 2016). 
Many individuals move between these forms of status at various points in 
their lives.
In this chapter, I draw attention to the precarious legal status experienced 
by people who are, in fact, recognised as refugees under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention (‘Convention refugees’). By this I mean that their asylum claim 
is approved based on a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ in their country 
of origin, on grounds of their race, religion, political opinion, nationality or 
social group (The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951). While 
previously so-called Convention refugees could expect permanent residence 
permits within a limited and predictable period of time, this expectation 
has been eroded by a number of different policies pursued, with increasing 
assertiveness, by Australia, the United States, Canada and within Europe 
(European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2016; hereafter ECRE, 2016). 
These include periodic checks of a refugee’s continued need for protection 
and shorter-term residence permits. While a ‘final’ decision on refugee sta-
tus has been described as a much-anticipated end to months or even years of 
refugee waiting (Rotter, 2015: p. 86), these new and intensified policies pro-
long uncertainty concerning permission to remain in the country of refuge.
I divided the chapter into three parts. After first providing context for the 
turn towards more temporary protection in Europe, I move to a normative 
discussion about the role of time in refugee law. How does the law balance 
the rights of refugees acquired over time in the country of residence with 
a state’s interest in excluding people it believes no longer have a need for 
protection? One way the Refugee Convention moderates this tension is by 
conditioning the cessation of refugee status because of improved conditions 
10 An end to asylum?
Temporary protection and the 
erosion of refugee status
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in the country of origin on proof that the changes are durable. Meanwhile, 
human rights law recognises that ‘settled migrants’ (people with long-term 
legal residence) may have a right to remain if their familial and private 
attachments are stronger than the state’s reasons for removing them. Al-
though the passage of time therefore has a purposeful dimension under in-
ternational law, its significance is devalued through the interpretation of the 
law by national courts. The final part of the chapter illustrates this point 
through two supreme court judgments from Norway concerning cessation 
of refugee status and the subsequent revocation of a residence permit. The 
two cases, both involving Afghan women with children, reveal how narrow 
legal reasoning and prolonged administrative procedures maintain a facade 
of legal security while reinforcing the ‘invisibility, immobility, uncertainty 
and arbitrariness’ associated with chronic waiting (Khosravi, 2014: p. 74).
The temporary turn in European asylum policies:  
prolonging protracted displacement
Following the large numbers of asylum seekers claiming protection in 
late 2015, European countries responded with a range of new or intensi-
fied measures to contain and deter refugees. In addition to policies aimed 
outside their borders, including extraterritorial processing regimes and 
third-country transfers, states also adopted policies that reduced the secu-
rity of stay within them. These policies include granting refugee subsidiary 
forms of protection with fewer entitlements; reducing the duration of resi-
dence permits; introducing protection reviews to assess the continued need 
for asylum; and applying integration-related requirements (such as income 
minimums, knowledge tests, etc.) for family reunification and permanent 
residence. Previous policies that provided refugees a clear path to long-term 
residence have been replaced by measures that result in premature return to 
unsafe areas or ‘permanent temporariness’ (Bailey et al., 2002; Tize, 2020) 
in the country of residence.
Temporary protection policies are nothing new in the practice of refugee 
law. While the primary legal instrument, the 1951 Refugee Convention, has 
traditionally been interpreted to provide longer-term protection (O’Sulli-
van, 2019a), states also grant complementary forms of protection to refu-
gees who may not meet convention criteria but face a risk of serious harm 
if returned to their countries of origin (McAdam, 2007). The subsidiary 
protection status regulated by the EU Qualification Directive is one exam-
ple. This status often comes with a shorter-term residence permit (ECRE, 
2016). Further, states have periodically established explicit regimes of tem-
porary protection as extraordinary measures in response to conflicts and 
disasters (Fitzpatrick, 1994; Ineli Ciger, 2018). In the 1990s, for example, 
refugees from the Balkans typically received temporary status with the as-
sumption that they would return as soon as war ended. In the United States, 
Temporary Protection Status (TPS) may be granted to nationals or previous 
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residents (if stateless) of countries experiencing ‘temporary’ problems like 
armed conflict, an environmental disaster or an epidemic. TPS visa hold-
ers have the right to work and travel, but no path to permanent residence 
despite, in some cases, holding this ‘temporary’ status for decades. What is 
novel about more recent policies, however, is that they erase the distinction – 
in theory at least – between refugees recognised under the Refugee Conven-
tion and forcibly displaced persons facing other, potentially less sustained, 
threats.1 Instead of serving as a supplementary or exceptional response, 
temporary policies now infiltrate the mainstream practice of refugee law.2 
The focus of this practice has shifted from criteria for inclusion i.e. (who 
qualifies for refugee status?) to those for exclusion (who can return, how fast, 
and to where?). The consequent approach to protection, based principally 
on minimalist duties of ‘non-refoulement’ (non-return) to persecution or 
serious harms, represents a convergence of the rule and its exception as a 
technique of sovereign control (Karlsen, 2015: p. 59). ‘Future returnee’ is the 
new refugee.
While many exclusionary policies are procedural in nature (i.e. rules gov-
erning where an asylum claim may be lodged), or relate to the type of per-
mit granted, others are based on restrictive interpretations of the substance 
of refugee law. They challenge, in other words, long-standing assumptions 
about who qualifies as a Convention refugee, and for how long. One ex-
ample is application of the so-called internal protection alternative (IPA) 
exception to refugee status, which results in return to the country of origin 
even if a person’s place of previous residence remains unsafe (Schultz, 2019). 
Another, as mentioned earlier, involves the periodic review of whether ref-
ugee status is still warranted. The Refugee Convention permits cessation 
of refugee status under certain conditions, including when the refugee ‘… 
can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he has 
been recognised as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail 
himself of the protection of the country of his nationality’ or, if the person 
is stateless, the country of previous residence (Articles 1C(5) and (6)). Thus, 
while states may cease refugee status under certain conditions, they have 
rarely done so in individual cases (O’Sullivan, 2019a). With the exceptions of 
Germany and Australia, states have typically granted refugees permanent 
residence either immediately or at least predictably within a relatively short 
time (ECRE, 2016).
This commitment to provide a stable refugee status is clearly eroding. 
Canada,3 Denmark,4 Norway and Sweden5 have all adopted policies in-
volving the proactive review of a refugee’s continued need for protection. In 
Denmark, the threat of cessation even applies to resettled refugees, who al-
ready, in theory, have a ‘durable solution.’6 The proposed EU Qualification 
Regulation would introduce mandatory reviews of refugee status in connec-
tion with the renewal of residence permits.7 The introduction or extension of 
non-protection related criteria for permanent residence, meanwhile, means 
that more refugees have temporary residence permits for longer periods of 
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time. This exposes those with the least resources to reviews of their contin-
ued need for protection whenever they apply for renewal.
The threat of cessation and revocation of residence prolongs insecurity of 
status and impedes long-term planning. As Ramsay describes in her work 
on resettled refugees in Australia, the ‘conventional refugee narrative’ in-
volves ‘moving from a distinct point of displacement to a distinct point of 
resolution’ (Ramsay, 2017: p. 515). I discuss later how this linear, progressive 
narrative is also reflected in law. With cessation practice, however, the pos-
itive modality of waiting in anticipation of receiving refugee status (Rotter, 
2015: p. 85) is replaced by chronic uncertainty. Like other policies of tempo-
rary protection, the threat of cessation can lead to mental health problems, 
withdrawal from education, language and work training, and housing and 
employment insecurity (UNHCR, 2018: p. 27; Brekke et al., 2019). Long and 
ambiguous processing times intensify uncertainty and immobility, as other 
applications (for permanent residence, family reunification, citizenship or 
travel documents) are suspended until there is resolution on the question of 
refugee status (Brekke et al., 2019: p. 4).
A final decision to cease status or revoke residence does not necessarily 
resolve this insecurity. In some cases, the consequence of cessation is irreg-
ular status for those who will not or cannot return. In other cases, refugees 
join the ranks of the internally displaced within their countries of origin. 
Even those eligible to remain in the country – for humanitarian reasons 
including best interests of a child, family reunification or the opportunity 
to study – may lose entitlements, like the right to adult education, while 
those applications are determined. A permit provided for humanitarian 
reasons meanwhile may be formally limited in terms of duration and the 
rights that derive from that status. It may specify, for example, that it is 
non-renewable, does not include a right to family reunification, and/or 
does not provide a basis for permanent residence.8 In short, far from pro-
viding a longed-for ‘solution,’ the ultimate granting of refugee status pro-
longs what for many refugees has already been a protracted situation of 
forced displacement.
Durable solutions and the legal dimensions of ‘refugee time’
To understand the legal relationship between refugee status and the end 
of displacement, it is necessary to interrogate what Durieux (2015: p. 226) 
calls the two dimensions of ‘refugee time.’ The first dimension relates to 
the passage of time (‘time as attachment’) and opportunities to re-establish 
one’s life and livelihood. While states have no obligation to grant refugees 
a specific residence status, they must provide a basket of rights and benefits 
that accrue over time. These rights and benefits increase as the refugee’s 
relationship to the state evolves from simply being subject to its jurisdiction 
to eventually being habitually resident, which is defined as a stay of 3 years 
or longer (Hathaway, 2005: p. 190).
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Refugees who are lawfully staying have a right to the same treatment as 
nationals when it comes to primary education, welfare and social security. 
Meanwhile, in terms of employment, housing and post-primary school, 
states are obliged to ensure the same access – at a minimum – as that en-
joyed by other non-nationals in the ‘same circumstances.’9 Those who have 
completed 3 years of residence on a state’s territory are exempt from any 
restrictive measures imposed on the employment of foreigners. While the 
Convention stops short of requiring states to naturalise refugees, states are 
explicitly encouraged to do so.10 In other words, the Refugee Convention es-
tablishes a linear trajectory in which the passage of time results in increased 
attachments to society, consistent with the state-centric concept of refugee-
hood that motivated the post-war Convention regime.
Full membership is, however, conditioned by a second dimension of ‘ref-
ugee time:’ ‘Time as a deadline,’ meaning the eventual end of refugee status 
(Durieux, 2015).11 While the logical consequence of long-term stay is natu-
ralisation, the Convention also opens for cessation of refugee status before 
this happens, under two types of conditions. The first type encompasses 
voluntary acts of the refugee, like moving back to the country of origin, or 
taking a new citizenship somewhere else. The other type, as mentioned ear-
lier, refers to changes within the country of origin that remove the need for 
international protection.
Cessation following changes in the country of origin requires more than 
the absence of conditions giving rise to refugee status. Changes must be sig-
nificant and ‘non-temporary,’ meaning that the state is once again able and 
willing to provide durable protection (O’Sullivan, 2019a). This ‘double guar-
antee,’ as Einarsen (2000: p. 531) describes (no risk of persecution plus long-
term protection), balances asylum states’ interest in controlling membership 
with a ‘clear commitment to avoid the constant uncertainty’ associated with 
ongoing reassessment of refugee status (Hathaway & Foster, 2014: p. 477). 
While dramatic events like a democratic transition can occur quickly, many 
of today’s refugee-producing countries are beset by complex conflicts where 
the consolidation of peace is a halting, difficult process. Therefore, the crite-
ria required for the cessation of refugee status are rarely met within the time 
period for which most temporary permits are granted. 
The requirement of non-temporary protection ensures that cessation 
practice aligns with broader aims of refugee law: to secure a ‘durable solu-
tion’ to the problem of forced displacement, meaning (1) return home when 
it is safe to do so (voluntary repatriation); (2) local integration (settled status 
in the country of asylum); and (3) third-country resettlement.12 Although 
these outcomes are not specified in the Convention, they are an integral part 
of the practice of refugee protection (UNHCR, 2003: para. 6; UN Global 
Compact on Refugees, 2018). Application of refugee law should therefore, 
as far as possible, reduce the precarity of life in exile or as a ‘returnee’ in 
the country of origin. This is achieved by providing those who qualify with 
a stable legal status, protection and opportunities for productive activity 
in the country of residence. When conditions in the country of origin have 
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improved, cessation depends on the possibility of a sustainable, secure re-
turn. This precludes applications of law that would require a ‘returnee’ to 
join the ranks of the internally displaced.
Productive value of ‘settled time’ under human rights law
Attachments made over time at the local level are recognised in human rights 
law. In some cases, even if refugee status has ceased, a former refugee may 
retain the right to remain in the country of residence. In Europe, the rights 
to family and private life under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Article 8 ECHR) apply to migrants irrespective of their status (Da Lomba, 
2017: p. 3). This means that any interference by the state, such as deportation, 
must be deemed proportionate in light of the human interests at stake. While 
the right to family life usually is confined to core family members and may be 
exercised abroad, the concept of ‘private life’ covers a wide range of relation-
ships outside the core family, encompassing the ‘network of personal, social 
and economic relations’ developed since birth (Slivenko v. Latvia, para. 96).13
In its expulsion jurisprudence under Article 8 ECHR, the European Court 
of Human Rights (viz. ECtHR) considers the ‘totality of social ties’ between 
the migrant and his or her community, and balances this against the state’s 
interest in removing them.14 In cases involving migrants who have commit-
ted crimes or violated their conditions of stay, states may claim an interest 
in upholding law and order or immigration control. For people whose ref-
ugee status has been withdrawn, meanwhile, the stated interest may be in 
preserving the institution of asylum for those who still need protection. The 
stronger the ties, and the less compelling the state interest, the more likely 
that Article 8 ECHR can be engaged as a defence to deportation.
While the length of stay is legally relevant, it is not determinative, par-
ticularly if the migrant has irregular status. While all long-term migrants 
have developed a private life in a host state, the ECtHR distinguishes be-
tween ‘settled migrants’ and those with a precarious status. For people who 
have lawfully spent most of their youth in a country, the state must have 
strong reasons to expel them – usually a serious criminal record.15 Irregular 
migrants, on the other hand, are presumed to have more ‘tenuous ties’ to 
the host state (Da Lomba, 2017: p. 4). Therefore, the bar for deportation is 
lower. As discussed later, temporary visa holders, especially those who have 
resided in the removing state for a modest amount of time, occupy a grey 
zone in this jurisprudence. They are not irregular (out-of-status), but nor are 
they provided the security of residence associated with ‘settled migrants.’
Distortion and devaluation of ‘refugee time’: the practice of 
temporary protection in Norway
The policies introduced or intensified in Norway following the record 
numbers of asylum claims in late 2015 are based on interpretations of law 
that distort the two dimensions of ‘refugee time’ and reduce the security 
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of stay for people with a recognised right to protection. These policies did 
not arise in a vacuum; although Norway as a non-EU state is not bound 
by the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), it pursues a policy of 
alignment with CEAS legislation. In addition to seeking inspiration at the 
EU level, Norwegian authorities closely monitor policies of neighbouring 
states, especially Denmark and Sweden (Brekke & Staver, 2018: p. 5). Its 
laws and practices both reflect and influence developments more broadly 
in Europe.
In November 2015, all but two parties in the Norwegian parliament 
presented an ‘Asylum Agreement’ including 18 measures to address the 
perceived crisis of refugee arrivals. One measure, focused on ‘temporary 
residence,’ states that immigration authorities may immediately start the 
process of revoking temporary residence permits when improvements in 
the country of origin have taken place.16 Parliament also asked the govern-
ment to propose temporary protection regimes that do not provide a path to 
permanent residence;17 to introduce new integration criteria for permanent 
residence;18 and to restrict family reunification for refugees.19 The Ministry 
of Justice and Security consequently released a hearing note with proposed 
amendments to the Immigration Act.20 This 150-page document included 
the increased use of temporary permits, longer qualification periods for 
permanent residence, restrictions on access to family reunification and an 
expanded scope for application of the IPA. A final proposal was presented 
to the parliament in April 2016,21 which approved amendments to the Im-
migration Act in June 2016.22
The new laws increased the time period for applying for permanent res-
idence after receiving a temporary protection permit from 3 to 5 years. 
The prospects of temporary protection lasting beyond 5 years, mean-
while, were expanded through the introduction of non-protection-related 
requirements for permanent residence including proof of economic self- 
sufficiency, local knowledge and language skills. While neutral in form, 
these measures disproportionately affect female refugees who for many 
years after arrival participate at a significantly lower rate in the labour 
market than men.23
A new provision on collective temporary protection was introduced, 
which explicitly does not serve as the basis for an eventual application 
for permanent residence. Finally, the scope for granting a time-limited, 
non-renewable residence permit for unaccompanied minors was ex-
panded as a consequence of changes to the criteria for refusing refugee 
status on the basis of an IPA.24 This means that if a minor can return to a 
safe area no matter how unreasonable the consequences (e.g. being sepa-
rated from family, having no access to schools), he or she does not qualify 
for refugee status. When Norwegian authorities nonetheless determine 
that the minor would not have an adult caregiver in the proposed area of 
return, a temporary residence permit may be granted for those under the 
age of 18 years.
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Pursuing an end to protection: cessation and revocation of residence
Another policy change involved intensified efforts to identify people whose 
refugee status and/or residence permit may be withdrawn. Although the le-
gal basis for cessation is clearly spelled out in Norway’s Immigration Act, 
actual cessation practice was, until 2016, limited to a handful of deporta-
tion cases involving serious crimes. The high administrative costs involved 
and the fact that those affected often have a right to remain on alternative 
grounds were among the reasons why this provision was not prioritised.25 
This changed as a result of political pressure to intensify return activities 
and, as the numbers of refugee arrivals fell in 2016, an increased institutional 
capacity to process such cases (Brekke et al., 2019: p. 18). Cessation activi-
ties have been pursued as part of a broader effort to identify people whose 
residence may be revoked, including for reasons related to fraud or error.26
In April 2016, the Ministry of Justice and Security issued an Instruction 
to the Immigration Directorate on cessation of refugee status and revoca-
tion of residence permits.27 While the Immigration Act permits cessation of 
refugee status, the Instruction requires that caseworkers apply the cessation 
provisions when conditions are met. In addition, they must consider cessa-
tion and eventual revocation when processing applications for permanent 
residence. The Instruction do not apply to refugees who already possess 
permanent residence, are resettled from third countries or have received 
collective protection in a mass influx situation.
So far in Norway, Somali nationals have been most affected by this 
change of practice. In 2016, the Immigration Directorate had sent its first 
warning to 120 refugees from Mogadishu, informing them that cessation 
and revocation would be considered in connection with their applications 
for permanent residence (Strand, 2016). By way of explanation, it stated that 
since the withdrawal of al-Shabaab in 2012, the situation had appeared to 
stabilise. The Grand Board of Immigration Appeals reviewed this practice 
in 2017.28 It confirmed that the cessation analysis required a ‘margin of se-
curity,’ meaning that the grounds for refugee status disappeared and that the 
improvements in the country of origin appeared to be durable. When apply-
ing this standard to the facts in Mogadishu, a majority found that despite 
the state’s inability to enforce the rule of law, adequate protection could be 
secured from the strong clan system. Despite the insecurity this practice 
unleashed, most of the affected refugees have been able to remain on other 
grounds (Brekke et al., 2019).
The Norwegian supreme court has recently decided two cases involving 
the cessation of refugee status and subsequent revocation of a residence 
permit. These judgments provide more insight into how the courts inter-
pret ‘refugee time’ and contribute through their reasoning and procedures 
to prolonged insecurity – particularly for women and children. The first, 
from March 2018, addressed the legal criteria for ceasing refugee status 
under the Immigration Act.29 The second, decided some months later, did 
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not substantively review the cessation decision. Instead, the court exam-
ined whether the subsequent revocation of a temporary permit interfered 
with the plaintiffs’ right to private and family life under Article 102 of the 
Norwegian Constitution and Article 8 ECHR.30 Interestingly, both cases 
concerned Afghan women who came to Norway alone with young children, 
and who could not return because of their ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ 
(§28 para 1(a) of the Immigration Act). The absence of a male partner was 
decisive in both cases for the decision to grant protection.
In the first case, an Afghan woman and her daughter came to Norway 
in 2011, after being separated from the woman’s partner in Greece. They 
received refugee status because their home area in Jaghuri district was in-
secure and, in the absence of male protection, they could not be returned to 
a safer part of the country. When the woman’s partner arrived in Norway, 
his asylum application was rejected, and his family received notice of ces-
sation and revocation of residence rights. The question before the supreme 
court concerned interpretation of the cessation provisions of the Immigra-
tion Act. Did it require simply that the family no longer fulfilled the criteria 
for refugee status, as the Norwegian state argued? Or, consistent with the 
‘double guarantee’ advocated by UNHCR and others, did it also require a 
showing of durable protection on the part of the Afghan government? Since 
the Immigration Appeals Board’s decision was based on its conclusion that 
Jaghuri was no longer unsafe, the court determined that it had erred by not 
considering whether the change in security had stabilised. Importantly, the 
court confirmed that the criteria for cessation involve more than simply the 
absence of persecution or serious harm.31 Effective, non-temporary protec-
tion is also required. The court also seemed to recognise the careful balance 
of ‘refugee time’ constructed in law by noting that foreigners who had ad-
justed to life in Norway should not be returned to a precarious existence that 
can easily lead to further displacement and a new claim to refugee status.32
The case was then remanded to the Immigration Appeals Board, which 
based its new decision on the possibility of return to Kabul instead, if con-
ditions in Jaghuri did not meet the cessation criteria. The Oslo district court 
confirmed this conclusion. It held, however, that while the requirement of 
‘fundamental and stable’ change applies to the claimant’s home area, it does 
not apply to other areas.33 In an IPA like Kabul, the only consideration 
would be whether the claimants have a well-founded fear of persecution or 
face a real risk of serious harm. Despite evidence of Kabul’s deteriorating 
security situation, the court concluded that conditions there did not meet 
that threshold. In other words, it upheld a broader scope for cessation of 
refugee status and revocation of residence when return is to a situation of 
internal displacement than if the refugee could return safely to his or her 
previous home.
To illustrate the absurdity of this logic: In the Somali cases, cessation of 
refugee status for persons from Mogadishu could take place if changes there 
are stable and durable, but refugees not from Mogadishu could be returned 
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there under less secure conditions. In this case the court constructs time 
(short-term protection) and space (somewhat safe places) in ways that not 
only expand the state’s power of exclusion beyond its normative bounds but 
expose refugees to new forms of legal and physical precarity in their coun-
tries of origin, as internally displaced persons.
The second judgment, decided 6 months later, concerned another Afghan 
woman (called ‘B’ in the anonymised court summary), who came to Nor-
way with her 2-year-old daughter in October 2011. B stated that she and 
her current husband fled their hometown of Herat in Afghanistan to escape 
threats related to her forced marriage to another man. On the way to Nor-
way following a 3-year stay in Iran, the couple was separated in Greece. 
Although the Immigration Directorate acknowledged that B could have a 
‘well-founded fear of persecution’ on multiple grounds, her temporary resi-
dence permit was granted in 2012 on the basis that she was a ‘single Afghan 
woman without a male network.’34 After her husband turned up in Norway, 
B thus received notice that her refugee status, along with her daughter’s, 
would be recalled as the conditions for which they were granted protection 
no longer existed. The question for the supreme court was not whether this 
decision was correct (although it did confirm the appeals court’s conclu-
sions). Instead, the issue was whether the resulting revocation of her tem-
porary residence permit was consistent with the right to private life under 
Article 8 ECHR and Article 102 of the Norwegian Constitution.35 B’s attor-
neys argued that as a ‘settled migrant’ she had a protected right to a private 
life, and that the revocation decision was a disproportionate interference. 
During the 4 years and 4 months that B and her daughter had lived in Nor-
way until their final revocation decision, they had settled into the local com-
munity and learned Norwegian. The daughter had attended kindergarten 
and school.
The court, meanwhile, agreed with the Norwegian state’s argument that 
the applicants, given the temporary nature of their residence, were not ‘set-
tled migrants’ for the purpose of protection of private life. Noting that the 
ECtHR distinguishes between irregular migrants and ‘settled migrants,’ the 
court concluded that formal residence is a necessary but not sufficient con-
dition for qualifying as a ‘settled migrant’ under Article 8 ECHR. It found 
a ‘long-term perspective’ decisive, meaning that migrants with permanent 
residence are settled, while those with temporary permits typically lack a 
reasonable expectation of stay.36 Exceptionally, Article 8 can apply when 
the temporary status is prolonged over an extended period of time – here 
the court referred to a judgment from the ECtHR in which the applicant’s 
temporary residence lasted two decades.37 In the present case, however, less 
than 5 years had gone by between B and her daughter’s arrival and the final 
administrative decision. The court dismissed evidence of their integration 
as ‘typical’ and therefore not legally relevant.38 There was no independent 
evaluation of the daughter’s best interest in this case, even though she spent 
the bulk of her childhood, from 2011 in 2018, in Norway. 
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If the first case underscored the tension between ‘time as attachment’ and 
‘time as deadline,’ this judgment is directly concerned with the legal value of 
‘time while temporary.’ First, it reinforces a disconnection between ‘settled 
migrant’ status and the actual passage of time in country. Protection of a 
human right becomes dependent on formal categories of residence deter-
mined at state discretion. As noted earlier, refugees – especially women – 
may be subject to protracted temporariness for reasons like the inability 
to pass a language or knowledge exam – which may not reflect their ac-
tual ties to a community. The fact that the daughter, meanwhile, had spent 
most of her life in Norway was not deemed worthy of comment. As Ilstad 
and Bondevik (2016) describe, Norwegian administrative practice has typi-
cally distinguished between ‘kindergarten time’ and ‘school time,’ meaning 
that migrant children’s attachments to the community of residence are only 
perceived to start at around 6 years of age (Ilstad & Bondevik, 2016). For 
the purpose of determining a child’s best interest, and potentially his or 
her right to remain, little weight is accorded to non-familial attachments 
formed during the earliest years.
Finally, refugee time is not only devalued but suspended during the pe-
riod of appeal following the immigration authorities’ final decision.39 The 
applicants’ attachment to Norway is assessed at the point in which the ad-
ministrative decision to revoke residence was made. The passage of nearly 2 
years from this point to the supreme court’s judgment, and the applicants’ 
incremental inclusion in Norwegian society (especially for the daughter) 
during that time, was found irrelevant.
Precarity of protection and the passage of time:  
concluding reflections
This chapter has explored the precarity created by novel state practices of 
refugee law. While a decision to grant refugee status has traditionally sig-
nalled an end to waiting for resolution of a refugee claim, these new and 
enhanced policies prolong insecurity for a potentially indefinite period. 
Proactive reviews of a refugee’s continued need for protection and more 
limited paths to permanent residence upset the careful balance established 
under law between two dimensions of ‘refugee time:’ Gradual inclusion in 
the community of residence (‘time as attachment’), on the one hand, and the 
possibility of return when conditions have improved (‘time as a deadline’), 
on the other hand. In principle, the tension between these two is managed 
by requiring that the withdrawal of status depends on durable protection in 
the return state.
In practice, however, Norway and other states have endorsed clans and 
even the institution of marriage as providers of protection for the purpose 
of withdrawing refugee status. They argue this protection may be limited 
to specific spaces in an otherwise unsafe environment. Arguments based 
on non-state protectors and ‘returns’ to internal displacement create a 
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disconnect between application of law and the lived experience of refugees – 
especially for women made dependent on male relatives for their mobility 
and protection. Children, meanwhile, suffer disproportionately from the 
practice of relying on the final administrative decision to ‘set time’ for as-
sessing their rights or best interest. Large parts of their lives may be dis-
counted. These constructions of time and space illustrate how temporary 
protection, introduced by states as an alternative to Convention Refugee 
status, has infiltrated the Convention regime and eroded the solutions ori-
entation of refugee law.
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Absolute power is the power to make oneself unpredictable and deny other 
people any reasonable anticipation, to place them in total uncertainty…. 
The all-powerful is he who does not wait but who makes others wait…. Wait-
ing implies submission…. It follows that the art of ‘taking one’s time’ … of 
making people wait … is an integral part of the exercise of power….
Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations (1997/2000: p. 228)
For those who are routinely and systematically criminalised, life itself 
comes to resemble an unrelenting kind of entrapment, an open-air confine-
ment that is inevitably interlaced with routine police abuse and punctuated 
repeatedly with longer or shorter episodes of imprisonment. While being 
condemned to a condition of criminalisation and inordinate susceptibility 
to imprisonment is indeed a fact of life, to greater or lesser degrees, for all 
poor people everywhere (Wacquant, 2009; Bonds, 2012), it is especially pro-
nounced for racially subjugated and colonised groups. Referring to Israeli 
military occupation and the racist socio-political order in Palestine, for ex-
ample, Noam Chomsky has depicted Gaza as ‘the world’s largest open-air 
prison, where some 1.5 million people … are subject to random terror and 
arbitrary punishment, with no purpose other than to humiliate and degrade’ 
(2012; cf. Peteet, 2005: pp. xiii, 171; 2017; Bornstein, 2008). Liz Fekete inci-
sively makes a similar point about all of Europe, where the ‘pan-European 
racism’ against minoritised Roma communities converts the entire conti-
nent into something approximating ‘a huge open prison’ (2014: p. 68). De-
scribing her research along the US–Mexico border, Patrisia Macías-Rojas 
affirms, ‘Policing permeated every aspect of social life’ (2016: p. 8), whereby 
‘criminalization … amounts to the branding of a caste-like criminal stigma’ 
(p. 164). Although her study plainly foregrounds the racialised subjugation 
of Mexicans in particular in the US–Mexico border region (cf. Levario, 2012; 
Muñoz Marínez, 2018), Macías-Rojas notably insists that the roots of this 
criminalised racial branding reside in the ‘historical association between 
Blackness and criminality’ (2016: p. 164). It is precisely this ever-present fact 
of racist criminalisation and police abuse and the ever-menacing possibil-
ity of imprisonment (or indeed, of torture or murder by police) that deeply 
informs and invigorates the contemporary Black Lives Matter struggles in 
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the United States. In the words of the African American rapper 2 Black 2 
Strong, from whom I have adapted the title of this essay, for those who are 
the object of systemic racial oppression, life itself becomes a matter of ‘doin’ 
hard time on planet earth.’
Without reducing the truly punitive and often brutal realities of impris-
onment to a mere metaphor, these gestures remind us that for racially subor-
dinate populations subjected to systematic criminalisation, prison becomes 
not some sort of distant and mysterious space apart but instead a known and 
familiar cruelty that is thoroughly interwoven into the fabric of everyday 
life (Price, 2015). Moreover, the capricious vulnerability to imprisonment 
punctuates a more permanent condition of radical uncertainty attending to 
the susceptibility to abuse arising from virtually any routine encounter with 
the law (and law enforcement). In this important respect, the criminalised 
condition of ‘doin’ hard time on planet earth’ is also substantially entangled 
always with a life significantly spent waiting under the horizon of virtually 
inevitable police harassment, likely arrest, and the inordinate prospect of 
eventual imprisonment.
This chapter will explore how the predicament of systematic criminalisa-
tion evoked by the notion of ‘doin’ hard time on planet earth’ may illuminate 
something about the particularly uncertain and indeterminate temporali-
ties of illegalised migrants’ susceptibility to detention, and how this socio- 
political condition of protracted waiting and detainability exposes the op-
erations of a disciplinary form of power that enhances ‘irregular’ migrants’ 
precaritisation and serves to enforce the disposability of migrant life.
Prison/detention
There are profound affinities between the susceptibility of criminalised 
populations to imprisonment and what I have characterised as migrant 
detainability (De Genova, 2007, 2017), just as there are important sub-
stantive continuities between ordinary incarceration and migrant deten-
tion inasmuch as both entail a punitive combination of spatial dislocation 
(confinement) and temporal rupture. Hence, detention must be situated 
within the nexus of diverse forms of captivity and confinement (Foucault, 
1972–1973/2015; 1975/1979; cf. Walters, 2004: p. 248). Notably, within the 
purview of ‘human rights’ discourse, detention appears as a rather generic 
figure of imprisonment. Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights states: ‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or 
exile.’ In this regard, detention and imprisonment appear to be effectively 
synonymous. However, within this normative perspective of ‘human rights,’ 
detention is implicitly distinguished from ordinary incarceration precisely 
to the extent that it is coupled with arbitrariness. That is to say, in its hegem-
onic and institutionalised forms, human rights discourse implicitly normal-
ises the prison and upholds incarceration as the presumptively justified and 
ostensibly non-abusive form of punishment; imprisonment in and of itself 
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becomes legible as a concern of human rights only to the extent that it is 
apprehensible as arbitrary. ‘Detention,’ then, comes to be deployed to sig-
nal precisely this excision of imprisonment from the presumptively ‘normal’ 
and ‘legitimate’ operations of the Rule of Law, in a murky netherworld of 
arbitrary and abusive power. For those whose plight is that of ‘doin’ hard 
time on planet earth,’ however, this seemingly durable distinction is imme-
diately revealed to be a dubious one, indeed. In these respects, we may be-
gin to appreciate the profound limits of human rights discourse and the 
degree to which prison abolitionism (see, e.g. Loyd, 2012; Loyd et al., 2012; 
Price, 2012; García Hernández, 2017) already substantially prefigures a crit-
ical conception of justice that far exceeds and transcends the normativity of 
human rights law.
Of course, one rather obvious difference between incarceration and 
migrant detention is that the latter is a form of spatial confinement that is 
deployed against people whose only transgression or offense is commonly 
their very existence (i.e. their mere status as ‘irregular’ migrants, ‘bogus’ 
refugees, or rejected ‘asylum seekers’). Here, indeed, we are accustomed 
to the understandable objection that migrant and refugee detainees have 
committed no crime, that they are not ‘criminals.’ Hence, their deten-
tion plainly looks like the kind of arbitrary imprisonment that is readily 
cognisable as an abuse of their putative human rights. But again, the 
normativity of imprisonment as a presumptively just and appropriate 
punishment for ‘true’ criminals is thereby subtly but pronouncedly rein-
forced. Indeed, if the outrage over the detention of migrants is that they 
are treated in a manner that is reminiscent of the treatment of the incar-
cerated, this might be an instructive occasion to confront the outrage of 
prison itself (Loyd et al., 2012; cf. Aas & Bosworth, 2013; Aliverti, 2013; 
Bosworth, 2014; Kaufman, 2015; Longazel et  al., 2016; Macías-Rojas, 
2016; García Hernández, 2017). Moreover, the predictable response to 
the objection that migrants are ‘not criminals’ from advocates for more 
restrictive immigration control is precisely the belligerent reaffirmation 
of a simplistic affiliation of migrant ‘illegality’ with outright ‘lawless-
ness’ and criminality.
For my purposes here, I am nevertheless interested in underscoring some 
of the heuristic differences between imprisonment and detention – and spe-
cifically, migrant detention – in order to interrogate the specificity of de-
tention as a distinctive form of power.1 Therefore, while located within the 
continuum of various types of coercive confinement, detention must be also 
distinguished from other forms of incarceration. What chiefly characterises 
detention as such is the extent to which it has been reserved as a category 
for naming precisely those varieties of confinement that are intended to 
be emphatically distinguished from the more customarily juridical coor-
dinates of penal imprisonment for criminal offenses. In short, detainees 
are so designated precisely because they are understood to not be ‘prison-
ers’; detention is so named exactly to the extent that it is conceived to be 
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something that is not incarceration. Here, indeed, we may recall Arendt’s 
memorable insight into the cruel and revealing irony that common crimi-
nals in fact had more legal rights and recognition than those ‘interned’ in 
the Nazi concentration camps, or indeed, than those relegated to the status 
of stateless refugees (1951/1968: p. 286). To be a ‘criminal’ is to be subjected 
to the recriminations of the law, and thus to be inscribed within the law 
and its punishments; in contrast, to be a detainee is to be subjected to an 
‘administrative’ apparatus, and as a consequence, to be potentially (not 
always, but not uncommonly) figured as effectively outside of the purview 
of the law altogether.
With detention – very much like deportation (De Genova, 2014) – we are 
in the midst of what Hannah Arendt famously designated as ‘the banality 
of evil’ (1963/2006). The particular banality of Adolf Eichmann’s evil, for 
Arendt, derived from what she deemed to be not only ‘the essence of total-
itarian government’ but also ‘perhaps the nature of every bureaucracy’: the 
dehumanising reduction of individuals into ‘functionaries and mere cogs 
in the administrative machinery’ (2006: p. 289).2 It is in this respect that 
the idea of the ‘banality of evil’ is instructive when we confront and seek to 
challenge such otherwise routine ‘administrative’ punishments as detention 
and deportation.
Imprisonment is customarily understood to be the highest form of ‘mod-
ern’ punishment, short of execution. Likewise, incarceration is generally 
understood to be a deprivation of liberty, frequently including the suspen-
sion of other ostensible civil rights, which is purportedly ‘corrective’ and 
presumptively ‘rehabilitative.’ Thus, imprisonment is temporally delimited 
and assumed to have a definite end, after which those ostensible rights as-
sociated with citizenship ought to be restored. Of course, there are also 
statutory measures that inflict permanent and irreversible harms upon for-
merly convicted persons, such as lifelong disenfranchisement, as is the case 
in many of the states of the United States. In this respect, incarceration is 
also inseparable from the profound and egregious inequalities of citizenship 
that I have elsewhere theorised in terms of denizenship (De Genova, 2015, 
2019) as well as the cynical deployment of forms of illegalisation convention-
ally associated with migration for the purposes of debasing (minoritised) 
citizens and stripping them of their juridical personhood as citizens (De 
Genova, 2018b; De Genova & Roy, 2020). Conversely, there has likewise 
been an increasingly expansive tendency to reclassify various immigration- 
related offenses as explicitly criminal acts that come to be subject to or-
dinary imprisonment, only thereafter to be further supplemented with the 
redoubled punishment of detention and deportation (Hasselberg, 2016; 
Turnbull & Hasselberg, 2017) – a deliberate and vindictive conflation of anti- 
immigrant law making with criminal law that has been called ‘crimmigra-
tion’ (Kanstroom, 2004; Stumpf, 2006, 2010), prompting new avenues of crit-
ical inquiry into the concept of governing migration through crime (Chacón, 
2009; Dowling & Inda, 2013; cf. Bosworth & Guild, 2008). Nonetheless, in 
190 Nicholas De Genova
general, imprisonment may be understood to be fundamentally articulated 
to the putative freedoms and obligations of citizenship as such.
Yet, for non-citizens, detention – entailing confinement and frequently 
most if not the full panoply of other deprivations of basic liberties asso-
ciated with imprisonment – is a banal, commonplace form of punishment 
that is ordinarily purported to be not a punishment at all, operationalised 
as a more or less automatic repercussion pertaining to the mere juridical 
status of non-citizens, especially those deemed to be ‘irregular’ or ‘illegal.’ 
That is to say, migrant detention is commonly activated as a more or less 
mandatory reflex of the routine functioning of an immigration regime. No-
tably, there are of course various terms and conditions of migrant deten-
tion that are applied differentially across distinct nation-state regimes, and 
likewise distributed unevenly among non-citizens of various immigration 
statuses. Nonetheless, the bureaucratic rationality that coldly executes such 
severely punitive measures as ‘standard operating procedure,’ and the con-
sequently heartless disregard for their veritable cruelty for those whose lives 
are thereby derailed, convert a systemic evil into the simple and banal func-
tionality of a presumptively efficient governmental apparatus.3
The uses of time
Another chief difference between imprisonment and detention as forms 
of confinement and punishment revolves around their distinct modes for 
governing time. Perhaps the premier and most excruciating difference from 
prison commonly at stake in migrant detention is the deeply ambiguous 
and profoundly punitive dimension of temporal indeterminacy. As Pierre 
Bourdieu suggests, ‘Absolute power is the power … to place [other people] 
in total uncertainty’ (1997/2000: p. 228). The temporality – and, indeed, the 
specific predicament of waiting – that frequently accompanies migrant de-
tention have, above all, to do with such uncertainty (Golash-Boza, 2012; 
Hall, 2012; Fili, 2013; Griffiths, 2013, 2014; Campesi, 2015; Fischer, 2015; 
Hasselberg, 2016; Freedom of Movements Research Collective, 2018; Espos-
ito et al., 2019).
The temporality of imprisonment marks a striking contrast. In The Pu-
nitive Society, Michel Foucault remarkably examines the profound corre-
spondence of ‘the prison-form of penalty’ and the ‘the wage-form of labour’ 
(1972–1973/2015: p. 261) as ‘historically twin forms’ (p. 71), predicated upon 
‘the introduction of the quantity of time as measure, and not only as eco-
nomic measure … but also as moral measure’ (p. 83). Hence, Foucault con-
tends, ‘the introduction of time into the capitalist system of power and into 
the system of penalty’ signals that ‘the time of life’ is ‘exchanged against 
power’ (p. 72; emphasis in original). Here, we may appreciate the profound 
affinity between Foucault’s formulation and Marx’s analysis of labour – 
specifically, what Marx designates to be living labour – in terms of the sys-
tematic conversion of an ontological and trans-historical human creative 
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capacity and productive power to transform our material circumstances, 
as an existential vocation of human life, into estranged and alienated ‘la-
bour’ in its specifically commodified form (wage labour) within capitalist 
social relations (De Genova, 2010a, 2012). In short, like the homogenisation 
of living labour into something abstract and quantifiable and, more spe-
cifically, measurable by time (as ‘labour-time’) in Marx’s analysis of wage 
labour within capitalist relations of production, the prison-form of penalty 
presupposes a strict quantification of (life-)time – as measure – that is, in 
effect, exchanged according to an ostensibly rational calculus. Hence, the 
colloquial phrase ‘doing time’ – less a matter of truly ‘doing’ so much as be-
ing compelled to do, and hence, its synonymous expression ‘serving time’ – 
comes to name the conversion of the time of life into a kind of indentured 
servitude to the state, time coercively spent in the service of a punishment 
in prison. Indeed, these affiliations have a direct genealogy in the connec-
tions among the colonial-era transportation of convicts, convict labour 
and indentured servitude, wherein the deprivation of freedom associated 
with imprisonment has long been equated with a regime of unfree labour 
(Ekirch, 1987; Linebaugh, 1991; De Vito & Lichtenstein, 2013; cf. Smith, 1947).
Whereas the notion of ‘doing time’ in prison ordinarily has the character 
of a finite countdown, however, migrant detention deploys indeterminate 
waiting and temporal uncertainty as an end in itself, as punishment (if not 
outright torture). Time spent in detention is not an anticipatory waiting ori-
ented towards a projected future; rather, it is commonly experienced as a 
compulsory waiting with no definite horizon, and therefore it is time that can 
only be quantified retrospectively – often, resentfully or melancholically – 
once it is already past, commonly perceived to be irredeemably wasted and 
lost, or indeed, as Shahram Khosravi (2018) argues with regard to depor-
tation, ‘stolen.’ Whereas both prison and detention, to the extent that they 
involve enclosed confinement, are spatially bordered, imprisonment may 
also be understood to be generally bordered in temporal terms as well, with 
its delimited and relatively explicit stipulations of sentencing for penal con-
victions. In some contexts, migrant detention is also legally subject to strict 
time limits, encouraging non-citizen detainees to ‘wait it out’ as they hope 
that their prospective deportations may be deferred. Nonetheless, migrant 
detention usually entails the uncertain prospect of eventual deportation, 
while always coupled with the uncertain prospect of non-deportation and ei-
ther indefinite detention or eventual release, which itself is always shadowed 
by the prospect of subsequent apprehension and further detention. In this 
important respect, furthermore, migrant detention subjects non- citizens 
to a regime of surveillance that does not reach its conclusion following re-
lease from confinement but rather is projected indefinitely into the future, 
beyond actual detention. Consequently, for all of these reasons, detention 
frequently can be found to deliver detainable non-citizens into a quintessen-
tially Kafkaesque nightmare (cf. Welch, 2002; Bhartia, 2010; van Houtum, 
2010; Cohen, 2016). It is poignantly revealing that the 2016 protest slogan 
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of detainees living in Denmark’s deportation centres was Stop Killing Us 
Slowly! (Freedom of Movements Research Collective, 2018).
Waiting as disciplinary power
Once we take into account the uncertainties of outright detention, more-
over, we must likewise factor in the vagaries and vicissitudes of migrant 
 detainability – as the unpredictable susceptibility to detection, arrest and 
detention that is lived as a protracted socio-political condition in every-
day life (De Genova, 2017; cf. 2007). Detainability thus amplifies migrant 
deportability (De Genova, 2002, 2010a), and enhances how irregularised 
migrants and refugees’ predicaments come to be reconfigured as an endur-
ing socio-political condition akin to ‘doing hard time on planet earth.’ The 
emergent ethnographic literature depicting situations in which migrants 
and refugees find themselves stranded en route, temporarily but indefinitely 
stuck someplace along the way on their migratory itineraries, and often 
vulnerable to arrest and detention, provides ample evidence of merely one 
example of this predicament (Mountz et  al., 2002; Coutin, 2005; Collyer, 
2007, 2010; Dowd, 2008; Mountz, 2011; Bredeloup, 2012; Lecadet, 2013, 
2017; Tazzioli, 2013; Andersson, 2014; Garelli & Tazzioli, 2017; Osseiran, 
2017; Picozza, 2017; Stierl, 2017, 2019: pp. 61–92). Similarly, an emergent lit-
erature exposes how rejected asylum seekers and other illegalised migrants 
and refugees increasingly find themselves ‘legally stranded’ even in their 
chosen countries of destination because they remain ‘undeportable’ (Eller-
mann, 2008; Paoletti, 2010; Sigona, 2012; Fischer, 2013, 2015; Le Leerkes & 
Broeders, 2013; Campesi, 2015; Courant & Kobelinski, 2016; Hasselberg, 
2016; Freedom of Movements Research Collective, 2018; Fabini, 2019). The 
legal limbo of undeportability points to a punitive regime of detention that 
generates what Carolina Sanchez Boe has called ‘a “floating population” of 
foreign nationals [who] are subjected to a forced circular migration through 
prisons, detention centres, and public space’ (2017: p. 189). Something akin 
to ‘the carceral circle’ famously described by Foucault (1975/1979) thus 
comes more clearly into view: a repetitive cycle of rejection and detention, 
expulsion and capture, whereby immigration and border enforcement re-
gimes literally convert detainable persons into a new type of virtual ‘ref-
ugee’ whose genesis is strictly internal to the space of their rejection (cf. 
Picozza, 2017).
In other instances, detention camps provide a kind of intermittent solu-
tion for housing destitute migrants who alternate between temporary con-
finement and homelessness (Leerkes & Broeders, 2013; cf. Andersson, 2014: 
pp. 177–207). Life itself, under such conditions, more and more is made to 
resemble a kind of enduring entrapment and a protracted state of greater 
or lesser degrees of outright deprivation of liberty, even if one’s potential or 
actual confinement within an institutional space of capture and punishment 
(a detention camp) is only anticipated and approximated in an amorphous 
Detainability and disposability of life 193
way by a kind of containment in and through unresolved mobility. Such ex-
amples mark an adaptation in the regimes governing migration and refugee 
movements through the coercive prolongation of their mobilisation itself – as 
a mobility without remedy or relief (Garelli & Tazzioli, 2016; Spathopoulou, 
2016, 2019; Picozza, 2017; Tazzioli, 2018, 2019a, b). Referring to the Euro-
pean Union’s purportedly ‘emergency’ implementation of ‘reception’ cen-
tres, known as ‘hotspots,’ for the expedited processing and registration of 
newly arriving refugees and migrants at the height of the ‘crisis’ of European 
border control during 2015–2016, which were soon converted into detention 
camps (including closed prisons for unruly migrants), Aila Spathopoulou 
(2019) proposes the provocative concept of a ‘hotspotisation of the road.’ In 
this scenario, refugees and migrants in Greece found themselves subjected 
to and governed by the European asylum regime even in transit beyond 
the spatial confines of the official hotspots, trapped in the extended and 
expansive space of the border as they continued to move onward. In such 
examples, we note that the autonomy of migration – a freedom exercised in 
and through movement – nonetheless operates only within and against what 
Foucault (1976[2007]) memorably depicted as the ‘meshes of power’; it is not 
an abstract, essentialised or absolute autonomy but one that is necessarily 
limited, constricted, compromised, contradictory and tactical (De Genova 
et al., 2018: p. 243). It is in this respect that detainability and deportability 
operate as disciplinary forms of power in which the temporal indeterminacy 
of waiting for a punishment that may or may not ever come to pass serves to 
condition the scope of illegalised migrants’ subjectivity and imposes a grim 
horizon upon their relative freedom of action.
The coercive spatial dislocations of detention and the concomitant tem-
poral ruptures – waiting in detention, waiting for the authorities to deliver 
a decision on one’s asylum petition, waiting for deportation, waiting in 
fear of detection and arrest, waiting for anything certain in the protracted 
alienation of existential indeterminacy – frequently are indisputably pu-
nitive in character and commonly inflict profound torment on those who 
are subjected to detainability (e.g. Fischer, 2015). Yet, they cannot be un-
derstood to be purely and simply repressive mechanisms. Contrary to the 
exorbitantly sovereign image of ‘absolute power’ depicted by Bourdieu in 
the epigraph to this chapter, therefore, migrant detainability and indeter-
minate waiting (particularly in detention) serve to reconfigure discipli-
nary power (both in and through, as well as beyond detention) through 
the production of an amorphous social condition of temporal precarity. 
Of course, the manipulation of time and the production of protracted pre-
carity, more generally, are not confined exclusively to the experience of 
‘irregular’ migrants subject to detention and deportation (see, e.g. Schling, 
2019). Such tactics of precaritisation are an elementary feature of the crea-
tion and maintenance of migration as a reliable, eminently mobile, flexible 
and ultimately disposable source of labour-power (Golash-Boza, 2015; De 
Genova, 2018a).
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Such precaritisations of time tend to be productive, if for no other rea-
son than that the human persons subjected to them stubbornly persist in 
seeking ways to prevail in spite of them. In short, regimes of waiting and 
temporal indeterminacy capitalise on the autonomous subjectivities of the 
people whom they make their object. In other words, such regimes capitalise 
upon the elementary resistances of human subjects in their refusal to accept 
to be reduced to pure objects. As Frantz Fanon memorably remarks early 
in his essay ‘The Fact of Blackness’ – ‘I came into the world imbued with 
the will to find a meaning in things … and then I found that I was an object 
in the midst of other objects’ (1952[1967]: p. 109) – only by the end of that 
same essay to proclaim that he refuses to be mutilated and will not accept 
the socio-political amputation of his racial condition. Foucault analogously 
underscores the intrinsic and inextricable relation between objectification 
and subjectivity, between subjection and subjectivation, between domina-
tion and freedom:
Power relations are possible only insofar as the subjects are free.… 
Thus, in order for power relations to come into play, there must be at 
least a certain degree of freedom on both sides. … This means that in 
power relations there is necessarily the possibility of resistance because 
if there were no possibility of resistance (of violent resistance, flight, 
deception, strategies capable of reversing the situation), there would be 
no power relations at all. 
(1994: p. 292)
Elsewhere, Foucault remarks: 
At the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly provoking 
it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom. 
Rather than speaking of an essential freedom, it would be better to 
speak of … a permanent provocation
(1982: p. 790)
Thus, detainability is a disciplinary form of power precisely because its 
contribution to the subordination of migrant life as precarious labour is 
addressed to the constitutive role of that labour’s productive power and cre-
ative capacity, and hence its subjectivity, within and against capital – a sub-
jectivity that is always incorrigible (De Genova, 2010b).
By rendering all of life unstable and unpredictable for migrants sub-
jected to detention or the threat of detention, detainability refines and 
exacerbates the sheer disposability of migrant life and intensifies mi-
grants’ precarity. But to be rendered disposable is not the end of life but 
indeed a way of life – a life that comes to resemble ‘doin’ hard time on 
planet earth.’
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Notes
 1 Whereas deportability – the susceptibility to deportation – is indeed convention-
ally confined to non-citizens, detainability – the susceptibility to detention – is a 
condition that widely (and perhaps increasingly) also pertains to citizens. In the 
context of an escalation over recent years in exceptional police measures under 
the rubric of ‘security’ as well as securitarian law-making, the increasing use in 
many countries of detention (rather than incarceration), particularly as a pur-
portedly ‘preventative’ measure, confirms that detainability operates as a signif-
icantly more general mode of governance than deportability (De Genova, 2002, 
2010a). Thus, much of what I will argue with specific regard to migrant detention 
and detainability has considerably wider ramifications, and often pertains, albeit 
unevenly, not only to non-citizens but also to various categories of citizens. The 
unequal distribution of detention and detainability is a graduated and differen-
tial one that not only sorts and ranks according to the inequalities of citizenship 
status, therefore, but also class inequalities and racialised hierarchies associated 
with the ascriptive identities of minoritised communities, most notably, Muslim 
‘minorities,’ citizen and non-citizen alike, in the context of the so-called War on 
Terror (cf. De Genova, 2007; De Genova & Roy, 2020; Eckert, 2014).
 2 As is well known, Arendt invoked this notion with regard to the unsettling (and 
terrifying) ‘normal’-ness of the high-profile Nazi technocrat Adolf Eichmann, 
during his trial for war crimes, crimes against the Jewish people and crimes 
against humanity (1963/2006: p. 276). While Eichmann was widely considered to 
be directly implicated in the perpetration of a truly extraordinary evil, in other 
words, Arendt nevertheless discerned something profoundly important about 
how mundane that evil was when embodied in the non-descript personality of 
Eichmann.
 3 For a parallel exploration of the notion of ‘standard operating procedure’ in the 
normalisation of torture in the Abu Ghraib prison in the US-occupied Iraq, see 
Gourevitch and Morris (2008).
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1
As I write these words, the whole world is waiting. Life on a global scale 
seems to be suspended in uncertainty due to the coronavirus crisis in early 
Spring 2020. Nearly everywhere, from East Asia to the American West, peo-
ple are in self-isolation and/or imposed quarantine; everybody is waiting for 
‘normal’ life to return. A large part of humanity now consequently shares a 
sense of waiting, a state of agitation about the unknown future. Naturally, 
not all people wait in the same way and under the same conditions. Some 
people cannot afford quarantine, which means they have to stop working. 
The reports from different corners of the world testify that poor and mar-
ginalised groups die at a disproportionate rates as compared with death rates 
of the privileged. While the pandemic affects everyone, disregarding class 
or race, the consequences of the outbreak are diverse. Social vulnerabilities, 
poverty, degraded health, lack of health insurance, overcrowded housing, 
all these influence the outcome of the pandemic, which manifests differently 
for different social groups. Needless to mention, the suspension of ‘normal’ 
life due to the pandemic not only aggravates vulnerabilities that have ex-
isted already but also engenders new ones. Differential distribution of inse-
curity makes the pandemic a political issue. Destabilising the socio-political 
conditions of some part of the population makes bodies, and therefore lives, 
more vulnerable. The political and legal regulations that have resulted in an 
unequal distribution of risk and hope during the current pandemic emer-
gency are similar to the theme of this book.
While waiting is an inescapable part of life in modern societies, and we 
all, disregard class, gender or race, experience waiting in our daily lives – 
from waiting for a bus to waiting for a decision in contact with bureaucra-
cies, or waiting for transition into the next phases of life – the consequences 
of waiting are different depending on the forms of vulnerabilities of those 
who wait. Indeed, the empirical studies on which the chapters in this volume 
are based show that all of us wait, but we wait differently. The groups that 
are the focus of this book, asylum seekers, confined people either in mi-
grant detention centres or prisons, undocumented migrants, people stuck in 
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camps, all experience waiting differently from one who waits for her next job 
promotion or a waiting that constitutes love, as Roland Barthes (2002[1977]) 
put it. Waiting discussed in this book is a forced waiting, imposed by bor-
dering practices with consequences of destabilising of lives and bodies.
This kind of border waiting refers to the waiting time not only at the ac-
tual state borders but to all waiting times that non-citizens and racialised 
citizens are often pushed towards. The unceasing practices of bordering 
(which include, but are not limited to, the requirement to obtain various 
permits to leave, to arrive, to stay, to study, to work, to be with one’s beloved 
ones, etc.) lead to institutionalised delays. Thus, it becomes difficult to iden-
tify when exactly border waiting starts or ends. While in many studies the 
focus is on ‘when’ waiting seemingly ends (with resettlement, the granting of 
asylum status or deportation), less attention has been paid to when waiting 
starts. Migration is a process, which begins long before the actual movement 
from one country to another. If migration starts with desire (for a better life) 
or fear (of persecution), then who can determine when it starts? When does 
the search for the ‘normal life’ begin?
Vulnerable groups are exposed to multiple forms of waiting for differ-
ent things at the same time (Hage, 2018). In the context of migration and 
displacement, different objects of waiting and different types of waiting go 
parallel to each other and overlap one another. We can rarely single out 
one form of waiting from other ones. The answer a researcher usually gets 
when asking undocumented migrants or asylum seekers what she is waiting 
for is ‘I wait to start a normal life.’ However, in the context of migration 
and forced displacement, the normalcy is waiting itself. When does a mi-
grant’s narrative of waiting end? After arrival, after receiving asylum, after 
so-called integration, after family reunification, after naturalisation, after 
returning to the homeland? After deportation? When do they stop waiting, 
in other words, before a new waiting starts? For instance, in some cases de-
portation does not mean an end to the migration cycle, but rather, it is only 
another phase of recirculation, and consequently of further waiting. In a 
similar vein, for minorities who are persecuted in their country of birth, a 
prolonged waiting for a ‘normal life’ may start perhaps already in childhood.
Thus, what we see is a temporal and spatial stretching of waiting from 
pre-departure, and transit, to post-arrival and even post-deportation. As 
elaborated in the introduction, waiting is constituted in and through multi-
ple and relational temporalities. It means that waiting by migrants involves 
different geographies, other people and different phases of life. Thus, wait-
ing is never an individual action. The consequences of prolonged waiting 
affect not only the individual migrant but many people around her, who 
remain in a state of waiting for material and non-material remittances, or 
for reunification.
As several chapters in the book demonstrate, fluctuation between differ-
ent forms of waiting engenders a sense of being sent back in time, expressed 
in terms of being sent ‘back to square one’ (Khosravi, 2019), or ‘going in a 
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circle’ (see Jacobsen, this volume; see also Karlsen, this volume). A life in circu-
lation is a position of being constantly delayed in what is supposed to be a ‘nor-
mal life-course.’ This constant delay is linked to the ‘temporal violence’ (Musso, 
this volume; also Machinya’s chapter) individuals are exposed to, as issue which 
runs throughout all chapters in this book. The evidences throughout the book 
indicate a ‘stolen time’ (Khosravi, 2019), which leads migrants towards a sense 
of ‘inability to project themselves forward in time’ (Mbembe, 2013: p. 29).
However, in contrast to studies that approach border waiting in terms of 
emptiness, stillness and passivity, a life in circulation can be highly produc-
tive. It is productive in terms of control over labour force. Delaying migrants 
and keeping them in circulation is robbing them of their time. Border prac-
tices turn migrants’ time into waste time, and thus steals their labour. Keep-
ing people in prolonged waiting, constantly delaying them and repeatedly 
sending them ‘back to square one,’ generates a large amount of surplus time. 
One basic rationale for this temporal bordering (waiting, delaying and circu-
lating) is the belief that the time of these people is less worthy than the time 
of citizens. Employers regard the time of asylum seekers or undocumented 
migrants as worthless and therefore it can be extorted more cheaply.
Waiting is racialised. Some groups are kept waiting longer than other groups 
because their skin is darker. This secures racialised inequality. The socio-eco-
nomic disadvantages Somalis experience in Sweden compared with other 
groups, such as Bosnians, are partly due to the fact that they were exposed to 
longer waiting for residency permit and also for naturalisation than Bosnians 
(Behtoui & Olsson, 2013). Furthermore Somalis constituted the largest group 
in detention centres in Sweden in 2014. However, they were not among the first 
20 most-deported migrant groups that year. In other words, Somali migrants 
in Sweden were detained even though they were largely not deportable. The 
question, then, is how the seemingly meaningless detainment of this specific 
non-deportable Muslim and Black group can be justified. Temporal border-
ing is a way to secure inequalities between social groups. Keeping Somalis 
in longer waiting for residency permit or for naturalisation has resulted in 
reinforcing a racial hierarchy in the Swedish labour market, wherein Somali 
labour force is valued less and therefore exploited more easily.
2
As posed by Jacobsen and Karlsen in the introduction, the question is ‘are 
there specific migratory forms of waiting?’ While I totally agree with the 
arguments for the ‘de-migranticising’ (Dahinden, 2016) of migration stud-
ies, I think it is critical to expose the implication of bordering practices that 
lead to differential precarisation. So how to write to about waiting in the 
context of migration and not contribute to the image of migration as an 
exceptional experience (see Ramsay, 2019; Cabot, 2019)? Similarly, Rozakou 
in her chapter shares her concerns about how to avoid the risks of repli-
cating the logic of bordering practices in academic research. The concerns 
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raised by these scholars are highly crucial since presentation of the image 
of non-Europeans in waiting for authorisation, for visa or for resettlement 
from the former colonialising countries reproduces the condition of coloni-
ality. So how to write about the victimhood of bordered people, yet avoid 
reproducing the image of colonial relationships between powerful white 
people who assumed to be able to keep black and brown migrants wait? 
How to write about migrants’ suffering because of prolonged waiting with-
out reducing them merely to waiters who only wait for the helping hands of 
the Global North?
One way to avoid such potential pitfalls – sometimes also discussed 
here in terms of methodological nationalism (in the introduction; also in 
Drangsland’s chapter) as this relates to the experiences of border waiting – 
is to pay attention to how migrants conceptualise waiting in their own 
languages. The absence of interest in the non-European concepts among 
scholars in this field may be rooted in an approach that focuses entirely 
on the migrant-hood and interaction with the temporal borders. How are 
 experiences of waiting are formed by histories, religions and economies other 
than the Western ones? For instance, Persian-, Dari- and Arab- speaking 
people use two words for waiting – entezar and sabr. The former has conno-
tations of expectation and anticipation, waiting with hope, while the latter 
refers to the act of waiting and suffering, a form of endurance, and of being 
patient. The one who have sabr endures pain and suffering. This is similar to 
the word patience, which comes from the Latin word pati, which means ‘to 
suffer.’ Awareness of suffering caused by bordering practices produces new 
subjectivities. As Dostoevsky famously puts it – ‘suffering is the sole origin 
of consciousness’ (2014[1861]: p. 32). Suffering may indeed lead to perplexity, 
an emotional reaction to facing all hostilities during border waiting, but it 
may also raise significant political questions and demands for understand-
ing what has happened and why.
Hence, it is no accident that, etymologically, the origins of the word ‘wait’ 
indicate ‘to watch’ and to ‘be awake.’ Border waiting engenders wakefulness 
and vigilance. Waiting is being in a state of consciousness. The person in a 
state of waiting constantly thinks about her or his waiting. Border waiting 
means constantly updating oneself about legislations, new legal openings 
and conventions. It also means tirelessly collecting documents, finding new 
resources, updating networks and at the same time be watchful about one’s 
own deportability or the risk of missing a deadline. Wakefulness makes bor-
der waiting similar to insomnia, that is a compulsion to be vigilant and pay 
attention to what is happing around oneself. Similar to the one who waits, 
the insomniac thinks about the reasons for her insomnia and seeks salvage 
from it. This aspect of waiting is even more palpable in the French verb 
attendre, which means ‘to direct one’s mind toward.’ As also mentioned in 
the introduction, one of the main contributions of the book is the lending 
of an analytical lens through which we can explore waiting in irregular mi-
gration as a form of navigation through ‘an ever-shifting terrain of laws, 
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built environments, technologies and bodily materialities’ (Jacobsen and 
Karlsen, this volume). A waiting-towards the not-yet is attentive and oriented.
What keeps the person in prolonged waiting awake is not measuring the 
chronological time, chronos, but chasing moments of potential opening, kai-
ros. Approaching waiting as a state of wakeful navigation and vigilance here 
refers to the qualities of time, what Greeks called kairos, that is, critical mo-
ments when things can happen and openings for changes may ensue.
Lack of mobility in time and space associated with border waiting (usu-
ally expressed as ‘going nowhere in life’) does not mean lack of mobilisation. 
Navigation through the spatio-temporal contexts of waiting might create 
openings for new political orientations. Protests by migrants and refugees – 
from Moria camp in Lesbos in Greece (see Rozakou’s chapter) through Ka-
kuma refugee camp in Kenya (see Camminga’s chapter) and the occupation 
of the Saint-Ferréol Church in Marseille (see Musso’s chapter) to sit-in pro-
tests in main European cities – may thus trigger a subjectivity through the 
actions of politics. Border waiting is being in a state of wakefulness engaged 
with potentialities for a different future.
3
Machinya (this volume) writes that undocumented Zimbabwean migrants in 
South Africa who ‘have no time left’ and the risk of deportation becomes om-
nipresent live in a ‘borrowed time;’ they borrow time from the future. The fu-
ture is not a section of a linear timeline, which will come after the present, but 
rather is in a constant dialectical relation with the present. All struggles, strat-
egies and tactics, navigations and wakefulness of border waiting are animated 
through the constant interplay between the now and the not-yet. Waiting (the 
now) is not suspended time oriented through a temporal progression towards 
a future (end of waiting), but rather, the now and the not-yet constantly make 
and remake each other. Dialectical wakefulness between the now and the not-
yet generates hopeful visions and practices. Even in the form of daydreaming, 
these practices are agentive. Daydreaming, orienting oneself towards not-yet 
fulfilled promises, is pre-eminently a political act by which migrants claim 
their right to potentialities that make prospects for a better future possible.
Approaching border waiting this way, then, we can avoid the pitfall of re-
producing the coloniality of power. Migrants, refugees, blacks and browns 
are not waiting for a chance to belong but rather to participate. Unlike the 
concept of ‘belonging,’ which has connotation to possession (custody, con-
trol) and to the desire of an outsider waiting for permission to enter (to be 
accepted and tolerated), the will to participate is the opposite. It is not a 
request for benevolence. Rather the contrary, it is a refusal to ‘belong,’ that 
is, ‘to be the property of’ someone else.
Like acts of citizenship, border waiting is not a static condition but rather 
a process and a practice. Waiting as wakeful navigation through material 
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struggles in the present and ‘directing one’s mind toward’ the not-yet is a 
daily practice. Like the act of citizenship, the act of waiting, as it is expe-
rienced by precarious groups, is a constant struggle to have the right to 
participate. This struggle is perhaps what De Genova writes about in terms 
of ‘doin’ hard time on planet earth.’ Thus, for people who are exposed to 
bordering practices, there is no end to waiting but rather endless struggle to 
withstand and to demand the right to take part.
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